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Abstract 
The price of industrial progress is the potential for exposure of an increasingly informed public to 
chemical hazards in the environment. Of particular concern are acute exposures to chemical 
incidents, where problematic health risk assessments have highlighted the lack of expertise and 
resources available to support public health professionals in Wales responsible for protecting the 
health of populations. 
A systematic literature review of chemical incident databases, public health surveillance systems 
and major chemical incidents worldwide was used to guide the development of the first active, 
multi-agency community-based public health surveillance system for acute chemical incidents to be 
undertaken in Europe. A total of 642 acute chemical incidents were reported in Wales from all 
sources over a three year period. Of the 270 incidents reported by the primary source, chemical 
spills were the most frequently reported type of incident (28%) and operational industrial sites the 
most common location (25%). Of the estimated 238,000 people exposed, 528 reported symptoms 
in a total of 57 incidents. A single chemical was implicated in 86% of the incidents. 
Shortfalls were identified in the current expertise and resources available to public health 
professionals in Wales, leading to the development of a public health management model for acute 
chemical incidents. Model development took place in the context of United Kingdom - wide 
initiatives and involved the conduct of structured interviews with 41 organisations with interests in 
the field. The model selected for Wales was implemented on 1 February 1997 and comprised three 
levels of operation: (a) accountability for the protection of public health vested in health authorities 
at the local level; (b) a subscription-based front-line advisory and support unit to those authorities; 
(c) and a centrally funded national co-ordinating centre to provide the necessary evidence-base 
through programmes of surveillance, training, and emergency planning. 
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Chapter 1- Introduction 
The last fifty years have seen extraordinary advances in chemical technology throughout the world 
(United Nations Environment Programme 1992). The production of chemical substances has 
increased exponentially, as have their multifarious uses. More than 600 new chemical substances 
are believed to enter the marketplace each month (Lillibridge 1997), over 11 million are known and 
some 60,000 to 70,000 are in regular use (United Nations Environment Programme 1992). 
The contribution of the chemical industry to the development of human societies should not be 
underestimated (McQuaid 1989). Agricultural productivity has improved in both the industrialised 
world and in many developing countries through the evolvement of chemical fertilisers and 
pesticides. The clothing industry has become increasingly reliant on synthetic fibres in the 
manufacture of garments, and the introduction of plastics has revolutionised many sectors of the 
global economy. Chemicals provide fuels for transport and have been employed in many areas of 
the construction industry. They have also played a major role in maintaining human health, through 
the creation of new drugs and pharmaceuticals (United Nations Environment Programme 1992). 
However, countering this progress in industrial development is the fact that more people are now at 
risk of exposure to chemical hazards. With more substances being synthesised, rising production 
and ever expanding requirements for storage, handling, transport, use and disposal of chemicals, 
the potential for inadvertent chemical releases has increased, giving rise to greater risks to human 
health and the environment (McQuaid 1989). 
Once released into the environment, chemicals may appear as pollutants of air, food and water. 
Whether they cause harm to human health will be dependent on the toxicity and physical 
characteristics of the chemical(s) involved, the concentration, route and duration of exposure and 
the biological susceptibility of the host (Bertazzi 1989a; Meharg et al. 1997; World Health 
Organisation 1997). In this respect, children, the aged, pregnant women, and those weakened by 
disease may be more susceptible than the healthy adult (Baxter 1994). 
The timing of any adverse health effects after exposure may also vary (World Health Organisation 1997). 
Acute effects, such as bronchoconstriction and irritation of the skin and eyes, may appear within seconds. 
Hours or days later, sub-chronic effects may emerge, for example, delayed pulmonary oedema, but 
perhaps of most concern to the public and the scientific and medical community are the potential chronic 
effects on human health, such as cancers and congenital malformations (Haines 1993). It is also 
important not to forget that mental effects may also arise from real or perceived releases, for example, 
post-traumatic stress disorder, chronic anxiety and depression (World Health Organisation 1997), and 
that the environment may also be severely and extensively damaged (Meharg et at 1997). 
Any definition of a chemical incident must therefore attempt to embrace all of the above factors. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the definition used is that of the World Health Organisation (WHO): 
... an event or occurrence resulting 
in the release of a substance or substances hazardous to 
human health and / or the environment in the short or long term. Such events include fires, 
explosions, leakages or releases of toxic substances that can cause people illness, injury, 
disability or death. 
(World Health Organisation 1997) 
Chemical incidents range from common, small-scale releases to full scale disasters (Baxter 1994). 
However, the size of the problem of chemical incidents remains largely unknown (Bhopal Working 
Group 1987). Remarkably little formal documentation of chemical incidents has taken place in the 
United Kingdom (UK) and for that matter anywhere in the world. Whilst many anecdotal accounts 
of chemical incidents can be found in the literature, as well as commentaries in periodicals and 
newspapers, accurate statistics are seldom available on the actual numbers of incidents occurring 
within defined geographic areas, nor information on how well they have been managed (Binder 
1989; Baxter 1993; Hall et aL 1996). 
Occasionally, however, there are disasters. In 1974, a cyclohexane explosion at a petrochemical 
works at Flixborough in the UK killed 28 persons and injured a further 89 (Department of 
Employment 1975; Kirkwood 1997). Seveso is still regarded as the prototypal chemical disaster 
(Bertazzi 1991). The 1976 accident at a trichlorophenol plant near Milan, Italy caused the 
widespread contamination of several square kilometres of populated countryside with 2,3,7,8- 
tetrachlorodi-benzo-p-dioxin (Bertazzi 1989a). The accidental release in 1984 of methyl isocyanate 
gas from a pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, however ranks as the worst industrial disaster in history 
(Lillibridge 1997). There are still no reliable estimates of the total number dead (observers place it 
between 6,000 and 20,000) and injured (at least 15,000) (Bhopal Working Group 1987). 
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Fortunately, such disasters are uncommon, although it is an interesting statistic that between 1980 
and 1990,15 gas releases occurred in the United States (US), which exceeded Bhopal in terms of 
the quantity and toxicity of the chemicals released (Mukerjee 1995b). However, their very 
occurrence has led to significant changes in the way members of the public perceive exposure to 
chemical substances. 
Chemical hazards to health have achieved a high public profile (Vale 1994). The often sensational 
reporting of such disasters by the media has resulted in fear and sometimes panic in populations 
living close to chemical industries. They are frightening because they have the potential to cause 
large numbers of deaths and illness and raise questions about the fragilities of technologies over 
which society, and the local community in particular, have little or no control (Haines 1993). In the 
US, for example, the Bhopal disaster greatly stimulated local right-to-know movements. 
Communities demanded to know about chemicals and their health effects, in order that they could 
participate more effectively in decisions that might affect public health (Bhopal Working Group 1987). 
Governmental authorities in many countries now recognise that these concerns need to be faced, 
both to allay unnecessary fears and to take timely, cost effective action to protect human health and 
the environment, and to mitigate the deleterious effects of chemical incidents (McQuaid 1989; 
Haines 1994). 
The WHO, in it's Global Strategy for Health and Environment commented that: 
at no time before in history have there been so many environmental problems arising which 
may have an adverse effect on health and with which the health sector must contend, 
(World Health Organisation 1992a) 
and referring to the Report of the WHO Commission on Health and Environment (World Health 
Organisation 1992b), it stressed that: 
public health professionals should be at the forefront of moves to improve the environment. 
(World Health Organisation 1992a) 
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Chemical incident response actions for public health professionals include coordinating pre-hospital and 
in-hospital emergency procedures, ensuring access to toxicological information (Lillibridge 1997) and 
undertaking rapid and complete risk assessments, both of immediate and long-term health effects (World 
Health Organisation 1997). However, such risk assessments are never easy (Coggon 1995). Inherently 
subjective, they involve a combination of science and judgement, with psychological, social, cultural and 
political factors (Slovic 1997). They are also not assisted by the fact that industrial chemicals remain 
poorly understood (Lillibridge 1997). Of the 70,000 chemical substances in regular use in the world 
today, adequate toxicology exists for only 2 to 3 per cent (Mukedee, 1995b). 
The inevitable result is that a day or two after an incident, conclusions are drawn by the public and 
media that politically sensitive data is being withheld by incompetent authorities. The growing 
activism of workers and community groups around occupational and environmental health issues 
creates significant challenges and opportunities for the field of public health. Public health 
professionals often find themselves in an uneasy, even antagonistic, relationship with 
environmentalists and community activists who react critically to government's performance in 
investigating and controlling environmental health hazards (Bhopal Working Group 1987). 
There is therefore evidence of much public distrust in the individuals that are responsible for health 
risk assessment (Slavic 1997). The UK approach to managing chemical incidents is principally 
characterised by the partnership between a number of key players (Home Office 1990; Doig 1995). 
These include the chemical industry, emergency services, local government, and other agencies. 
However, responsibility for identifying health problems arising from acute chemical incidents and 
taking action to remove or mitigate them lies with two principal players, the Environmental Health 
Departments of local authorities and the Departments of Public Health of health authorities. The 
former represent the first contact point for members of the public, should they have any concerns 
regarding the environmental health risks presented by a chemical release, whilst the latter have 
specific responsibility for coordination of the health aspects of response to chemical incidents (NHS 
Executive 1993; Welsh Office 1993). This includes ensuring that: 
plans are made to respond to public health aspects of incidents relating to non- 
communicable environmental hazards. 
(NHS Executive 1993; Welsh Office 1993) 
4 
The ability of health authorities in the UK to cope with chemical incidents has however been 
questioned (Murray 1990; Baxter 1991; Thanabalasingham et al. 1991; Hill and O'Sullivan 1992). 
The level of preparedness of accident and emergency departments has been found to be variable 
with regard to training, the provision of protective clothing and the availability of facilities for 
decontaminating chemically contaminated casualties (Murray 1990; Cooke 1992; Hunter and 
Mannion 1992). The health professionals within those authorities, normally designated Consultants 
in Communicable Disease Control (CsCDC), have also been slow to appreciate the health 
considerations, and the need to work with local authority Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) and 
the professionals of other agencies in relation to issues of planning, preparedness, response and 
rehabilitation (Baxter 1991). 
This is not surprising given the lack of training that most CsCDC will have received in the 
toxicological, environmental, epidemiological and clinical aspects of chemical incident management 
(Hill and O'Sullivan 1992; Lillibridge 1997). Despite the existence of the National Poisons 
Information Service, and the establishment in 1991 of an independent health advisory group (Health 
Advisory Group on Chemical Contamination Incidents) by the UK Department of Health (Kennedy et 
al 1994), calls have also been made for the establishment of a national or regional advisory and 
support network for non-communicable environmental hazards (Baxter 1991; Hill and O'Sullivan 
1992; Ayres 1995). The corollary to this is the system already active in the UK for the management 
of communicable disease control (Palmer 1992). 
For communicable disease control in the UK, CsCDC and EHOs are generally familiar with well- 
established procedures for epidemiological evaluation, outbreak control, and population protection 
(Palmer 1992). A national laboratory network, the Public Health Laboratory Service (PHLS), also 
exists to support such professionals in tracing the cause of outbreaks, whilst the PHLS' own 
Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre monitors infectious diseases both nationally and 
internationally and employs epidemiologists to assist, when requested, with local investigations. 
The close collaboration between CsCDC, EHOs and the PHLS is tried and tested and works well. 
The situation, however, is very different where the same professionals are faced with a disease for 
which no infectious origin is clearly evident or with a potential exposure situation arising from the 
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occurrence of a chemical incident. There is no national or regional organisation that can provide a 
service similar to that of the PHLS. 
The aim of this thesis is to consider whether the establishment of such a national or regional 
organisation for acute chemical incidents is warranted in Wales and, if so, to develop a public health 
management model for its provision. 
Chapter 2- Methodology 
Introduction 
In this Chapter, the author will define the concepts and the theoretical framework underpinning the 
research to be undertaken. Any project relating to public health should take, as its starting point, a 
systematic effort to specify its current meaning. A complete conceptual development cannot, 
however, be limited to definitions and therefore a brief discussion is also included on the models 
that have guided public health. In that the author is developing a new model which, by its very 
nature, will need to be tested in the practical setting of an acute chemical incident, the underlying 
methodology has primarily focused on breaking down the barriers that may preclude the utilisation 
of the research in the decision-making process. The solutions to this potential problem are 
discussed and definitions provided of a 'model'. 
What is meant by public health? 
Frenk wrote of public health that: 
as a field of knowledge and as a social practice, public health has historically been one of 
the vital forces that have led to reflection on and collective action for health and well-being. 
(Frenk 1993) 
Over the years, public health has been defined in many ways, which when arranged 
chronologically, present a word picture of the evolution and development of the field (Curran et al. 
1983). Early definitions limited public health primarily to sanitary measures invoked against 
nuisances and health hazards outwith the control of individuals, and which, when present in one 
individual could be communicated to others (Hanlon 1974; Acheson 1998; Editorial 1991). The 
focus of the public health movement at this time (early to mid-nineteenth century), based on the 
activities of medical officers of health and sanitary inspectors, was improvements in housing and 
sanitation standards and the provision of bacteriologically safe water and food (Ashton and 
Seymour 1991). 
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The concept of prevention of disease in the individual was then added with the development of 
techniques for the application of the great immunological discoveries of the early twentieth century 
(Hanlon 1974). As early as 1920, a comprehensive conception of public health was emerging. In 
an article published in that year, Winslow stated that: 
Public health is the science and art of 
1. preventing disease 
2. prolonging life 
3. promoting health and efficiency through organised community effort for 
a) the sanitation of the environment; 
b) the control of communicable infections; 
c) the education of the individual in personal hygiene; 
d) the organisation of medical and nursing services for the early diagnosis 
and preventive treatment of disease, and, 
e) development of the social machinery to ensure everyone a standard of 
living adequate for the maintenance of health, 
so organising these benefits so as to enable every citizen to realise his birthright of health 
and longevity. 
(Winslow, as cited by Curran et aL 1983) 
From the 1930s onwards, however, there was a marked shift of power and resources from the 
public health movement to hospital-based services, culminating in the establishment of the National 
Health Service in 1948. The problem that was being recognised by governments of all political 
persuasions by the 1970s was that the demand for treatment services was limitless and that health 
care costs were rapidly spiralling out of control (Department of Health and Social Security 1976). 
A so-called 'new' public health movement therefore emerged at a time of re-evaluation of the effectiveness of 
therapeutic medicine. A principal protagonist in this debate was McKeown who stated that 
past improvements in health have been due mainly to modifications of behaviour and 
changes in the environment and it is to these same influences that we must look for further 
advance. 
(McKeown 1979) 
In support of McKeown's argument was the political attraction of health promotion, that is, making 
individuals responsible for their own health (Editorial 1991), and the emergence of a whole new set 
of diseases - those associated with inequalities in health (Townsend and Davidson 1982; 
Whitehead 1987), with industrialisation and industrial decline and environmental damage as well as 
the new infections of human immunodeficiency virus and increasing public concern over food 
poisoning and meningitis (McPherson et a!. 1998), none of which could be addressed by curative 
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medicine alone. International direction to the 'new' public health was also provided by the WHOs 
Health for All by the Year 2000 strategy (European Office of the World Health Organisation 1985), 
whose targets were adopted by many health and local authorities in the UK. Initiatives included the 
Healthy Cities Project in Liverpool, where the active participation of individuals and communities 
was sought in any decisions likely to affect their health, and in taking actions required to make them 
healthier (Ashton, Grey and Barnard 1986). Efforts were also made to encourage the development 
of healthy public policy across many areas, including health education in schools; healthy food 
options and smoke-free areas in restaurants; exercise promotion through town planning and leisure 
services; healthy work environments, and crime prevention (Ashton and Seymour 1991). 
It is therefore not surprising that when the first official inquiry into public health, since the 1871 
Report of the Royal Sanitary Commission, concluded its deliberations in 1988 that the definition of 
public health resembled very closely that of Winslow in 1920, that is: 
the science and art of preventing disease, prolonging life and promoting health through 
organised efforts of society. 
(Acheson 1988) 
Of the definition, Acheson stated that it gave: 
as much weight to the importance of lifestyle as to environmental hygiene in the 
preservation and promotion of health, and (left) no room for rivalry between preventive and 
curative medicine. 
(Acheson 1988) 
The US Institute of Medicine in its report on the "Future of Public Health", which was also published 
in 1988, provided an equally authoritative definition: 
public health is what we, as a society, do to assure the conditions for people to be healthy. 
(US Institute of Medicine 1988) 
In the 1990s, the pendulum has also swung back to the environmental approaches to public health 
which were so successful in the nineteenth century (Draper 1991). Draper in his book on "The 
greening of public health" states that: 
the core of public health action is avoiding or countering hazards in the environment, from 
the physical, chemical and biological to the socio-economic. 
(Draper 1991) 
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This new environmental public health, however, has a broader outlook, with the increasing 
recognition of the interdependence of ecosystems and health systems, which has fostered concepts 
such as "sustainable development", where improvements in health standards are only genuine 
when the resources used in their achievement can be renewed (Ashton 1991). 
Bringing the discussions up to date, 1997 witnessed the appointment of Britain's first minister of 
public health, a sign that the new Labour administration recognises that the health of the population 
depends on more than the provision of good healthcare services (Olsen 1997). With the 
government's stated commitment to public health, a likely catalyst to improving the population's 
health in the new millennium could well be the practice of "health impact assessment'. The subject 
of a recent report of the British Medical Association Board of Science and Education, health impact 
assessment provides a means of identifying, predicting and evaluating the likely positive and 
negative changes to health arising from any future policies, programmes or projects (British Medical 
Association 1997). This means those introduced by all government departments, not just the 
Department of Health. 
Conceptual Models in Public Health 
From the above discussion, it is evident that the essence of public health is that it adopts a 
perspective based on groups of people or populations. This contrasts with clinical medicine, which 
operates at an individual level, and biomedical research, which analyses the sub-individual level. 
This population perspective inspires the two facets of public health: as a field of inquiry - public 
health research - and as an arena for action - the practice of public health (Frenk 1993). 
Public Health Research 
To help visualise the role of public health within the more general field of health research, Frenk et 
al. developed the typology shown in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 Typology of Health Research, with Examples of Phenomena to be Studied 
LEVEL OF ANALYSIS OBJECT OF ANALYSIS 
Conditions Responses 
Individual and Subindividual Biomedical Research Clinical Research 
(Basic biological processes; structure (Efficacy of preventive, diagnostic, and 
and function of the human body; therapeutic procedures; natural history 
pathological mechanisms) of diseases) 
Population Epidemiological Research Health Systems Research 
(Frequency, distribution and (Effectiveness, quality, and costs of 
determinants of health needs) services; development and distribution 
of resources for care) 
Source: Frenk 1993 
For the objects of analysis, conditions were defined as: 
the biological, psychological and social processes that constitute the levels of health in a 
given individual or population 
and response as: 
the external response that society organises for improving health conditions. 
(Frenk et a!. 1988) 
The second dimension reflects the two different levels of analysis: individual and sub-individual, and 
population. Crossing these two dimensions are the three principal types of research that 
characterise the health field, namely: biomedical, clinical and public health, with the latter 
differentiated into epidemiological research and health systems research. A criticism aimed at this 
typology is that it identifies each level of analysis with a given discipline. The fact is that the 
biological sciences, for example, the toxicological analysis of environmental risks, may be just as 
essential to public health as the social sciences (Frenk 1993). Interdisciplinary integration is 
therefore an essential prerequisite to the concept of public health (Acheson 1988). 
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The Practice of Public Health 
As stated above, public health is also an arena for action. As Frenk states: 
... 
it addresses the systematic efforts to identify health needs and organise comprehensive 
services with a well-defined population base. 
(Frenk 1993) 
In this respect, the Acheson report provided a detailed account of the development of the public 
health function in England (which is equally applicable to Wales), and fashioned a role for the 
specialty of public health medicine at the forefront of health authorities' service planning (Acheson 
1988). Health authorities were required to ensure effective arrangements for control of infection, 
prevention of disease, and promotion of health, and to appoint a named leader of the public health 
function in their respective districts, to be called Directors of Public Health (DsPH). DSPH were, in 
turn, required to assess health needs and produce annual reports on the health of the population. 
The compelling need for greater collaboration between health authorities and local authorities was 
also highlighted in the Acheson report, with a specific recommendation that: 
the DPH and Chief Environmental Health Officer (CEHO) should meet on a regular basis 
and ... establish channels of communication which encourage collaboration. (Acheson 1988) 
Additionally, the important input of other non-medically qualified practitioners was recognised, for 
example, nurses, health promotion officers, statisticians, health economists and town and country 
planners. The complex guidance (Department of Health 1993) that was later issued on these 
relationships was, however, criticised as not having even started to break down the professional 
barriers to such collaboration (Harris and Shapiro 1994). Intersectoral collaboration is therefore 
another essential prerequisite to the concept of public health, the importance of which will become 
increasingly evident in subsequent chapters. 
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Models of Public Health 
Frenk, however, went further in his analysis of the new public health, by using the distinction 
between the afore-mentioned objects of analysis, that is, conditions and responses, to identify the 
principal conceptual models that have guided public health. The former are analysed from two 
main perspectives: health and disease, whilst responses are directed at different objects of 
intervention, namely the individual, including his or her immediate family surroundings, and the 
environment, which is subdivided into biological and physical components, and social components. 
Table 2.2 Main Conceptual Models on Public Health 
SOCIAL RESPONSE: CONDITIONS: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 
OBJECTS OF INTERVENTION Health Disease 
Individual/Family Hygienist/Preventative Model Biomedical Model 
Biophysical Environment Sanitarist Model 
Ecologist 
Classic Epidemiologic Model 
Social Environment 
Model 
Sociomedical Model Social Epidemiologic Model 
Source: Frenk 1993 
Crossing these two dimensions produces the typology of models shown in Table 2.2. The names 
given to the models correspond to the history of public health, much of which has already been 
described earlier in this Chapter. For example, the "hygienist/preventative" model was initially 
developed in the nineteenth century, when there was a movement to instruct the family in a series 
of behavioural rules that defined a "healthy life". This model was displaced by the "biomedical 
model", which brought the control of specific diseases to the centre of public health concerns, but 
eventually reappeared in programmes aimed at changing individual behaviours and lifestyles as 
the basis of the strategy of health promotion. Public health can therefore be characterised by a 
wealth of intellectual traditions, each implying a particular programme of development for 
acquisition of knowledge and for action. 
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Model Development in Practice 
As will be evident from the above discussion, models are constructed representations of aspects of 
our environment; they use concepts as the building blocks (Polft and Hungler 1993). As Treece and 
Treece state: 
model is a conceptual idea, formulated in the mind or on paper, that diagrams or explains a 
situation in real life. 
(Treece and Treece 1986) 
Although the terms are often used interchangeably (Bell 1993), models differ from theories in that 
they provide a visual or symbolic representation of a conceptual framework that, as Polfit and 
Hungler state: 
helps to express abstract ideas in a more readily understandable or precise form than the 
original conceptualisation. 
(Polit and Hungler 1993) 
Several types of models are referred to in the research literature (Treece and Treece 1986). 
However, for the purposes of the author's research, the concepts and phenomena under study will 
be presented as schematic models, that is, the concepts and linkages between them will be 
represented diagramatically through the use of boxes, arrows and other symbols. The perceived 
advantage of this approach is summarised by Polit and Hungler, who state that: 
schematic models can be useful in the research process in clarifying concepts and their 
associations, in enabling researchers to place a specific problem into an appropriate 
context, and in revealing areas of inquiry. 
(Polft and Hungler 1993) 
Most researchers tie their studies to an existing conceptual model or theory. The author's intention, 
however, is to knit together findings from a comprehensive literature review of previous research in 
the study area (Chapter 3), together with surveillance of acute chemical incidents (Chapter 5) and 
structured interviews of key personnel of UK organisations working in the field (Chapter 6), to form 
the basis for the development of his own conceptual model (Chapter 7), which will then be 
evaluated (Chapter 8) and appropriate conclusions drawn (Chapter 9). 
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Linking Research to Decision-Making 
In investigating both the terminology and conceptual models of public health, it has been 
demonstrated to be a deeply social as well as a scientific discipline, and because of the complex 
nature of its interests and responsibilities, a highly politicised one. Curran et al. state of its duties 
and responsibilities that: 
all ... are discharged in the pressure cooker of public life, which 
is constantly fuelled by a 
variety of often contentious power bases ... the political structure, news media, regulatory 
agencies, the scientific community, industry, special interest groups and the public at large. 
(Curran et at. 1983) 
Added to this is the fact that all actions and decisions must be made in the full view of any 
interested parties. 
It was therefore recognised, at an early stage, that the main barriers to the development of a public 
health management model for acute chemical incidents in Wales would be rooted in the different 
kinds of logic and demands that the author, as the researcher, and the "decision-makers" faced in 
their respective areas of activity. By "decision maker" is meant any person who makes a decision 
to determine a course of action in response to a given health problem, and might include Welsh 
Office policy makers, DsPH of health authorities and CEHOs of local authorities. 
To ensure that the research undertaken was relevant to decision-making, solutions were sought to 
overcome the potential barriers highlighted in Table 2.3. The first potential conflict relates to the 
definition of priorities. In this respect, the author was always conscious of the danger that the 
decision-makers might end up with a very different perception of the practical benefits of the 
research than himself, making implementation of the final model and its testing impossible. To 
surmount this barrier, every effort was therefore made to ensure the presence of decision-makers in 
the management of the research undertaken, so that they could express their needs and identify 
opportunities for themselves and their respective organisations. As Frenk rightly states: 
decision-makers must be "informed consumers" of research products. 
(Frenk 1993) 
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Table 2.3 Sources and Solutions of Possible Barriers between Researchers and 
Decision-Makers 
POTENTIAL BARRIERS BETWEEN MEANS OF OVERCOMING THE BARRIERS 
RESEARCHERS AND DECISION MAKERS 
1. Priorities - Education of "informed consumers" of 
research 
- Presence of decision makers in the 
governing or advisory bodies of research 
institutions 
2. Time management - Collaboration between researchers and 
decision makers since the planning stage of 
projects 
- Identification of intermediate products of 
research 
3. Language and accessibility of results - Executive summaries 
- "Translators" of research to policy 
- Joint seminars for discussing results 
4. Perceptions about the final product of - Explicit utilisation objectives together with 
research: discovery vs. decision production-of-knowledge objectives 
5. Integration of different findings on the - Meta-analysis 
same problem 
- Mission-oriented research 
Source: Frenk 1993 
The second barrier reflects the real differences between political timescales and scientific 
timescales, as will become increasingly evident in the later Chapters on model development and 
model selection. In general, time is one of the principal enemies of decision-makers. The author, 
however, was keen to allow for the full expression of the processes under study. This barrier was 
again overcome by an ongoing process of collaboration between the author and decision-makers, 
enabling negotiation and agreement on the time frames required for producing useful results. At 
all stages of the research, the author also offered intermediate products, such as progress reports, 
which were useful for decision-making, in advance of any of the component areas of the research 
being completed. 
Another set of important differences has to do with the language and accessibility of results. 
Whilst the results are presented in precise terms for the purposes of this thesis, the author has 
also sought to regularly translate the findings into recommendations for policy and action, in a 
language understandable to decision-makers. For example, for the surveillance (Chapter 5) and 
model development (Chapter 6) parts of the research, executive summaries have been produced 
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and joint seminars and meetings held where the author has discussed the results with various 
decision-makers. 
A fourth potential barrier is represented by the fact that for the decision-maker, research cannot be 
said to have come to a proper conclusion until it has influenced a decision. To overcome this 
barrier, in the initial formulation of the research proposals, objectives were also set for applying the 
results. In this way, the need for utilisation of the knowledge gained became a programmed phase 
of the research process. 
Finally, there is the problem of integrating the different results and information, so as to enable the 
decision-makers to assess all the dimensions of the same question and make a decision. As Frenk 
states: 
in applied fields (such as the management of acute chemical incidents), decision-makers 
face complex problems on which they demand comprehensive information, but scientific 
knowledge is provided to them in small parcels that are very difficult to aggregate. 
(Frenk 1993) 
For this reason, the methodology employed has been based on the philosophy of "mission-oriented 
research". The latter is based on integration along three dimensions: levels of analysis, objects of 
analysis and disciplines. The first two dimensions have already been considered (see Figure 2.1). 
Neither would, however, be possible but for the third dimension, that is, the integration of 
disciplines. This was seen from the outset to be the key to the development of the author's 
research: the interaction of public health research with biomedical research, clinical medicine, and 
the social sciences; and the interaction of public health doctors with environmental health officers, 
policy makers, toxicologists, epidemiologists, chemists, occupational hygienists, emergency 
planners, emergency responders and other professionals. 
The advantages of such a mission-oriented approach are that complete information on any problem 
can be assimilated quickly, because knowledge is integrated at the planning stage; the practical 
implications of the research can be identified and translated into action more readily; setting 
priorities and forming groups is easier, as is the financing of research; and, interinstitutional and 
multicentric collaborations become the norm (Frenk 1993). 
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Conclusion 
Through reviewing the development of the intellectual field of public health, a theoretical framework 
for the research has evolved. This is primarily based on the need identified to establish dynamic 
and creative linkages between the results of the research and public health decision-making in the 
field. The framework also provides a basis for the evaluation of the model developed. The bottom 
line is that the research would not have been possible had the results not been capable of being put 
into practice by public health professionals attending the scene of an acute chemical incident and or 
providing advice and support on the public health aspects of such incidents. 
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Chapter 3- Literature Review 
Introduction 
Chemical incidents are regarded as a major public health problem (Binder and Sanderson 1987; 
Lechat 1990; Lillibridge 1997). However, on what basis is such a statement made? This Chapter 
will therefore start by investigating the public health relevance of existing sources of data on 
chemical incidents worldwide, including special surveys and surveillance systems, in order to 
provide guidance for the development of a system for better defining the size of the problem of 
acute chemical incidents within the principality of Wales (Chapter 5). 
A review of the general literature on acute chemical incidents will then be presented to help 
ascertain the types of incidents and challenges facing public health professionals. It is not intended 
for this to be a practical guide to the public health aspects of response to acute chemical incidents, 
as there are already a number of excellent texts in the area, for example, the joint publication of the 
International Programme on Chemical Safety (IPCS), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) (OECD 1994). The lessons learned from the review will, however, 
provide a framework for analysis of the data gained from the surveillance system developed in 
Wales. 
Method 
A systematic literature search for published documentation on chemical incident databases, public 
health surveillance systems for acute chemical incidents, public health surveys of acute chemical 
incidents, and individual reports of acute chemical incidents was undertaken. The original intention 
was to cover world literature from 1945. In practice, however, the sources of information available 
were not sufficiently comprehensive and their coverage was mainly of work published in English 
since 1980. 
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Literature searches were made of library catalogues, bibliographies, abstract indexes, external on- 
line databases, scientific and news journals and worldwide web sites (Table 3.1). Personal contact 
was also made with a wide range of national and international bodies, the latter including IPCS, 
OECD, and the United States Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR). 
A small number of search terms were developed for identifying chemical incident databases, public 
health surveillance systems for acute chemical incidents and public health surveys of acute 
chemical incidents, as shown in Table 3.1. A public health surveillance system was distinguished 
from a public health survey, on the basis of the traditional definition of "surveillance", that is, the 
ongoing and systematic collection, analysis and interpretation of data on specific health events 
affecting a population, closely integrated with the timely dissemination of information to those 
responsible for prevention and control (Centers for Disease Control 1988). In contrast, public 
health surveys were considered to be one-off studies. 
The search for reports of acute chemical incidents was intentionally biased towards those giving rise to 
community exposures. Details of the criteria used in selecting incidents for inclusion in the review are 
provided in Table 3.2. The most difficult task was to translate the "criteria for inclusion" into search terms 
which were sufficiently tightly defined to identify acute chemical incidents, whilst at the same time 
producing a manageable number of entries. It was also recognised that a framework was needed for 
classifying the incident data, to obviate any criticisms of the conclusions drawn from any analyses 
undertaken (McQuaid 1989). A proforma was therefore developed for this purpose (Appendix 3.1). 
The report which provided the most complete information on an incident was selected as the 
primary source. However, checks were made on the consistency of information reported on 
incidents, where they appeared in more than one source. Where undertaken, the accuracy of 
information, for example, on deaths, injuries and evacuations, and on the chemicals involved was 
found to vary, confirming the findings of previous studies (Binder 1989). 
On selection of the primary source, the incident data was classified in accordance with the proforma 
developed, and entered into a Microsoft Access (v. 7) database to facilitate analysis. Information 
entered included the date, country, location and nature of the incident; details of the chemical(s) 
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released; and statistics on the public health consequences, in terms of deaths and injuries by 
population group, evacuation details, and the prevalence of epidemiological studies. 
Table 3.1 Sources of Literature Reviewed and Search Terms Used 
SEARCH TERMS for ON-L INE DATABASES 
First Word Second Word First Word Second Word 
Accident & Chemical Fire & Chemical 
Environmental Industrial 
Industrial Warehouse 
Toxic 
Hazardous Substances 
Transportation 
Incident & Chemical Explosion & BLEVE 
Environmental Chemical 
Industrial 
Toxic 
Hazardous Substances 
Transportation 
Disaster & Chemical Waste & Chemical 
Environmental Toxic 
Industrial Industrial 
Toxic Hazardous 
Hazardous Substances 
Transportation 
Pollution & Chemical Contamination & Chemical 
Environmental Water 
Industrial Food 
Water Soil 
Soil 
Marine 
Leak & Chemical Epidemiology (-ical) & Study (-ies) 
Toxic & Gas 
Gaseous 
Hazardous Substances 
Release & Chemical Surveillance & Chemical Incident 
Toxic & Gas Survey & Chemical Disaster 
Gaseous Database & Chemical Accident 
Hazardous Substances Epidemiological 
Public Health 
Hazardous Substances 
Spill & Chemical 
Oil 
Transportation 
Hazardous Substances 
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Excerpta Medica - Environmental Health 11987 -1997 I Effects of Pollution on Man 
and Pollution Control 
WASTE AND ENVIRONMENT TODAY 1 1991 -1 
- 1997 
Table 3.2 Search Parameters 
World 
aria for inclusion of "Acute Chemical Incidents" a) An uncontrolled, illegal or threatened release 
of a chemical substance(s); 
b) The release must have resulted in ill-health 
or had the potential to cause ill-health 
(defined by reference to deaths, injuries 
and/or evacuations); 
c) Members of the community must have been 
exposed or been at risk of exposure; 
d) The release must have necessitated the 
immediate mobilisation and organisation of 
the emergency services and other 
supporting organisations. 
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Results 
Chemical Incident Databases 
A total of 9 chemical incident databases were identified through the literature search (Table 3.3). Six 
of the databases had been established to meet explicit legislative requirements. Four of these were 
based in the United States (US) (Binder 1989; Wendt and Hall 1996) and one in Finland (Laitenan 
and Tech 1988). The remaining database of this type and the only one applicable to the UK was 
the Major Accident Reporting System (MARS), established under the provisions of European 
Community law, to receive notifications from member states of major chemical accidents occurring 
at specified industrial sites within their respective territories (Health and Safety Executive 1990; 
Kirchsteiger 1997). The other 3 databases had been set up for primarily commercial reasons. Both 
the Major Hazard Incident Data Service (MHIDAS) (AEA Technology 1994) and the Failure and 
Accidents Technical Information System (FACTS) (TNO 1992) collected information on chemical 
accidents on a global basis, drawing their information from a variety of sources, including the media. 
The Environmental Incident Database Service (EnviDAS) did likewise, but focusing only on 
environmental impacts (Meharg et al. 1997). 
On closer inspection, it is however clear that these databases, whilst holding information on many 
thousands of incidents, focus mainly on the causes and the immediate losses. They therefore 
serve primarily to guide risk assessment decisions in relation to major hazard planning and 
management (Tandon, Winder and Mifflin 1989; TNO 1992). All have limitations when it comes to 
quantifying health consequences in the post-incident phase (Binder 1989; Bertazzi 1989a; Hall et al. 
1996). For example, the accuracy of death and injury information is questionable, with little or no 
validation of the data. This makes analysis of any association between mortality and morbidity, and 
risk factors, such as location of incident, virtually impossible (Binder 1989). 
Additionally, only acute health effects are covered, despite concerns about the potential long-term 
health effects of chemical incidents and the psychological impact of releases and evacuations 
(Haines 1993; Hall et al. 1996; Mitchell 1996; Shaw, Windham, Leanoard and Neutra 1986); neither 
is information available on exposure levels (Meharg et al. 1997). 
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Given the well-recognised discrepancy between the number of incidents that actually occur and 
those that are recorded, such collections of data are also far from exhaustive (TNO 1992). In a 
review of three of the afore-mentioned US' systems, Binder reported the shortcomings of any single 
national reporting source when trying to assess both the number and effects of chemical incidents. 
Of the 587 incidents reported to these three national databases during the study period, only 8 
appeared in all three systems. This was attributed to the different areas of emphasis of each 
database and the failure to report by responsible parties (Binder 1989). 
In spite of these criticisms, many still consider such databases to be a useful tool with which to 
awaken people to the extent of the problem (Bertazzi 1989a). 
Public Health Surveillance Systems for Acute Chemical Incidents 
Only two current geographically defined surveillance systems were identified, both initially by 
personal communication. Two other systems were identified in the scientific literature, although 
neither were still operational. 
The first of the current systems was the Hazardous Substances Emergency Events Surveillance System 
(HSEESS), maintained by the US ATSDR (Binder and Bonzo 1989; Jones et al. 1993). Further to the 
shortcomings identified by Binder in her review of US chemical incident databases (see above), the US 
ATSDR decided to develop an active state-based system to better determine the public health 
consequences associated with hazardous substances releases. Implemented on 1 January 1990, the 
system had expanded its coverage to nine US states by 1992. Within each participating state, at least 
one full-time member of staff was employed to actively investigate all hazardous substances releases. 
Sources of information included the personnel and records of state environmental agencies, local 
emergency planning committees, fire and police departments, and hospitals. Incident reports were 
collected on standardised data collection forms, including information on the event, chemical(s) released, 
deaths, injuries and evacuations. On collection, the data was computerised using an ATSDR provided 
data entry system, and sent to the agency on a quarterly basis. Hazardous substances emergency 
events were defined as uncontrolled or illegal releases of substances or their hazardous by-products. 
Not included were events involving petroleum products exclusively. 
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Table 3.3 Chemical Incident Databases (Adapted from Meharg et a/. 1997) 
Major Hazard Incident Data MHIDAS UK Health and Safety International Compiled from literature 
Service Executive (HSE) and media reporting 
(AEA Technology 1994) 
Environmental Incident EnvIDAS UK HSE International Compiled from literature 
Database Service and media reporting 
(Meharg et al. 1997) 
Major Incident Reporting MARS Commission of the European European Events that are deemed 
System Communities to be major incidents 
under the Seveso 
(Kirchsteiger 1997) Directive 
Emergency Response ERNS US Environmental Protection US Reported by government 
Notification System Agency (EPA) agencies 
(Wendt and Hall 1996) 
Acute Hazardous Events AHE USEPA US Reported by government 
Database agencies 
(Binder 1989) 
Failure and Accidents FACTS TNO Environmental and International Compiled mainly from 
Technical Information System Energy Research literature, periodicals, 
newspapers, technical 
reports and other 
(TNO 1992) publications 
Hazardous Materials HMIS US Department of US Events that are deemed 
Information System Transportation (DOT) to be legally reportable by 
carriers 
(Binder 1989) 
National Response Center NRC US Coastguard Agency US Events that are deemed 
Database to be legally reportable by 
responsible parties 
(Binder 1989) 
Technical Inspection Centre Not Technical Inspection Centre, Finland Events that are deemed 
Database Applicable Finland to be legally reportable by 
responsible parties 
(Laitenen and Tech 1988) 
A later publication on HSEESS has revealed that a total of 3125 hazardous substances releases 
were reported from 1 January 1990 to 31 December 1992 (Hall et al. 1996). During 467 (15%) of 
these releases, 1446 people were injured. Most releases (77%) occurred at fixed facilities, and 
23% were transportation-related. The substances most frequently involved in releases with public 
health consequences were acids, ammonia, pesticides and volatile organic compounds. The 
HSEESS was particularly instructive in terms of the benefits of employing an active system of 
surveillance, and also in identifying factors to be considered in the design of appropriate data 
analysis routines. 
The second current system was based in Scotland (Forbes 1993). A national unit to support local 
health professionals in the investigation of environmental health issues had been established in 
1989 - the Environmental Health (Scotland) Unit. The "Environmental Health Incident Notification 
System" was a voluntary programme, with a broad aim: "to record all incidents, of whatever nature, 
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which adversely affect environmental health". The system was reliant on notifications of 
environmental incidents from all the various response organisations within Scotland. Following 
discussions with these organisations, the types of incident to be recorded were: 
those of an unusual, serious or difficult nature and those which were long-standing and 
unresolved. 
(Forbes 1993) 
Notification of an incident could either be made in writing or via the telephone, Information recorded 
included the name of the notifying organisation, the date, nature and other brief details of the 
incident, and any assistance required. On average, approximately 400 notifications per year were 
received, although no further breakdown was provided. A design feature emphasised by Forbes as 
being critical to the success of the programme was the need to: 
pass information back so that everyone can learn from the problems, errors or the 
investigations undertaken. 
(Forbes 1993) 
The two other systems identified by the review both involved the ongoing and systematic collection 
of incidents by fire brigades over periods of one year and six months respectively. The most 
comprehensive was that undertaken by the UK fire service in 1980 to determine the numbers and 
characteristics of dangerous chemical incidents handled by their employees (Maclean 1981). The 
system was based on a self-completion questionnaire, which all brigades were asked to complete 
for each chemical incident to which they were called during the period 1 January to 31 December 
1980. The system developed had many excellent design features, including piloting of the 
proposed questionnaire and three stages of data validation. Over the twelve month period, a total 
of 1158 incidents were reported, which equates to 3.3 chemical incidents per day in the UK. The 
most frequently reported incidents were chemical spillages (43%), leakages (22%) and fires (18%). 
However, a surprising finding for the researchers was that 16% of the incidents were identified as 
arising from chemicals being washed ashore around the coast. The incidents reported were further 
classified by time of year and day, chemicals involved, protection and decontamination issues and 
the numbers of casualties. Overall, a total of 5 fatal and 681 non-fatal casualties were recorded in 
173 (15%) incidents. However, only 4% of the incidents resulted in casualties which were 
sufficiently serious to warrant treatment. 
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The second fire service system involved a six-month surveillance study of chemical incidents 
handled by brigades in Australia (Winder et at 1992). The system identified 523 incidents, most 
commonly spillages and leakages. 
Public Health Surveys of Chemical Incidents 
Two surveys were identified by the review, one in the scientific literature, the other through personal 
communication with the authors concerned. The former was a report of research undertaken into 
the frequency and causes of evacuations associated with chemical accidents from 1980 through 
1984 (Sorensen 1987). The primary source of data was national, regional and state wire service 
coverage of accidents in the United States. Using an automated search of a commercial database 
of newspapers and periodical publications, 300 accounts of evacuations were identified. The 
evacuations ranged in size from two households to 30,000 people, mainly originated at fixed 
facilities or following train derailments and resulted in 2051 injuries and one death. However, 
concerns were expressed in the report regarding the accuracy of the data contained within 
newspaper coverage of chemical accidents. 
The second survey identified will be presented in Chapter 4, as its broader findings are used to set 
the context for the development of a surveillance system for acute chemical incidents in Wales 
(Chapter 5). 
Reports of Acute Chemical Incidents - General 
Sources of Incident Reports 
A total of 493 reports were obtained, covering 369 incidents. The most productive source of information 
on incidents was HSELINE (34%), followed by the hand search of key journals (21%) and the review of 
European Reports (14%) (Figure 3.1). Seventy-five per cent of incidents were identified from a single 
source, suggesting little overlap in the reporting of specific incidents by the various sources used. For 
example, of the 206 reports identified through on-line searching of MEDLINE, TOXLINE and HSELINE for 
the period 1981 - 1997, only 9 incidents were common to all three systems (Figure 3,2). 
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The latter finding may be explained by the differences in source materials for the three databases. 
Incident reports identified within HSELINE were mainly drawn from news journals. In contrast, 
scientific peer-reviewed journals provided much of the source materials on incidents within 
MEDLINE and TOXLINE (Figure 3.3). For the 369 incidents identified by the review, only 81 (22%) 
were published in scientific peer-reviewed journals. The most common sources of information on 
incidents were the anecdotal accounts of news journals (45%), followed by summaries of incidents 
provided within published reports (23%). The quality of information contained within most reports 
was therefore questionable and, for this reason, the following analysis of incidents must be 
interpreted with caution. 
Figure 3.1 Sources of identification of 493 reports of chemical incidents 
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Figure 3.2 Distribution of 206 chemical incident reports, by on-line database 1981 -1997 
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Country of Incident Location 
Of the 50 countries in which incidents were recorded, the United States (N = 100) and the United 
Kingdom (N = 84) were the most commonly involved, followed by France (N = 16), Spain (N = 15), 
Portugal (N = 12), The Netherlands (N = 10) and Japan (N = 10). The differences in frequency of 
occurrence, however, does not necessarily mean that incidents are relatively more common in 
these countries, but is more likely to reflect the availability of information and the more complete 
reporting of incidents (Bertazzi 1989a). 
Location of Incidents 
Sixty-three per cent of the incidents occurred at fixed facilities and 31 % were transportation related 
(Table 3.4). The locations of the fixed facility incidents were as follows: chemical plants (72%), 
chemical storage plants (11%), commercial premises (7%), farms (5%), waste disposal sites (2%) 
and water treatment works (3%). Of the transportation incidents, 41 % involved transport by rail and 
32% occurred on the highway. The remainder involved transport at sea (18%) or by pipeline (9%). 
Table 3.4 Classification of 369 chemical incidents according to location 
Cause Fixed facilities Transportation-related Other 
Number (Percentage) 233(63%) 113 (31%) 23 (6%) 
Nature of Incidents and Chemicals Involved 
The most frequently reported types of incident were explosions (27%), airborne releases (22%), 
chemical spills (20%) and fires (15%). The remainder included food (6%) and water contamination 
incidents (4%) (Figure 3.4). Seventy-three per cent of explosions and 59% of airborne releases 
originated at chemical plants (Figure 3.5). Likewise, such plants provided the most frequent location 
for fires (46%). Fires also accounted for 72% of all incidents occurring at chemical storage plants. 
Chemical spills arose mainly as a result of transportation-related incidents, both on the highway 
(29%) and the railroad (30%). Seventy-eight per cent of incidents involved the release of a single 
chemical (Table 3,5). A total of 197 different chemicals were released in the incidents recorded. 
Those chemicals most frequently involved were acids, pesticides, chlorine and ammonia. 
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Figure 3.4 Distribution of 369 chemical incidents, by nature of incident 
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Table 3.5 Distribution of the number of chemicals released in all 369 incidents 
INCIDENTS RY 
NUMBER OF CHEMICALS 
RELEASED 
NUMBER OF 
INCIDENTS 
(%) NUMBER OF 
CHEMICALS 
(%) 
I 286 77.5% 286 
2 41 11.1% 82 16.7% 
3 17 4.6% 51 10,4% 
4 8 2.2% 32 6.5% 
5 5 1.4% 25 5,1% 
6 or more 2 0.5% 14 2.9% 
Not Stated 10 2.7% 0 0% 
TOTAL 369 100% 490 100% 
Public Health Impact 
Mortality data was available for 361 of the incidents. A total of 14,175 people died in 110 incidents. 
The large number of deaths is, however, somewhat misleading, as only 16 incidents were 
responsible for 92% of the fatalities. The incidents included Bhopal, 1984 (2,500 dead - lower 
estimate), Mexico City, 1984 (542 dead) and Toxic Oil Syndrome, Madrid, 1981 (340 dead - lower 
estimate). Of those who died, 368 were employees, only 18 were responders and 13,789 were 
members of the public. Table 3.6 provides a breakdown of the numbers of deaths by population group. 
A total of 203,725 people were injured in the 294 incidents for which information was available. No 
injuries were reported in 72 (19.5%) of the incidents. Table 3.7 shows the distribution of the numbers of 
people injured by location of incident. More people were injured pursuant to incidents at fixed facilities 
(85%) than as a result of transportation-related releases (1 5%). In 63 incidents, more than 100 people 
were injured. Airborne releases (30%), food contamination incidents (20.5%), explosions (17.5%) and 
fires (11 %) were the most commonly reported types of such incidents (Table 3.8). 
Table 3.6 Distribution of the number of deaths, by population group 
EMPLOYE ES RESPONDERS PUBLIC ALL INCIDENTS 
NO. OF 
DEATHS 
NO. OF 
INCIDENTS 
(%) NO. OF 
INCIDENTS 
(%) NO. OF 
INCIDENTS 
(%) NO. OF 
INCIDENTS 
(%) 
0 299 81% 350 94.5% 313 85% 251 68% 
1 20 5.5% 3 1% 7 2% 27 7.5% 
2-4 20 5.5% 3 1% 3 1% 26 7% 
5-9 8 2% 1 0% 9 2.5% 18 5% 
10 - 49 8 2% 0 0% 8 2% 
16 4% 
50 - 99 2 
0.5% 0 0% 1 0% 3 jo 
100 > 0 0% 0 0% 16 4% 16 4% 
TOTAL 369 100% 369 100% 369 100% 369 100% 
32 
Table 3.7 Distribution of the number of injured, by location of incident 
NUMBER OF 
INJURED 
FIXED FACILITY TRANSPORTATION ALL INCIDENTS 
No. of 
Incidents 
% No. of 
Injured 
No. of 
Incidents 
% No. of 
Injured 
No. of 
Incidents 
% No. of 
Injured 
Y0.. _ 29` 11%. ti; t,,. 0 43 X39%:. 0 72 ". ý` z: 19,5 ý. _.., 0_ .ý 
1 8 3% 8 7 6.5% 1 15 4% 15 
2-4 13 5% 35 7 6.5 20 20 5.5% 55 
5-9 26 10% 186 2 1.5% 12 28 8% 198 
10 - 49 56, 22% 1289 . 14 12.5% 289 70 19% 1578 = 
50 - 99 22 8.5% 1522 4 3.5% 275 26 7% 1797 
100 > 49-' 19% 169901 " 14 12.5% 30181 63 17% 20008 K 
Not Stated 55 21.5% 0 20 18% 0 75 20% 0 
TOTAL 258 100% 172941 111 100% 30788 369 100% 20372 
, 
Table 3.8 Classification of chemical incidents causing more than 100 injuries, by 
nature of incident (N = 63) 
NATURE OF INCIDENTS ALL INCIDENTS µl r>r. 
No. of Incidents (%) No. of Injured 
Airborne Release 19 30% 121129 
Chemical Spill 5 8% 1832 
Fire 7 11% 4297 
Explosion 11 17.5% 8414 
Food Contamination 13 20.5% 41273 
Water Contamination 3 5% 21094 
Other 5 8% '" 2043 
TOTAL 63 100% -200082 
For fixed facility incidents, the population group most often injured were members of the public, 
followed by employees and responders, whereas for transportation-related incidents, more 
responders than employees were injured. The latter finding is not surprising given the likely 
attendance levels of responders, compared with employees. As has been cited elsewhere, it does 
however suggest that such individuals may need additional training and protective equipment 
(Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 1994; Hall et al. 1996). 
Evacuations were ordered in 119 of the incidents. However, information on the numbers of people 
evacuated was only available for 68 (57%) of the incidents. The median number of people 
evacuated was 2,500, with a range of from 4 to 250,000. In 47 incidents, in-place sheltering was 
ordered. 
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Reports of Acute Chemical Incidents - Specific 
Explosions 
Ninety-nine (27% of the total) explosions were identified by the review (Table 3.9). In fifty-five, the 
explosions were followed by fires and in 7, by airborne releases. The remainder (N = 37) were 
reported purely as explosions. Chemical plants (N = 72) were the most frequently reported 
locations for explosions (Figure 3.6). Six explosions occurred during the transportation of 
chemicals by pipeline, accounting for 60% of all pipeline incidents. Information on the chemicals 
involved was available for all but 10 of the explosions. A single chemical was implicated in 68 of the 
incidents. Not surprisingly, liquefied gases figured highly in the chemicals listed. 
The potential impact of explosions on human health is well illustrated by the fact that 59% of the 
incidents resulted in deaths, a figure far higher than for any other type of incident included within the 
review. Not surprisingly, the population group most affected were employees, with a cumulative 
total of 311. deaths reported in 42 incidents (no information was available for a further 4 incidents). 
In spite of the fact that only eleven incidents were recorded where members of the public were 
killed, the average number of deaths per incident was 213, with a range of 1 to 575. Seventeen 
responders were also killed in a total of 6 incidents. 
A similar picture emerged in relation to the numbers of people injured. People were reported injured 
in 63 (80%) of the 79 incidents for which information was available. Again, the population group 
most affected were employees (41 incidents; 748 injured), followed by members of the public (16 
incidents; 7974 injured) and responders (7 incidents; 73 injured). 
Unfortunately, information on the necessity for population evacuation was lacking in relation to 38 of 
the incidents. Of those 61 explosions for which information was available, evacuation was advised 
in 35 (57%) cases. In-place sheltering was also recommended in 7 incidents. 
34 
Table 3.9 Une-listing of 99 explosions identified by the literature review 
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Special Features M Erp! csions 
Explosions are characterised by a shock-wave. Heard as a bang, explosions cause damage to bum, 
break windows and can eject objects over distances of several hundreds of metres. Injuries and damage 
are initially caused by the shock-wave of the explosion, the effects of which will be dependent on the 
characteristics and quantities of the chemical(s) involved and the degree of confinement of the vapour 
ckwd. Loss of life generaly ours at pressures above 10 kilopascals (kPa). Putting this into context the 
explosion of a tank containing 50 tonnes of propane would moult in a pressure of 14kPa at 250 metres 
(International Labour Organisation 1988). 
Figure 3.6 Distribution of 99 explosions, by location of Incident 
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Boiling"Liquid Expending-Vapour Explosions (BLEVEs) 
As stated earbeº. M is often difficult to make a distinction between an explosion and a fire (International 
Labour Organisation 1988). A 9LEVE is a combination of explosion and fire. The phenomenon occurs 
when a vessel, within which a iquef$sd gas is kept above its atmospheric boiling point, fails as a result of A 
being punctured or its structure weakened by. for example, a fire impinging on its surface. The contents, 
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which are Instantaneously released, mix with air to form an explosive vapour cloud. On Ignition, a afire. 
ball* is quickly formed. Besides the direct bums caused within the Immediate vicinity of the 'fire-bar, the 
radiant heat Is sufficient to cause severe skin bums and deaths up to 300 metres from the flames 
(Arturson 1981). The vessel involved In the BLEVE also becomes a dangerous projectile. At San 
Juanico (see below), a 45 m3 tank flew 1200 metres (Arturson 1981). 
The effects of BLEVEs are unfortunately all too well known. In 1974, ignition of a cloud of 
cyciohexane over a petrochemical works at Flixborough in the United Kingdom started a fire In 
which 28 people were killed and 89 were Injured (Department of Employment 1975; Kirkwood 
1997). On 11 July 1978, a road tanker carrying liquefied propane ran into a ditch outside the Los 
Alf aquas camp site on the east coast of Spain. The tank split and the resulting BLEVE killed 102 
Instantaneously, and a further 119 of 140 who were removed from the scene suffering from severe 
bums (Arturson 1981). The worst disaster of its kind, however, occurred on 19 November 1984 at 
a large liquefied petroleum gas storage and distribution depot In San Juan Ixhuatepec. 20 km north 
of Mexico City (Arturson 1987). Following a fire at the depot, thirteen explosions, some of the 
BLEVE type, occurred, resulting in severe damage to a total area of approximately 100,000 square 
metres. 550 people died, 7000 needed medical help and 60,000 were evacuated. Further 
examples are provided In Table 3.9. 
Fires 
Because many manufacturing processes k wow petroleum products, fires are common occuriences. Fdty- 
six (15°6 d the total) incidents of fires involving chemicals were Identified by the review (Table 3.10). Forty- 
four were reported purely as fires, and 12 as fires followed by explosions. Chemical plants (N = 26) and 
chemical storage plants (N " 18) were the most commonly reported locations for fires (Figure 3.7). A small 
number were also related to the transportation cl hazardous chemicals by rail (N " 7). 
Special Features of Chemical Fires 
The problems faced by public health professionals when assessing the potential health effects 
arising from fires include: (a) Identification and quantification of the combustion products of 
3$ 
potentially large numbers of different chemicals; (b) evaluation of the likely dispersion patterns of 
combustion products; (c) identification of toxic substances in fire-fighting waters; and, (d) the likely 
effects of fire-fighting water migration on the operation of sewage treatment plants, potable water 
supplies and recreational waters. 
Smoke Toxins 
For 51 of the fires identified through the review, information was available on the source chemicals 
involved. Interestingly, a single chemical was implicated in only 25 (49%) of the fires, which 
compares with a percentage figure of 78% for all incidents. This Is not a surprising finding, when 
one considers that many fires arise due to the incompatible storage of 2 or more chemicals. For 
example, the fire at Alloid Colloids, Bradford (July 1992), was caused by the Incorrect storage of 
drums of a flammable solid (azodiisobutyronitrile) and an oxidising agent (persulphates) (Anon 
1992a). 
As stated above. however, it is not just the original chemicals Involved In a fire with which public 
health professionals should be concerned, but also the health effects that may arise from exposure 
to the so-called 'smoke toxins' generated as a result of the fire, for example, nitrous oxides from 
fires Involving ammonium nitrate (International Labour Office 1988). Unfortunately, the 
combinations and reactions of the different chemicals and substances that may be Involved in a fire 
are poorly understood (Christiansen, Kakko and Koivisto 1993; Atkinson and Jagger 1994). Such 
information is also difficult to obtain, as numerous compounds can be produced. and the means for 
collecting air samples is often not readily available (Baxter, Heap, Rowland and Murray 1995). For 
polyvinyl chloride, research has shown that some 75 different combustion products may be evolved 
(Markowitz at at 1989). Decision-making based on a hazards and risk assessment approach is 
therefore likely to be hampered, in the case of fires. 
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Table 3.10 Line-listing of 56 chemical fires identified by the literature review 
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The lack of available information on products of combustion accounts for the fact that most fire 
casualties are attributable to the effects of toxic gases, as opposed to bums (Bowes 1976; Terrill, 
Montgomery and Reinhardt 1978; Markowitz et a!. 1989). with severity inversely proportional to the 
square of the distance from the source (International Labour Office 1988; Lillibridge 1997). 
Fortuitously, only 7 of the incidents resulted in deaths, mainly of limited numbers of employees. 
The exception was the fire and explosion which occurred in 1947 in Texas City, where fire broke out 
on a ship carrying ammonium nitrate fertiliser, resulting in an explosion which instantaneously killed 
576 members of the general public (Quarentelli 1991; Robertson 1995). 
Figure 3.7 Distribution of 56 chemical fires, by location of incident 
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Wtnhr. r., (. t the ; ",; f 1c ýti, "rr r rold ýn 17 incidents, and employees in 9 incidents. The population 
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group most frequently injured, however, were emergency responders. A cumulative total of 553 
fire-fighters and 22 police officers were injured in 18 incidents. highlighting the risks faced by such 
workers. A good example Is provided by a major fire, which occurred at a site used for the storage 
of ground scrap plastic, at Thetford, United Kingdom in 1991 (Baxter of al. 1995). Forty-six of the 
53 casualties were emergency personnel who had inadvertently received exposure to the fire 
smoke. Although the symptoms resolved within 48 hours, concerns were also expressed over the 
potential long term health effects. 
Plume Dispersion 
The rates and mechanisms of dispersion of the products of combustion are also critical to the 
prediction of health impact, and in guiding evacuation policy. In this latter respect. population 
evacuation was advised in a high percentage - 57% - of the 44 fires for which information was 
available. In 13 incidents. In-place sheltering was also recommended. 
It Is Important to recognise that plumes may be convected away from population areas by the 
Intense heat of a fire, but nevertheless still pose a health hazard from particle fallout Altenrat vely. 
they may expand by diffusion or be driven to ground level by cooling, wind, or thermal Inversions 
(Baxter at al. 1995). The former was the case in Kuwait after the Gulf War, where high 
concentrations of elemental carbon, metal oxides, silicates, vanadium, nickel, and potycyclic 
aromatic hydrocarbons were all determined in the particle fallout resulting from plumes arising from 
oil fires (Al. Shatti 1992). In contrast, the plume from the Sandoz chemical warehouse fire, which 
occurred at Basel, Switzerland In November 1986, fumigated parts of the city at night. potentially 
exposing thousands of people to an unknown mixture of chemical combustion and reaction 
products (Ackermann-Liebrich 1992). 
Fire-Fighting Waters 
Modem chemical plants and storage facilities are designed to have adequate bunding to prevent 
spillages and leakages entering watercourses. However, it is much more difficult to protect the 
environment from the consequences of fire incidents (Meharg et al. 1997). This is because the 
quantities of water used in fire-fighting overwhelm most spillage containment systems (if present). 
For example, some four million gallons of water were used for extinguishing and cooling in relation 
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to the fire at Alloid Colloids, Bradford in July 1992 (Amass 1994). The result was a significant 
quantity of polluting material being released off-site into the local river system. The issues for public 
health professionals. in such circumstances, relate primarily to the potential pollution impact sites 
downstream of the release. for example, fish farms and shellfish beds, potable water abstractions 
points and recreational waters. 
In response to this and similar experiences at other incidents, guidance was issued by the UK 
Health and Safety Executive in 1995 setting out measures to be taken by industry to prevent 
pollution of watercourses by contaminated fire-fighting waters (Health and Safety Executive 1995). 
The guidance also suggested that there may be cases where it would be more appropriate to allow 
chemical fires to bum out under control in order to avert a major water pollution incident. Such 
circumstances were to be considered as part of contingency planning. 
Airborne Releases 
There are large numbers of chemicals which. If released, have the potential to disperse with the wind and 
kill or injure people living many hundreds of metres away from the original site of an tnckieht. Table 3.11 
provides details of the 82 incidents of airborne releases (22% of the total) which were identified by the 
review. AN but four were reported purely as airborne releases. The most frequently reported locations of 
such Incidents were chemical plants (N " 48) (Figure 3.8). Only seventeen incidents were transportation- 
related, 10 Involving transport by rail, 4 occurring on the highway and 3 happening at sea. The category 
"other* includes acts of chemical terrorism (N " 2) and natural disasters (N = 3), both of which are 
covered in subsequent sections of the literature review. 
Information on the chemicals involved was available for all 82 Incidents. Seventy-two resulted In the 
release of a single chemical. Those most frequently expelled were chlorine (N . 17) and ammonia 
(N " 8), which Is not surprising given the fact that both have been produced and used in large 
quantities since the beginning of the century (Advisory Committee on Major Hazards 1979). 
The immediate effects of population exposures to toxic releases of chemicals may be bums injuries, 
acute chemical toxicity. acute respiratory and conjunctival irritation, or the sight and smell of smoke and 
fumes inducing fear in populations (Mayon-White 1997). Provided the acute episode is 
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survived without neurological sequelae. complete recovery usually occurs. However, exposure to irritant 
gases may occasionally result in the longer term respiratory illnesses bronchiolitis, reactive airways 
dysfunction syndrome and pulmonary fibrosis (Watt, Watt and Seaton. 1997). 
Table 3.11 line-listing of 82 airborne releases identified by the literature review 
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Twenty of the 80 incidents for which information was available resulted in deaths. Chlorine (N = 4) 
and ammonia (N " 3) were again frequently involved. Other chemicals included hydrogen and 
45 
potassium cyanide, hydrogen sulphide and the most infamous of all, methyl isocyanate. However, it 
is difficult to present accurate figures on the numbers of deaths and injuries, as for many of the 
incidents, for example. Bhopal, there remain no definitive statistics (Mukerjee, 1995a). 
Figure 3.8 Distribution of 82 airborne releases, by location of incident 
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Evacuations were ordered in 28 (47%) of the 59 incidents for which information was available. 
However, information on the actual numbers of people evacuated was only available in 17 (60%) of 
the incidents. These ranged from 200 to 220,000 in number, with chlorine (N = 5), ammonia (N - 3) 
and hydrochloric acid (N " 2) the main chemicals implicated. In a further 10 incidents. in-place 
sheltering was recommended. 
Seventy-three (17% of the total) incidents involving chemical spills were identified by the review 
(see Table 3.12). Sixty-one were reported purely as chemical spills, 3 as chemical spills followed by 
explosions, 8 as chemical spills followed by fires, and I as a chemical spill followed by both 
explosion and fire. Seventy-eight per cent of the spills were transportation-related (Figure 3.9). 01 
these incidents. 39% occurred on the highway and 37% involved transport by rail. The remainder 
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arose during transportation at sea (19%) or by pipeline (5%). Chemical plants were the locations 
for fourteen of the 16 incidents reported at fixed-facilities. 
Information on the chemical(s) involved was available for 69 of the 73 Incidents. A single chemical 
was implicated in 61 of the spills, which is predictable given the compartmentalisation of chemicals 
during transportation. Releases of more than one chemical either involved the derailment of a 
number of tank cars carrying different chemicals (N - 4) or the displacement of drums of varying 
chemical content from the flatbeds of lorries (N = 5) or the decks of ships (N a 1). A total of 84 
different chemicals were spilled. Those that featured most commonly were crude oil (N = 7). 
toluene (N = 6), sulphuric acid (N a 5). acryionitrile (N = 4), diesel oil (N = 4). petroleum (N = 4), 
sodium hydroxide (N = 4) and styrene monomer. 
Deaths were reported In relation to 7 of the spills. However, as 4 Involved single employees and 
were transportation-related. It Is not clear whether the deaths were caused by injuries sustained In 
the course of the accidents or were due to exposure to the chemicals released. People were 
injured In 31 (56%) of the 55 Incidents for which Information was available. The population group 
most frequently Injured were members of the public. However, with the exception of A incidents, 
which each gave rise to more than 200 casualties, the numbers injured were relatively small, when 
compared to those which followed many of the fire and explosion incidents. Injuries in emergency 
responders were reported following 10 of the spills. All were transportation-related (8 road; 2 rail) 
and involved exposure to very toxic chemicals, that Is, acryfonitrile, hydrobromic acid, oleum 
(fuming sulphuric acid) and ethyidichlorosilane. Employees were Injured in 9 of the incidents. Five 
of the incidents were transportation-related and involved single employees. The other four Incidents 
occurred at chemical plants. 
In spite of the small numbers of deaths and Injuries, relative to the other types of Incidents 
reviewed, 27 of the 56 spills for which Information was available led to evacuations, 12 of which 
involved more than 1,000 members of the public. In-place sheltering was advised in a further 9 
incidents. 
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Special Features of Chemical Spills 
The above results correlate well with the findings of other research undertaken into the frequency. 
nature and location of chemical spills, that is, most occur during the transportation of hazardous 
materials, chiefly flammable, corrosive and toxic substances (Arturson 1981; Quarentelli 1991; 
Lillibridge 1997). This is in spite of the introduction of international conventions and legislation. 
covering the safe transportation of dangerous goods (Smith and Purdy 1990; Schonfield of a/. 
1995). 
In the UK. more than eighty million tonnes of chemicals are transported by road annually (Canadine 
1990). As a result, any community that is near a railway, a highway, a commercial airport, or 
commercial shipping route is at risk from a chemical incident, and may suddenly be required to 
respond to a major emergency (Quarentelli 1991; Christie 1993; Campbell et aL 1993; Campbell 
1994; Pearce 1996; Lillibridge 1997). This, in essence, is the problem with transportation-related 
incidents. They often arise in areas unprepared to deal with chemical incidents (Binder 1989). lt 
also means that unlike the risk estimates and safety cases that can be prepared in relation to fixed 
facilities, the development of specific models of hazardous material transportation risks is very 
difficult. 
Table 3.12 Line-listing of 73 chemical spills identified by the literature review 
Vom location C'okntryr Orlgrn of IncIMnt CMmlcal Domh" Inju d Evacuow paht. ncs 
... vt , Inr 
yyT\lo" N" '"14W )v 11 'J. 3 
"JPO IIa4 i1ho. con4ITo1(odd. 0 343 Y« wow M41. (114) 
1DS1 ManAcsha t)- .j : tat«f V anslY,. tal. vt 11ar1 .. vfrlrm hyrllnawf. 0 Not `. ta1W Nd Star«t A ,, nn ý'y9: cI 
10ßt Oklahoma 1YWd S41" tranrlt+ORal-on " clad Toh n. 0 0 Yes 1410n (Tye tat 
1691 Ilwrluýor. a "oeJ A,. a.! a t"anep"natn fl'a1 M. 1hyl fur an 0 NM Statad NN `. S! T1«t T"+: +, ' W4 "! 
1N1 Tow Um m 81MM TIY+Ipo1 s on " RAN Bwy1110aN1 0 0 yes Anon. (+9o1c) 
1 DP t " All ir a"-. gar - '. r c«t ", ra±w CP W. Ka1 "am ". hn on IN, a1': hk»rdý (1 : ll V.. KIIv M a+ ". t DM 1 
1"2 LOWWWO UrM. O soma TryMpW%4on; RN vinyl 0" magomor 0 0 Yes Mon (t 
1902 1`ý Wsy ama tk. "d GMmr1 T, ant{<vtaI. ra pod NO Slalod 0 NM Stated V. a Arxv (1pg2 
ton Taw Wool funs TMAGOO UOn " Sea Auy$oMIWs 0 Not Stated Not Staled Mon. (ISM 
I Df7 la, Memo ('1. d : IanM+o. t. I. Pwoh" CuIlthunc af. M Cl N, SI"t. d No Anon (tp(l7a1 
1992 LaUyrn. WAN States Twtwo4atIon " Rad Air~ko t lIa, urth1" 0 0 No Mon. (t 9Sli) 
1167 C-61004Vn r#ýi '. tYw 1"sn ai<. tat v, 11 'a1 1A h4rrr, Ivey, Tnr. 1 (1 N, A '. "a! o" A-.. r "M: f. 
1463 D~ Wood swell Tra V04alKut " pia NdtA acid 0 43 V.. Ar-on (1"30 
1iM4 `o voV Ty11Ry1 1 -. l. r1 R. aýýYý Tra"`a{ý>"ta1 "r. IImn 1'abnbum n 
N"N `. ýal«1 via "-, tn aMi 1'.. "; }1 : `yam 
1964 04441 c. nre. Tran oonnan " Ned SVOWIC. ad 0 0 No Stave Amn (I 964Q 
1[NIR 1`h AartskhN 6+64{1 ý, rlMM Trrnyý'1st. v, Il,. q"I wý1".. r" rr1 ". it.. ß. 1o Nra! ýT! ý.. ,r ,T 
INS or4atiO CaliId Ttan, (1vnaIV fl SITrl ývirrrrt, r, l h".. ýw, 
1"11r11A. 
1, "1 '.! at«1 Nr, ....... 
48 
19H. ' ... .. a - n. 'a':, 
t ans: "-nat. v, N"ai h.,. v rny; '.!. ... n r, h r. 
1986 Ctavr, Mnd t o 1. d, KYg00I8 TtYapottat, an - Rued Tolwte 0 0 No S mdhend Rvdtr (1990) 
1988 &aa1 Cotv*W Ca*+aae Tranfportatio i- Rad Fthylane dr hlorlde 0 0 No A non (190&il 
19" Hut Undiled Ipq00m Ttvntportation " 9M ßtamoxww )prequel) 0 N01 Stated Not Staled Colla s (19M 
1988 t aJwgsºu! an Cw_Wly Crwnrral Plant P. M..... hPnnry and U 0 No A- 'i: 38, 
1986 Hut t 9sd IOItgdOt11 TMn odalion " Road DO"ll1letherli d1" 
M00yW%f 
0 4 Not Stated MOM (196k) 
191,1 6 v'. P! lwr, 1 t1`! ad Ilr20c chw. <Al Pint Solvent 
0 0 0s on 
1986 Segovia Span Tnmoo4aiofl " Road OMum (w4hu! le acid) 3 1 No V4 0110Z Senow et at 
(1995) 
1'BI ! lammen a^x)a 0'. ", 4, t'+Anl Not Staled a ai Nnt ý. tatoa Arvv '9R(ß 
1990 Okletoma t)tt1W Sit.. Charcoal Pori UtWum hexed>t0ride 1 100 No Antat. (1990p) 
1987 14 ý aft qcn llnsad Kq+y04m T! an, later, Road loot opyl alcohol 0 Not Slalnd Yes S. nAn and Pwdy 0 990) 
1987 Texas WMtl08lew (Damics PWM Hydrdtuodcaoid 0 iii Vi. NO all at (0% 
1987 [ýmcaaor Ur404 K% 1W' T! a spWlalao R, Md Tok ani 0 0 No Aron (1967D) 
1987 Aveiro POR11pet c om-ca Ptwl 70 % soMtlon 01 
p loagv+e In 
mOnöthtotub. nivla 
0 9 No VeMttte N OI. (1996) 
19! 17 I/erf! r.. )a".,, "w ,.. IP. 1 ar.: 3a r" t. gnat. utal, v, it, wd tl ,l NaA, "., M 'L N- rer.: ar.. « 'ug' 
1988 Motcaw Soviet U'a Trer!, ponatton " Rut Not Stated 0 34 Vet Anon (10ß$d) 
1911fl {A awa uo. .. a 1 .. 
""Ar-si, ', 1u i. r. n l is , '. ',., . r, O 
'v l4. r.., ao7P Y! a ßi! 
1988 Wa s-otvT . ss liIMW I('t n Tm inponat on " Road PNtNWn 0 1 Yee Smillt and Purd/ (1990) 
19811 Nr>nr SPa Nowr Sea Tranas".. al 'n SPa A, -, y1wd, da 4 0 No GronW g as at 1994) 
1988 S*I1 d tM 8I 96rm Or w Tokw* 0 Not Staüa Not 911AS0 A010096lp) 
1989 Pa t0 poftQal Transpvtahan Road P. 4mlpun, 0 11 Vet Vi+NW$ M 41 t 1995) 
1969 "1 Poo"» Powe Ttwwoorladcn Road Pat. $I wncywWE 0 2 No OwrpaM 
i$%) 
- 
1989 CKJOt 2 (ans . Transportation Rad Sod! 1M1 hydroatde 0 Not stated yes Arw( 1199061 
1989 Strafe Ramgal Ti n* tofellOn " Sea Heavy crude oY 0 0 No VMMUra M IOW 
1 ! M'r A, a=ýa -'rot `: 'a'os Tar s{s+*t a!. n Pa .. 
M '1 i! Nr, l `! a (011 A'".? "ý r 
1990 Ekaen be" Tmwp01tedcvt " Rad DimMtg4 $h1 0 0 Yea Sah"90 at at 11 
1', t'. iC ý, fw IOU . rý. i. -. ^ 
1 a's/s'rta! +nn I). 'a l 1 I!,., di , äl, u, 's, Iano U ". 4 '-a "". a.. a' a .:,.. j.. a^" o! al 
1980 pat IMSo IQ Od. n TM%v0ft 0n " Road i lydwbromlo sod 0 1S Not Staled Anon. (1981fi ° 
1990 Caldomwl )P-+&. d 110" TrantPcvta! aA, `"'.. a Fnafe nd o n N, ý c: st+P^. s! a "99 1 
1490 Msuiewes'lse°WU frwtti Tlaftwoola wn " Road Ee1y1 eayteb 0 1 Not Stated Stelle N at. 11990) 
1990 Madolanya Tranat, piat. pn tt(ad !! M, nc><t k, rgcal! c acnl I I N; IW, aa, .a at a. 1995) 
1991 KbVWWn9OU 600- TtenaporlaUon " Rax AcrylonertIa 0 20 Nw Mahd 8e+»e9N «et (I M) 
11191 A! AVa '`{ýaT ('. har Hal t`! Ant tilPym (er! 1{, halr ac', )) 0 Yw!. Vlll. M: 1-1,..: Of &A 
1991 CAWOPIVA 1AlsatO AIM Tti fO&WO 11 " Mad metwn sodtu111 0 220 Yet BOMAM of it (19981 
1119: W, acc. nºn IMwA'". BPS iranepýMatr! r+ Red Fanten. 0 :S you lMSch; l 
1992 Mdydaa Un4d ttdygdd. ll t7! ernrR4l plats Chlolo wladsone 0 Not Stated No Anon (19929) 
199: Attr. tr. ocv c-7, onvGN P4f11 1'oln9aunl 1 J; 1 No : wmaa P". A 'bl'. N) 
1902 7olelo S4V' Trp stow n" Road Toluene 0 1 Yes V40W Sanchae it ad,. , (1995) 
199; Naa ta'ad C'^>v'^.. A. -a TrarapcMAtrn RRAd ry1, o, lalo A. l1 . '! Iv. .x , 1. a'0 P'a 'vW 
1902 to Cavha rtatn Tran! nolIOn " Sea Crt4de 00 0 s Yet Vik&w Sandes of of 
(1496) 
1991 1$#veo na SWea* T. a., pM%fMAA See NaphMa 0 0 Vii Vtl i Saarach" M 01 
Im a" (MNrl so" TnnMie. Mtlen "º ne TOM" 0 0 Not swell Anon film) 
1991 !: r. Mynq I. h 'J K-wouA i tron. pc"tNan Swa C'. i. oll 0 11.10 No la ! ttN as it (1993) 
Im Nit Stated Realft CftMtiaid PI" M'drl11t001MhMN 2 Not Stated NO "NMO (1990) 
t mir r qtr "...,, ; ý. a. rf ax. a t. a.,.. t,. Ma!. n+ 
U.,. A A, . 1w a, ""A 1 VPa Harn 09941 
1'J; 1ý Iaa W7 a, ter'-:. ev1a'. v, I]Arl 
l'p., l, 1r. 4, v'l '' 1r'r', (a1o: 1 Ar.; x. -'SAA.!: 
49 
Figure 3.9 - Distribution of 73 chemical spills, by location of incident 
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Water Contamination Incidents 
A total of 14 water contamination incidents (4% of the total) were identified by the review (see Table 
3.13). The causes of the incidents comprised contamination of source waters (N = 9; all following 
spills: five at chemical plants, two arising from agricultural activities, one at a waste disposal site 
and one transportation-related): operational error during water treatment (N a 4); (3 involving 
fluoride overdosing and the other, accidental contamination of post-treatment supplies); and 
chemical contamination of water with a boiler additive at a school. 
so 
05 10 15 20 25 
Table 3.13 - Line-listing of 14 water contamination Incidents identified by the literature 
review 
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Information on the chemical(s) involved was available for all 14 incidents. Phenol was the most 
commonly reported contaminant (N = 4), followed by fluoride (N = 3), pesticides (N = 2) and 
aluminium compounds (N a 2). Only one death was recorded, and in only 2 of the 7 incidents for 
which information was available, were more than 100 people reported as suffering with symptoms. 
However, in all 12 of the incidents for which information was available, large populations were 
potentially place at risk, as shown in Table 3.13. 
Special Features of Water Contamination Incidents 
From the review undertaken. and those of others (Young et a! 1996), it would therefore appear that 
incidents which result in the acute chemical contamination of drinking water supplies are 
reassuringly rare. The data on deaths and injuries also suggests that they present a lesser risk to 
human health than other types of incidents. This is probably because most chemical contaminants 
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are readily detectable by smell or taste, and thus people usually refrain from consuming water 
containing them (World Health Organisation 1997). 
However, water contamination incidents, when they arise, do assert special requirements on water 
companies and other agencies, incWing public health professionals. Alternative water supplies may need 
to be provided, public information rapidly disseminated, and immediate health risk assessments instigated 
(Mayon-White 1993). AddAionaly, even where minimal acute health effects have been reported in 
populations affected by contaminated water supplies, there is evidence to suggest that such i cidents do 
give rise to real mental and physical suffering in the community, attributed to anxiety and heightened 
awareness, rather than to any toxic effect (Department of Health 1991; Clarke. 1993; Fowle at al. 1994). 
Increasing attention may therefore need to be paid by public health professionals to the psychosocial 
aspects of acute chemical irxidents (Bertaai 1989a; Baxter 1993). 
Food Contamination Incidents 
Incidents may also occur which are not related to industry or transport (Gunnell 1993). The food 
chain may be endangered by the direct use of chemicals in the handling and processing of food 
(Bertazzi 1989), or indirectly through accidental releases and waste disposal activities (Travis and 
Arms 1987). Twenty-one incidents of food contamination were identified by the review (Table 3.14). 
Bar three, all originated as a result of agricultural practices (N = 8) or in commercial food production 
(N = 10). Pesticides were implicated in 5 of the agriculture-related incidents. More than 1.000 
people were affected in each of 8 incidents, confirming that when food contamination occurs, large 
numbers of people may potentially be at risk. 
Table 3.14 Line listing of 21 Food Contamination Incidents Identified by the literature 
review 
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Special Features of Food Contimrnat, on Incidents 
One of the most serious incidents of this type occurred in May 1981, when an epidemic of a 
previously undescribed illness presented itself in Spain. By the end of 1982, the disease, officially 
called 'toxic oil syndrome', had affected some 20,000 people with over 350 deaths (Anon. 1983a). 
Of particular interest in this epidemic, and likewise in an outbreak of 84 cases of jaundice that 
occurred in Epping. London in February 1965 (Kopelman of al. 1966; Hall at al. 1992), was that an 
infective cause was initially suspected. However, the epidemiological evidence provided by a series 
of case-control studies supported the hypothesis that cooking oil was responsible for transmitting 
the causative agent of toxic oil syndrome (Canas and Kilbourne 1987; Diaz de Rojas et al. 19987). 
Consequently, 38 Spanish oil merchants were put on trial in July 1987 charged with public health 
offences and fraud: all were found guilty and convicted (Ortega-Benito 1992). The benefits of 
epidemiological studies were therefore extolled. 
However. despite the apparent relation to the consumption of an illegally marketed cooking oil, the 
causative agent is as yet undetermined. Although aniline contamination of suspect oils was 
common, and a clear dose-response relationship was demonstrated (Kilbourne el al. 1988), the 
clinical picture of 'toxic oil syndrome' was distinct from that of aniline toxicity. Additionally. anilides 
found in the oil did not induce the same syndrome in animals (Anon 1983a; Toxic Epidemic 
53 
Syndrome Study Group 1982). The incident has therefore left a dilemma which concerns all 
countries. With the precise cause of the disease still unknown, no assurance can be given that it 
will not happen again (Anon. 1983a). 
Cooking oil has also been implicated in two other outbreaks of mass food poisoning. In October 
1968, an epidemic of an unusual skin disease similar to chloracne began to be reported in Japan 
(Kuratsune et a!. 1972). By August 1971, the disease had produced 1,057 patients. The cause 
was attributed to the ingestion of rice oil contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and 
the disease christened "Yusho", namely oil disease. Kuratsune et al. in their paper, believed that 
reporting their experiences would help many people in the world who were concerned about the 
chronic deleterious effects of PCBs (Kuratsune et al. 1972). Between June 1978 and October 
1979, however, history repeated itself when more than 2,000 people in Taiwan consumed rice bran 
oil contaminated with heat-degraded PCBs (Hsu et al. 1994). 
The afore-mentioned poisonings happened as a result of the accidental contamination of foodstuffs. 
Major outbreaks have, however, also occurred following the use of chemical fungicides as seed 
dressings (mainly of wheat seedlings). In Iraq, three epidemic poisonings were reported between 
1955 and 1972, caused by the distribution of seed grain treated with alkylmercury compounds 
(Damiuji and Tikriti 1972). The total number of official cases stands at 6530, including 459 deaths 
(Watanabe and Satoh, 1996). A major factor contributing to the size of the epidemic was the 
unusually long latency period of up to 60 days between exposure and the onset of symptoms. 
Similarly, in south-east Turkey between 1955 and 1961, three thousand people developed porphyrra 
turcica, due to ingestion of hexachlorobenzene, a fungicide added to wheat seedlings (Cripps et al. 
1984). Due to its late arrival, the shipped seed was used to replace edible stores of wheat, as 
bread or bulgar. The condition became known as "black sore", although many of the breast-fed 
children under the age of 1 year died from a disease known as "pink sore". 
Adulteration of alcoholic beverages with methanol and ethylene glycol have been other commonly 
reported causes of chemical disasters involving food (Haines 1994). 
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Consumer Products 
It was also felt important to raise awareness in this review that chemical incidents may also arise 
through the use of other products, which the general public normally regard as safe. In August 
1981, paediatric hospitals in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, began to report cases of a haemorrhagic 
syndrome in children (Martin-Bouyer et aL 1983). A retrospective epidemiological investigation 
identified the cause as talcum powder contaminated with the anticoagulant warfarin (Martin-Bouyer 
et al. 1984). 177 children died and a further 564 were affected. The possibility of intentional 
adulteration of the talcum powder has not been ruled out. Above all, the incident demonstrated the 
significant potential for transcutaneous uptake of warfarin. 
Chemical Terrorism 
Chemical terrorism has long been used to achieve political and military objectives (Lillibridge 1997). 
Modern chemical weapons date from World War 1, which brought us chlorine gas and mustard gas 
(Baskerville 1919), and they have grown ever more deadly. Just before World War 2, German 
scientists developed the first nerve gas, tabun, which led to deadlier agents called sarin and VX. 
For a fuller account of the biological / physical properties of chemical agents, see Carnes and 
Watson (1989) and Sidel (1990). 
International conventions have long prohibited the use of chemical weapons during war (Hu et at 
1989; Carnes and Watson 1989). In spite of this, the US budget for chemical warfare programmes 
for the period 1982 through 1991 has been estimated at $6.6 billion (Sidel 1989). Concerns have 
also been raised by the alleged use of tricothecene toxins and other combinations of chemical 
agents in Laos and Kampuchea in the late 1970s - The "Yellow Rain" Affair; and, mustard gas by 
Iraq during its war with Iran and against its Kurdish population in 1988 (Hu et al. 1989; Sidel 1989). 
Small-time terrorists are also getting involved. On 27 June 1994,12 litres of the nerve agent sarin 
(isopropyl methyl phosphonofluoridate) were released by the Aum cult terrorists in Matsumoto city, 
Japan, using a heater and fan from a truck (Morita et al. 1997). Seven people were killed, and 
about 600 residents and rescue staff affected by the agent. Of the 52 rescuers who came to the 
assistance of victims, 18 suffered symptoms. 
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A second incident with sarin occurred in the Tokyo subway on 20 March 1995. The Aum Shinrikyo 
cult were again responsible for the act of terrorism, which left 12 people dead and 5,000 injured. In 
the aftermath of the attack, calls were made for public health authorities and emergency services to 
start planning now for future incidents. In particular, concerns were expressed in this incident, as 
with that at Matsumoto, regarding the numbers of rescuers who were affected by the toxic vapour. 
Programmes were urgently needed to protect rescuers from poisoning (Nakajima et al. 1997). 
Natural Disasters 
Certain natural phenomena may also resemble chemical releases from industrial sites. For 
example, in the mid-1980s, the country of Cameroon was twice struck by unusual natural disasters, 
involving the release of lethal carbon dioxide gas from crater lakes. The first of these disasters 
occurred at Lake Monoun on 15 August 1984, and resulted in 37 deaths (Sigurdsson et al. 1987). 
The second occurrence was however much more disastrous. A cloud of 1.0 km3 of carbon dioxide 
gas, released from Lake Nyos on 21 August 1986, caused death by asphyxiation of 1,700 people 
and 3000 cattle (Kling et al. 1987; Palca 1987). 
The likelihood that natural disasters may give rise to secondary chemical incidents is also 
increasing, with technological expansion (Binder and Sanderson 1987; Showalter and Myers 1994; 
Lillibridge 1997; Nantel 1998). For example, in "Silicon Valley' in California, preparedness plans 
have been developed to take account of the devastating toxic exposures which may result from the 
destruction of pipelines and hazardous material storage containers, in the event of an earthquake 
(Binder and Sanderson 1987). 
Natural Toxins 
Natural toxins may be of animal, plant or microbial origin (Haines 1994). Examples include: 
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(a) Pvrrolizidine alkaloids 
Several outbreaks of veno-occlusive disease have been reported - Afghanistan, 1975 
(Mohabbat et al. 1976), India, 1977 (Tandon et al. 1977); and Tadjikstan, 1992 (Chauvin et 
a/. 1993). The cause is a pyrrolizidine alkaloid found in the seeds and roots of weeds, such 
as Heliotropium lasocarpium. 
In the Tadjikstan outbreak, a famine led to a delay in the wheat harvest. This gave time for 
the weed to grow and go to seed. When the wheat was eventually harvested, heliotrope 
seeds containing the deadly alkaloid were also ground into flour to make bread. Six weeks 
later, the first case of liver toxicity was reported. Between October 1992 and March 1993, 
3906 cases occurred, with a case fatality ratio of 1.3%. In spite of international efforts to 
increase the awareness of local populations at an early stage in such outbreaks, political 
and economic difficulties in such countries often preclude compliance with public health 
advisories (Chauvin et al. 1993). 
(b) Red Tides 
Red tides are a natural coastal phenomenon, found to be prevalent in most parts of the 
world (Hartigan-Go and Bateman 1994). They are caused by sudden population growths of 
minute marine organisms called dinoflagellates. Consumption of shellfish contaminated 
with neurotoxins released from particular species of dinoflagellates may lead to the 
development of neurological and gastrointestinal symptoms in humans, a condition 
commonly referred to as "paralytic shellfish poisoning". 
Redtides have been known to cause deaths of sea birds and fish in the United Kingdom 
(Clark 1994), but active surveillance of coastal waters during the summer months and 
routine shellfish sampling programmes have generally been effective in preventing 
outbreaks of human PSP. Worldwide, however, it has been estimated that 1,600 cases of 
PSP occur each year (Halstead and Schantz 1984). Between 1983 and 1991,18 outbreaks 
of PSP occurred in the Philippines alone (Hartigan-Go and Bateman 1994). More than 
1,300 cases were reported, with 50 deaths. In Guatemala, 187 people were affected with 
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PSP between July and August 1987 (Rodrigue et aL 1990). A case study implicated a 
species of clam as the vehicle of the neurotoxin. Twenty-six people died. 
It is interesting to note again the influence of economic pressures over health and safety 
issues even when bans on shellfish have been imposed. Hartigan-Go and Bateman (1994) 
considered, in such circumstances, that: 
... a source of economic relief (was) essential to obtain the co-operation of fishermen 
and market vendors to comply with the ban. 
(c) Trichothecene mycotoxicosis 
During June to September 1987, several thousands of people residing in the Kashmir 
Valley of India were affected by an outbreak of a gastrointestinal disorder (Bhat at al. 1989). 
Epidemiological investigations and animal studies confirmed the cause to be due to the 
consumption of bread made from mould-damaged wheat. In samples tested, varying 
quantities of trichothecene mycotoxins, probably released by moulds belonging to the 
genus Fusarium, were identified. Other outbreaks of mycotoxicoses have taken the form of 
ergotism (Krishnamachari and Bhat 1975) and aflatoxicoses (Ngindu eta!. 1982). 
It should also be noted that mouldy agricultural products may also cause allergenic (for 
example, farmer's lung disease) and non-allergenic respiratory illnesses (for example, 
organic dust toxic syndrome) (Dan 1987). An outbreak of the latter occurred in 1986 
among members of a college fraternity in the US, following a party in the basement of a 
property, the floor of which had been covered with 6-8 inches of mouldy straw (Brinton et 
a/. 1987). 
Conclusions 
Through reviewing the literature, 9 chemical incident databases were identified. All were found to 
focus mainly on the causes and the immediate losses from an industry perspective, which reflected 
their primary purpose, that is, of guiding risk assessment decisions in relation to major hazard 
planning and management. The accuracy of death and injury information was also questionable, 
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with little evidence of data validation. The development of a system of simply logging data on 
incidents in Wales picked up through the media or other sources was therefore unlikely to enable 
analysis of any associations between mortality and morbidity and various risk factors, such as 
location of incident. However, it was recognised that such databases might provide a useful check 
on the sensitivity of any surveillance system developed. 
Although limited in their numbers, three of the 4 surveillance systems identified by the review 
provided useful guidance for the development of the surveillance system in Wales. The US ATSDR 
HSEESS was particularly instructive in emphasising the benefits of employing an active system of 
surveillance, and also in identifying factors to be considered in the design of appropriate data 
analysis routines. The "Environmental Health Incident Notification System" in Scotland highlighted 
the importance of information dissemination from any surveillance system, whilst the system 
adopted by the UK Fire Service stressed the need for both piloting of the system and the 
development of rigorous data validation regimes. 
The review of individual chemical incident reports highlighted the lack of published material within 
the scientific peer-reviewed literature. The majority of reports were anecdotal commentaries in 
news journals, and summaries within published reports. The quality of the data reported on 
incidents was therefore variable and not validated. However, the analysis undertaken of the 
reports, on both a combined and specific basis, did highlight the types of routines that might prove 
to be beneficial in investigating factors associated with the public health consequences of acute 
chemical incidents. 
The review has therefore confirmed that in order to accurately define the size of the problem of 
acute chemical incidents within any geographically defined area, a public health surveillance system 
is required. 
to 
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Chapter 4- Background to the Development of the 
Surveillance System for Wales 
Introduction 
The literature review has provided guidance for the development of a multi-agency geographically 
defined surveillance system for acute chemical incidents in Wales. The review has also discussed 
many of the challenges that public health professionals face in handling such events. The aim of 
this Chapter is to set the political, legislative and organisational context within which the surveillance 
system evolved in Wales. 
This will begin with an examination of the arrangements that were in place in Wales in the early 
1990s for the inter-agency management of acute chemical incidents. 
Arrangements for the Response to Acute Chemical Incidents in Wales 
Introduction 
In 1990, a report commissioned by the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) concluded that 
arrangements in the United Kingdom (UK) for responding to and managing chemical incidents were 
generally very effective (Smith and Purdy 1990). The UK approach, and therefore the Welsh approach, 
to managing chemical incidents, at this time, was principally characterised by the partnership between a 
number of key players at the local level (Smith and Purdy 1990); these included the emergency services, 
local authorities, health authorities, the chemical industry and other agencies. 
The first principle of national policy, was that there was no single agency with all the skills and 
resources needed to deal with a chemical incident. Moreover, a Home Office review in 1989 
concluded that: 
the disaster response would not be helped by the creation of anything in the nature of a 
national disaster squad; prime responsibility for handling disasters should remain at the 
local level where the expertise and resources are found. 
(Home Office 1989) 
60 
The second principle was that to achieve maximum effectiveness, the different agencies and 
authorities involved all needed to adopt, and aim to work within, the framework of "Integrated 
Emergency Management" (IEM) (Home Office 1992). 
The key features of the IEM process were: 
(a) Full involvement at the planning stages for all key organisations 
(b) Integrated training 
(c) Clear defined roles for all organisations 
(d) Identified resources (Home Office 1992). 
Legislation relevant to Emergency Response 
By the early 1990s, a large amount of legislation had been enacted in the UK, both for the 
prevention of chemical incidents, and for the development of plans to minimise effects in the event 
of an incident. In particular, the occurrence of disasters at Flixborough, Seveso, Basle and Bhopal, 
had directly led to the imposition of formal systems of legislative control on owners of industrial 
installations producing and storing chemicals. However, the control systems introduced had been, 
on the basis of "major hazard" potential, largely selective in their application to different substances 
and different processes (Health and Safety Executive 1985). 
There was also in existence a number of semi-legal guidance documents, in the guise of circulars, 
which had been issued by Welsh Office to health authorities in Wales. 
Central Government Departments 
As stated above, fundamental to the arrangements for dealing with chemical incidents in Wales, at 
this time, was that the first response remained at the local level. However, it was also recognised 
that central government had a role to play. Hence, in the event of a major incident occurring within 
the principality, a Welsh Office Department could, where appropriate, take the lead. In such 
circumstances, the role of the "lead department" was: (a) to co-ordinate the activities of other 
departments in Welsh Office in discharging their own specific responses to an incident, and (b) to 
61 
gather information for the purposes of briefing ministers, informing Parliament and providing 
information to the public and the media on a national basis. 
In the case of an extremely severe incident, Welsh Office could also declare a "National 
Emergency". This did not, however, mean that the management of the incident passed to a central 
body. The aim of such a declaration was to facilitate the mobilisation of national support to the 
locality affected. Additionally, in specific cases, Welsh Office had the ability to reimburse local 
authorities and other agencies for some or all of the costs incurred in dealing with such an incident 
(Smith and Purdy 1990). 
Local Authorities 
Following the reorganisation of local government in Wales in 1974, the principal councils comprised of 
8 county councils and 37 non-metropolitan district councils, although emergency planning was 
essentially a function of the former authorities. The general approach taken by the county councils to 
emergency planning was one of "all hazards", that is, the development of flexible plans tailored to meet 
all the problems which were perceived to exist or might arise within their respective areas (Smith and 
Purdy 1990). They were also mandatorily required to prepare off-site emergency plans for designated 
classes of industrial installations, that is, those subject to the requirements of the Control of Industrial 
Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1984 (CIMAH) (Health and Safety Executive 1985). 
The Emergency Services (Fire and Police 
The legal basis for the involvement of the fire service in dealing with chemical incidents had been 
enacted some years' previous, in the Fire Service Act 1947. In the early 1990s, fire services were 
provided by 8 brigades in Wales, operating on boundaries coterminous with the county councils, 
and under the direct administration of those authorities. 
In relation to chemical incidents, the police had powers similar to those of local authorities. These 
were primarily under the Civil Defence Act 1948 and the Civil Protection in Peacetime Act 1986. 
The police were organised into four constabularies in Wales. 
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Health and Safety Executive 
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE), established in 1974 as a non-departmental public body, 
was responsible for the enforcement of health and safety legislation at most industrial sites in 
Wales. Of particular relevance to its activities was the following legislation: 
Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (HSWA) 
The HSWA imposed general duties, at all work premises, on employers towards employees and 
others, including members of the public off-site, to ensure that they were protected from risks 
arising from their activities. 
The Notification of Installations Handling Hazardous Substances Regulations 1982 (NIHHS) 
The first set of regulations enacted under HSWA were NIHHS (Health and Safety Executive 1982). 
Under NIHHS, operators of sites where certain hazardous materials were stored or handled, in 
quantities greater than a specified threshold, were required to provide details of their operations to 
HSE. The quantities notified were then used to consider the suitability of land use planning 
proposals within a set distance around the plant, known as the "consultation distance". 
When developments were proposed within the "consultation distance", the local authority planning 
department consulted HSE for an opinion on the risk which would be presented to people by the 
development, if it was permitted. The "consultation distance" was also used by HSE to set the area 
in which a top tier "major hazard" site was to provide information to the public in the event of a major 
accident. 
The Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazard Regulations 1984 (CIMAH) 
The CIMAH Regulations were designed to prevent, or mitigate the effects of, major accidents to 
both people and the environment (Health and Safety Executive 1985). Industrial activities falling 
within the scope of the regulations were defined in terms of storage and processes involving 
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specified dangerous substances. The requirements operated at two levels or tiers. The lower tier 
requirements were widely applied and required the person in control to: 
(a) report major accidents to the HSE; and 
(b) where required, demonstrate to HSE that the plant was being operated safely. 
More specific requirements applied to potentially more hazardous installations and required the 
person in control, in addition to the above, to: 
(a) submit a safety report to HSE which identified the nature and use of dangerous substances 
at the site, identified how major accidents could possibly occur and described the 
arrangements in place to prevent, control or mitigate them; 
(b) prepare an on-site emergency plan; and 
(c) provide information to the public about the major hazards on-site and their dangers, and 
what to do in the event of an emergency. 
As stated above, local authorities were also required by CIMAH to prepare an off-site emergency 
plan. In this respect, the HSE's interest in off-site planning extended to the adequacy of the 
information given by hazardous installations to local authorities and to ensuring that the latter 
prepared and kept the plans up to date. 
The Dangerous Substances in Harbour Regulations 1987 (DSHAR), which were very similar in their 
requirements to the CIMAH Regulations, applied to port and harbour areas (Health and Safety 
Executive 1987). 
The Planning (Hazardous Substances) Regulations 1992 
These regulations placed further controls on hazardous developments. They were administered by 
the Hazardous Substance Authority (HSA), usually the local authority planning department. If a 
company wished to handle specified quantities of certain substances, it had to apply to the HSA for 
consent to do so, irrespective of whether or not planning permission was also required. 
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Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) Regulations 1988 
Although there was no explicit mention of chemical incidents in the COSHH Regulations, the 
accompanying Approved Code of Practice (ACOP) (Health and Safety Executive 1988) made it 
quite clear that an employer was expected to consider foreseeable emergencies and to plan for 
them (Hayes 1991). 
In complying with the ACOP, employers were required to ensure that, on arrival at a site, visiting 
members of the emergency services (in particular, fire-fighters) were made aware of any 
substances on the premises which offered a significant risk to their health. They were also required 
to have the necessary means available to limit the extent of risks to their health and to regain 
adequate control of the site, in the event of a leak, spill or uncontrolled release of a hazardous 
substance. Such means were expected to include sufficient and suitable personal protective 
equipment to enable the source of the release to be safely identified and repairs to be made, 
together with established procedures for the safe disposal of the substance (Hayes 1991). 
Transport, Labelling and Packaging 
By the early 1990s, the UK was already signatory to a number of international agreements covering 
the carriage of chemicals by rail, road, air and sea (Smith and Purdy 1990). Additionally, 
regulations had been enacted by the Department of Transport covering the carriage of hazardous 
materials in road tankers and tank containers (Health and Safety Executive 1981); for the 
classification, packaging and labelling of hazardous materials both in transit and with the purchaser 
(Health and Safety Executive 1984); and for the carriage of hazardous materials in packages (as 
distinct from tankers) (Health and Safety Executive 1986). 
The main purpose of these regulations was to ensure that, in the event of a transportation-related 
chemical incident, information on the substances involved would be readily available to the 
emergency services on their arrival at the scene. This was considered essential in guiding their 
respective response actions. 
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Pollution Inspectorates 
Other agencies with statutory responsibilities, at this time, in relation to pollution of the environment 
in Wales included: 
(a) Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution, accountable for monitoring all releases to land, water 
and air from prescribed industrial premises, to ensure compliance with statutory limits; 
(b) National Rivers Authority, set up to check and regulate the quality of water courses, and to 
invoke the necessary remedial actions in the event of a chemical spillage or leakage into a 
river, ground water source, estuary or bathing water; and 
(c) Her Majesty's Coastguard and Marine Pollution Control Unit, responsible for coordinating the 
response to chemical incidents at sea. 
The Health Service 
The only legal powers enabling the involvement of health services in Wales in the management of 
chemical incidents, at this time, were those provided under section 3(1) of the National Health 
Service Act 1977, which states that: 
it is the Secretary of State's duty to provide throughout England and Wales, to such extent as 
he considers necessary to meet all reasonable requirements: 
(a) hospital accommodation; 
(b) other accommodation for the purpose of any service provided under this Act; 
(c) medical, dental, nursing and ambulance services; ... (e) such facilities for the prevention of illness, the care of persons suffering from illness 
and the after-care of persons who have suffered from illness as he considers are 
appropriate as part of the health service; 
(f) such other services as are required for the diagnosis and treatment of illness. 
(National Health Service Act 1977) 
In the early 1990s, these duties were exercised on behalf of the Secretary of State for Wales by 9 
District Health Authorities (DHAs) in Wales. The duties relate primarily to medical support and care. 
However, in attempting to broaden the perspective of DHAs in Wales from purely a therapeutic role 
at the time of chemical incidents, to a more strategic protection of health role, Welsh Office had 
followed the lead of the Department of Health, in issuing two circulars. The first (Welsh Health 
Circular (89)1), issued in 1989, advised DHAs that they were also expected to 
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examine and minimise the risks presented by environmental hazards to the health of people within 
their respective areas, and to assess any measures needed to improve their health (Welsh Office 
1989). The second, Welsh Health Circular (91)65, issued in 1991, had gone even further in 
requiring DHAs to: 
(a) ensure that comprehensive provision exists to safeguard their residents and cover 
all at-risk installations within their district; 
(b) ensure that all appropriate units and ambulance services have up-to-date, coherent 
and comprehensive plans for dealing with major incidents. 
(Welsh Office 1991) 
Control and Coordination Arrangements 
In practice, the initial response to an acute chemical incident in Wales, as is still the position today, 
was usually provided by the emergency services. Once alerted, one of their first tasks was to 
consider the control and coordination arrangements that needed to be put into place for the 
incident. In this respect, dependent on the scale of the incident, the "Senior Police Officer" present 
was responsible for setting up the appropriate levels of the Strategic (Gold), Tactical (Silver) and 
Operational (Bronze) command and control structure. 
The "Incident Control System" (ICS) in Wales in the early 1990s was therefore based on a classic 
command and control model of emergency management, which has since been openly criticised 
(Neal 1995). In particular, Quarantelli surmised in 1991 that: 
the recommended shift of command from officers of lower rank to those of higher often 
leads to loss of information and effective management. The ICS (also) involves primarily 
intraorganisational planning that does not provide for an interfacing or integrating of 
activities with relevant organisations from outside the (response) community. 
(Quarentelli 1991) 
From the author's perspective of working as a district council Environmental Health Officer in Wales 
from 1988 to 1992, the latter statement was very true. When called to an incident to advise on the 
environmental health risks to the community, it was very difficult to break in to the rigid structure of 
the ICS. From direct personal contact with Directors of Public Health (DsPH) and Consultants in 
Communicable Disease Control (CsCDC) of DHAs in Wales, at this time, the author was also aware 
that they were very rarely alerted to chemical incidents, and were not seen as part of the broader 
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liaison arrangements of the ICS. This was difficult when such professionals had been assigned 
particular responsibilities under the afore-mentioned circulars issued by Welsh Office. 
Roles and Responsibilities of Response Organisations 
It is not intended to provide a line by line account of the roles and responsibilities of the various 
response organisations, as they was seen in the early 1990s. However, from a review of the 
literature available at that time, it was evident that the roles perceived of DHAs in Wales were very 
narrowly defined. For example, in their report to CEC, Smith and Purdy stated of health authorities 
in the UK that their response to an emergency involved: 
local hospitals, doctors and ambulance services. 
(Smith and Purdy 1990) 
Likewise, in the Home Office publication "Dealing with Disaster", reference was only made to the 
roles of the ambulance service and the receiving hospitals (Home Office 1992). 
Discussion 
From the above review of arrangements for the response to chemical incidents in Wales in the early 
1990s, two perspectives were evident. Other response organisations, and even "other government 
departments", perceived the role of DHAs to be limited to that of ensuring the provision of 
ambulance and hospital services only. In contrast, by issuing the two circulars, Welsh Office 
(following the lead of the Department of Health) were making a clear statement of intent that they 
wished to see a broadening and strengthening of the involvement of public health professionals 
from DHAs in the future management of acute chemical incidents in Wales. 
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Strengthening the Public Health Role in the Management of Acute Chemical 
Incidents in Wales 
Introduction 
The views of Welsh Office, and likewise the Department of Health, were understandable given their 
experiences in relation to a number of high profile chemical incidents during the 1980s. 
In 1984, the River Dee in North Wales was polluted with phenol, with subsequent contamination of the 
drinking water supply serving approximately two million consumers (Jarvis et at 1985). Despite 
reassurances from the water authorities that there was no health risk, a retrospective cohort study found 
that people supplied with contaminated water had experienced significantly more gastrointestinal illness 
than those in a nearby unexposed area. The River Dee incident was followed in 1985 by the referral of 
three unrelated children to the same general hospital in Cardiff, Wales over a two-week period, suffering 
from aplastic anaemia (Morgan et al. 1988). Two of the children had bone marrow transplants and the 
third died. Investigations failed to demonstrate a common environmental toxin. The two incidents raised 
major concerns for Welsh Office in terms of the lack of arrangements that were found to be in place for 
the public health management of acute environmental hazards within the principality. In the absence of 
any other agency, both incidents had been investigated by staff of the Public Health Laboratory Service, 
whose remit was normally restricted to communicable disease control. 
Similarly, in England, much of the Department of Health's concern had arisen as a result of the 
water contamination incident at Lowermoor, Cornwall in 1988 (Rowland et at. 1990). Serious public 
anxiety about the possible long-term health effects of exposure to aluminium-contaminated water 
had even prompted the then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Health to establish the 
"Lowermoor Incident Health Advisory Group" (LIHAG), under the chairmanship of Professor Dame 
Barbara Clayton (Cornwall and Isles of Scilly District Health Authority 1989). 
It was therefore desirable for Welsh Office, and also the Department of Health, to be seen as acting 
responsibly in dealing with these problematic public health issues. As the first principle of national 
policy was that matters of this nature should be dealt with at the local level, both Departments were 
able to readily discharge their responsibilities through placing additional roles on DHAs. 
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The Response of Public Health Professionals 
Part of the problem for DHAs was that there was a perceived lack of clarity over which official was 
responsible within their organisations for the handling of acute chemical incidents. From 1974 to 1988, 
DHAs had been required to appoint a physician as their Medical Officer on Environmental Health (MOEH) 
(Hill and O'Sullivan 1992). Employed by the DHA, the MOEH was also designated as the local authority's 
"Proper Officer" for the control of notifiable diseases and food poisoning. In 1988, however, following a 
fundamental review of "Public Health in England", the responsibilities of the post of MOEH were split 
between a newly created post, that of Consultant in Communicable Disease Control (CCDC) (who would 
fulfil the afore-mentioned "Proper Officer" role), and the existing post of DPH, who was expected to 
become the focal point for medical advice on environmental health issues generally (Acheson 1988). 
The social reforms of 1974 had also, to a large extent, divorced public health doctors in DHAs in 
Wales from the environmental work carried out by local authority Environmental Health 
Departments (Forbes 1993; McPherson et a1.1998). The Welsh Office, and likewise the 
Department of Health, were therefore placing responsibilities on DHAs for which they were not best 
prepared or resourced (Duckworth 1991). This was recognised to some extent by LIHAG, which, in 
the first of two reports on the Lowermoor incident, recommended that: 
... an appropriate expert organisation should be designated to provide DsPH with 
authoritative medical and toxicological advice, without delay, in the event of an incident. A 
national panel should be established, comprised of independent scientists, whose 
expertise is most likely to be relevant and who would be willing to assist the designated 
organisation at short notice. 
(Cornwall and Isles of Scilly District Health Authority 1989) 
Although welcomed on its introduction in 1991, the remit of the so-called "Health Advisory Group on 
Chemical Contamination Incidents" (HAGCCI) (access to which was available to the Chief Medical 
Officer for Wales and the DsPH of Welsh HAs) was initially limited to the provision of advice in the 
event of serious contamination of a water supply. There was therefore no capability within HAGCCI 
to deploy a team of experts to the scene of an incident to make an urgent clinical and 
epidemiological assessment of the health impact (Baxter 1991). Neither did the establishment of 
HAGCCI obviate the need for the rapid availability of epidemiological, laboratory, and toxicological 
skills at the local level (Baxter 1990). 
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Additionally, the deficiencies of training in aspects of environmental health not related to 
communicable disease, which had been raised following the 1988 publication "Public Health in 
England" still remained (Baxter 1989; Phillip 1990). 
There were also major concerns regarding the ability of the NHS to fulfil those roles and responsibilities 
which the other response organisations expected them to undertake. In the UK, public health 
professionals were more used to disaster planning for major trauma than for mass chemical exposures 
and the medical management problems they posed (Baxter 1991). As a result, the level of preparedness 
of accident and emergency departments in the United Kingdom was considered to be variable with 
regards to training, the use of chemical incident protocols, the provision of protective clothing and 
antidotes, and the availability of facilities for decontaminating seriously ill casualties (Baxter 1991; 
Thanabalasingham, Beckett and Murray 1991; Cooke 1992; Hunter and Mannion 1992). 
A Study of Arrangements for the Identification and Investigation of Incidents of Acute 
Exposure of the Public to Toxic Substances (Hill and O'Sullivan 1992) 
To investigate these concerns further, in March 1991, the NHS Management Executive of the 
Department of Health established a Steering Group to oversee a study to investigate the size of the 
problem of incidents of acute exposure of the public to toxic substances in England, and to assess the 
adequacy of NHS arrangements for the investigation of such incidents (Hill and O'Sullivan 1992). 
Although based in England, the findings of the study were equally applicable to Wales, as reflected by the 
fact that Welsh Office soon followed the lead of the Department of Health in responding to many of the 
conclusions and recommendations drawn. The study involved a postal questionnaire survey of 
professionals within the NHS (DsPH, Chief Ambulance Officers, Poisons Unit Directors, Consultants in 
charge of Major Accident and Emergency Departments), as well as local authority Chief Environmental 
Health Officers. It was therefore not a surveillance study, but a retrospective snapshot of the size of the 
problem of incidents of acute toxic exposure in England in 1990. 
Eighteen per cent of the respondents (response rate: 60%) reported at least one incident, as 
defined, during the 12-month study period. The large number of incidents reported (N = 843) was, 
however, somewhat biased by the fact that one respondent (the Director of a Poisons Unit) reported 
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600 incidents. The most commonly reported incidents were fires (27%), and nearly half (47%) 
originated in factories or other places of work. In 14 incidents, more than 100 people were reported 
as having been exposed, although most incidents (75%) resulted in less than 11 people being 
exposed. More than 30 people became ill in each of 13 separate incidents, and in four incidents, 
fatalities were recorded. 
The most pertinent findings from the study, however, were that 24% of the respondents did not 
actually know what local and national arrangements existed for the investigation of such incidents; 
and of those who did know, only 25% considered the existing arrangements to be adequate. Sixty- 
five percent of all respondents either felt that changes were necessary (29%) or stated that they 
were unsure (36%). A large number of the respondents also made comments in relation to the 
perceived deficiencies of the existing arrangements, which Hill and O'Sullivan summarised as 
follows: 
the findings suggest that within the NHS, roles and responsibilities, and lines of 
communication and accountability in the event of an acute toxic incident which could 
endanger the public health are not clear. In addition, systems for the essential functions of 
providing advice, assistance and co-ordination are not well established. Implications to be 
addressed include: clarification of roles and responsibilities, and the provision of a capacity 
within the service to provide the essential functions of surveillance, emergency response, 
training and research. 
(Hill and O'Sullivan 1992) 
The area within the existing arrangements, however, which was highlighted as being the most 
deficient was the lack of any clear national mechanism for the provision of adequate practical 
support locally in the toxicological and epidemiological investigation of incidents. 
On the basis of these findings, Hill and O'Sullivan developed an idealised model for a national 
service for the investigation of the health effects of acute environmental incidents, as shown in 
Figure 4.1. Two levels of operation were proposed, with the health authority acting as the local unit 
and a new central unit being established at the national level. At each level, the service was seen 
as comprising of four basic elements: epidemiology, clinical medicine, environmental health and 
laboratory science. Additionally, the four boxed functions of surveillance, emergency response, 
training and research were included to represent those elements of the service where co-operation 
would be required at the interface between the local and national level. This was contrasted with an 
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Figure 4.1 A model for a national service for the investigation of the health effects of acute 
environmental incidents 
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outline of what the authors perceived to be the present arrangements for the investigation of acute 
incidents of exposure of the public to toxic substances, as shown in Figure 4.2. 
In making recommendations for the progression of their idealised model, Hill and Sullivan 
considered that: 
any development should occur within the framework of the National Poisons Information 
Service (NPIS). 
(Hill and O'Sullivan 1992) 
The latter service was established in 1963, as a result of the recommendations of a report to the then 
Ministry of Health on "Emergency treatment in hospital of cases of acute poisoning" (Ministry of Health 
1962). As is the position today, the service for the UK was based around seven centres, namely London, 
Birmingham, Leeds, Newcastle, Cardiff, Edinburgh and Belfast. The service for Wales was provided by 
the Welsh National Poisons Unit, based at Llandough Hospital, Cardiff, with funding from Welsh Office 
(see Chapter 5 for further details of the Unit). In their ability to offer toxicological, laboratory and clinical 
services, in addition to their core function of providing information, on a 24 hour basis, to health 
professionals on the medical management of poisoning cases, the NPIS was seen as fulfilling many of 
the elements of the central unit. Its limitations, however, were stated in terms of only having an ad hoc 
role in the coordination of activity relating to the investigation of incidents, and possessing no formal roles 
in training and surveillance (Hill and O'Sullivan 1992). 
Criticism was also aimed at the Department of Health, regarding the lack of official central guidance, 
regarding where responsibility should lie within the NHS for the local coordination of investigative 
services at the time of an incident of acute toxic exposure (Hill and O'Sullivan 1992). 
Existing Arrangements for the Public Health Management of Acute Chemical Incidents in 
Wales 
On the basis of the above discussions, Figure 4.3 provides a simple model of the arrangements that 
the author perceived were in place in Wales in 1992 for the public health management of acute 
chemical incidents. DHAs had access to two sources of advice: (a) the Welsh National Poisons 
Unit and (b) the HAGCCI advisory system. However, contact with the latter was only available to 
DsPH and the Chief Medical Officer for Wales through a secretariat located at the Department of 
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Figure 4.2 The present arrangements in England for the investigation of the health effects of acute 
exposure to toxic substances 
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Figure 4.3 Model of existing arrangements for the management of the health effects of acute 
chemical incidents in Wales 
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Health. The model also shows the idealised links that should have been in place at the local level 
for the effective inter-agency management of an acute chemical incident. 
The Introduction of Further Health Service Guidance 
In response to the recommendations made by Hill and O'Sullivan, the Department of Health issued 
two "Health Service Guidelines" in 1993, namely HSG(93)38 (Department of Health 1993a) and 
HSG(93)56 (Department of Health 1993b). In Wales, these were soon replicated by Welsh Health 
Circulars WHC(93)61 (Welsh Office 1993) and WHC(94)26 (Welsh Office 1994). 
Under WHC(93)61, DHAs were required to have in place adequate plans for dealing with the health 
aspects of chemical incidents, and to designate an "appropriate officer" to ensure access to the 
necessary advice and expertise concerning the public health hazards arising from such incidents. 
Enclosed with WHC (93)61 was further detailed guidance on "Health Service Arrangements for 
Dealing with Chemical Hazards", which made explicit the specific responsibilities placed on DHAs in 
Wales for. 
the protection of the health of, and provision of health care to those who have been or may 
be exposed to a chemical hazard. 
(Welsh Office 1993) 
The later issue of WHC(94)26 served only to reinforce the advice already given, by requiring: 
all parts of the NHS to review their arrangements to ensure they are able to discharge their 
responsibilities for dealing with the health aspects of non-communicable environmental 
hazards. 
(Welsh Office 1994) 
The latter guidelines also confirmed the monitoring and surveillance responsibilities of DHAs. 
These included for: 
the continuing surveillance of disease, possible causative factors and influences in the 
DHAs area to identify and investigate any pattern of disease which is unusual or novel. 
(Welsh Office 1994) 
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Conclusion 
The Department of Health and Welsh Office (in following their lead), had therefore chosen a policy 
line which was intended to clarify, but which had effectively increased the roles, responsibilities, and 
accountability of DHAs in England and Wales respectively, in relation to health service 
arrangements for dealing with acute chemical incidents. The full extent of these responsibilities is 
demonstrated by the model shown in Figure 4.4. 
However, the Welsh Office were still cognisant of the underlying concerns of those public health 
professionals, that is DsPH and CSCDC, responsible for dealing with these issues at DHA level in 
Wales. These included questions of additional expertise and resources, expanded training 
opportunities and consideration of the need for access to advice and support on a 24 hour, 365 day 
basis, above and beyond that already available from the Welsh National Poisons Unit. They were 
also keen to see whether the findings of Hill and O'Sullivan's study were replicated in Wales. 
Although the circulars were issued shortly after the commencement of the surveillance system in 
Wales, there was no doubt that Welsh Office were keen to better define the size of the problem of 
acute chemical incidents within the principality and of the extent of any additional expertise and 
resources required to support public health professionals in Wales. Hence, the development of the 
All Wales Environmental Health Surveillance Project for Wales. 
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Figure 4.4 Model of Health Service Arrangements for Dealing with Chemical Incidents, in 
Wales in compliance with WHC(93)61 
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Chapter 5- All Wales Environmental Health 
Surveillance Project 
Introduction 
In this Chapter, the author will describe the conduct of an unique, collaborative project involving the 
surveillance of acute chemical incidents in Wales from 1993 to 1995. The All Wales Environmental 
Health Surveillance Project (AWEHSP) brought together central government, local government and 
academics with the common goals of better defining the size of the problem of acute chemical 
incidents within the principality, and of identifying the additional expertise and advice needed to 
support health and environment professionals in the management of such incidents. The AWEHSP 
was important as a surveillance project in its own right. However, in the context of this thesis, it is 
used as the basis for the development of the public health management model. 
Objectives 
As described in Chapter 3, remarkably little formal documentation of acute chemical incidents has 
taken place anywhere in the world, let alone in Wales. To identify the specific needs of public 
health professionals within the principality, baseline data was therefore required in order to better 
define the size and nature of the problem, as well as the expertise and resources essential for the 
effective management of such incidents. The project had four objectives: 
Objective 1: To describe the range, frequency and distribution of acute chemical incidents in Wales; 
Objective 2: To describe the morbidity and mortality of employees, emergency services 
personnel and the general public exposed to acute chemical incidents in Wales; 
Objective 3: To identify what additional expertise, if any, is required for the successful 
management of acute chemical incidents in Wales; and 
Objective 4: To recommend how such expertise might best be provided in Wales. 
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Organisation of the AWEHSP 
In line with the theory of model development, a multi-disciplinary, multi-agency approach was 
followed involving Welsh Office, the Council of Welsh Districts (now the Welsh Local Government 
Association), Cardiff Institute of Higher Education (now the University of Wales Institute, Cardiff) 
and the Public Health Laboratory Service. To secure the commitment of participants, funding was 
sought on a joint basis, with 50% of the annual costs being met by Welsh Office (through the Chief 
Medical Officer's Research Budget in years I and 2, and Environment Division in year 3), and the 
remainder through contributions of £600 per annum from local authority Environmental Health 
Departments in Wales (co-ordinated through the Council of Welsh Districts). The author was 
employed by Cardiff Institute of Higher Education, which also provided the necessary project 
support infrastructure. 
At an early stage, a Steering Group was formed to oversee the work undertaken on the project. 
Representatives were sought from organisations in Wales, whose support and interest in the project 
were seen as essential to its success. Accordingly, they were drawn from medical, public health, 
environmental health, administrative and policy backgrounds. The group met on twelve occasions 
during the three years of the project and proved invaluable in developing the surveillance system. 
In particular, each member was able to advise on the priorities and methods that they considered 
consistent with the needs and resources of their respective organisations. A full list of members is 
provided at Appendix 5.1. 
Method 
Thacker et at stated that any public health surveillance system must fulfil three functions: 
(a) enable the measurement of specific hazards, exposures and health outcomes; 
(b) produce an ongoing data record; and, 
(c) generate timely and representative data that can be used for planning, 
implementing and evaluating public health activities. 
(Thacker et at 1996) 
An organised approach to planning, developing, implementing, and maintaining the surveillance 
system was therefore recognised as essential (Teutsch 1992). Accordingly, the steps shown in 
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Table 5.1 were followed in the planning of the surveillance system. At the outset, careful 
consideration was also given to the attributes that would eventually be used in the evaluation of the 
system. Above all, the system needed to be feasible and acceptable to those involved, but 
sensitive enough to provide the information required in a timely manner, without exceeding the 
budget allocated for the project. 
Table 5.1 Steps in Planning a Surveillance System 
1. Establish Objectives 
2. Develop case definitions 
3. Determine data source or data-collection mechanism (type of system) 
4. Develop data-collection instruments 
5. Field-test methods 
6. Develop and test analytic approach 
7. Develop dissemination mechanism 
8. Assure use of analysis and interpretation 
Source: " Teutsch (1992) 
As the project was time limited, the Steering Group considered it important to provide some focus to 
the surveillance activities. The project was therefore separated into three phases. Within each 
phase, targets were then set, together with implementation dates. 
Phase 1 of the Project - Target A 
Responsibility for identifying health problems arising from acute chemical incidents and taking 
action to prevent, remove or mitigate them lies with many different agencies in Wales (as 
described in Chapter 4). However, local authority Environmental Health Departments were 
perceived as having a central and vital role. They are often the first contact points for the public, 
should there be any concern regarding the possible health effects of having been exposed to an 
incident. The first target for Phase I of the project was therefore to design, develop and 
implement a confidential reporting system with the Environmental Health Departments of 
the then thirty-seven district councils and two port health authorities in Wales 
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(subsequently amalgamated in April 1996 to form 22 new unitary authorities). A target date 
of 1 January 1993 was set for implementation of the reporting system. 
The Surveillance System 
Figure 5.1 provides a simple schematic of the surveillance system developed. On becoming aware 
of an incident, the first decision to be taken was whether it met the case definition. 
Definition of an Incident 
Following discussions with officers of a number of local authority Environmental Health 
Departments in Wales and peer review by the Steering Group, it was agreed to use the following 
definition of an incident: 
Figure 5.1 The Surveillance System 
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Definition of an Incident 
any unforeseen event which causes ill-health or which has the potential to cause ill-health 
and which necessitates an immediate response 
or 
one or more individuals suffering from an illness which might be due to such an event 
The definition was intended to embrace both types of public health environmental problems 
recognised by the World Health Organisation: those arising because of potential exposure 
situations and those coming to attention because of concern about illness events (World Health 
Organisation 1991). The most important part of the definition, however, was the wording "and 
which necessitates an immediate response". This precluded problems of a long-standing and 
unresolved nature and focused attention on acute incidents. 
Interpretation was further assisted by the production of a list of examples of the types of incidents 
that met with the definition and also of those that did not require reporting. Included were 
explosions, fires, airborne releases, chemical spills, and contamination of food, soil and water, as 
well as incidents of illness in individuals or populations attributed to such an event, but where 
neither an event nor a substance had been identified. Excluded were events of exposure or illness 
related to infectious diseases and radioactive materials, as were routine industrial emissions subject 
to process regulations. 
A System of Reporting 
Primary surveillance systems are traditionally classified as passive or active (Mausner and Kramer 
1985). For example, most routine notifiable-disease surveillance systems rely on passive reporting, 
that is, the local health authority receives disease reports from various health care providers on a 
case-by-case basis. In contrast, an active surveillance system is one where regular contact is 
made with data providers to elicit reports, including nil returns. In view of the criticisms commonly 
aimed at passive systems of variability and incompleteness in reporting (Sullivan, Gibbs and 
Knowles 1992; Teutsch 1992), an active system of surveillance was selected for the project. 
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A system of monthly reporting was agreed with the local authority Environmental Health 
Departments and, accordingly, prompts issued by the author during the first week of each new 
month, requesting that either an incident report(s) or a "nil return" be submitted for the previous 
month. Initially, it had been planned to take advantage of new technology for information collection 
and dissemination, that is, the Epinet communications system. However, it soon became apparent 
that this would involve additional resources, in terms of training Environmental Health Officers in the 
use of the system, which was outwith the scope of the project. 
Although each local authority Environmental Health Department nominated reporting officers for the 
completion of returns, the monthly prompts were always issued via a letter addressed to the Chief 
Environmental Health Officer. The intention was to make the latter accountable for ensuring that 
their reporting officers sent in reports of incidents or 'nil returns'. This subsequently proved very 
effective, as highlighted by the excellent response rate achieved (see Results). Of particular 
importance in securing the co-operation of local authority Environmental Health Departments was 
the assurance given that the surveillance data would be treated in confidence. 
Reporting Forms 
A questionnaire was required that would: (a) provide the information needed to meet the objectives 
of the project; (b) be acceptable to the proposed participants; and (c) facilitate the evaluation and 
interpretation stage (Bell 1993). As Oppenheim states: 
this means, first of all, that the focus and contents of the questions must be right; second, 
that the wording must be suitable; and third, that the context, sequence and response 
categories must help the respondent without unintentionally biasing the answers. 
(Oppenheim 1992) 
The months of November and December 1992 were therefore spent in planning and designing the 
questionnaire, in consultation with members of the Steering Group. The first stage was to develop 
a complete specification of the variables that would need to be measured. In this respect, the 
variables were initially separated into three sections: (a) incident details; (b) actions taken; and (c) 
lessons learned. As the data normally collected in relation to acute chemical incidents was found to 
focus mainly on the release of hazardous substances into, and the effects of these releases, on the 
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environment as end-points (Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 1993), variables 
were especially included to investigate the many risk factors associated with the morbidity and 
mortality resulting from such releases. 
At the outset of the AWEHSP, three main areas were also identified where it was anticipated that 
additional support services may be required for the management of acute chemical incidents in 
Wales. These were: 
(a) technical advice and support for measuring toxic chemicals in the environment; 
(b) medical advice on symptoms of disease, how to recognise them and how to treat them; and 
(c) epidemiological advice and assistance on how to investigate and assess short and long- 
term risks to health. 
Variables were therefore included to identify what expertise (technical, scientific, medical, 
toxicological or epidemiological) was required by local authority Environmental Health Departments 
in relation to specific incidents, whether that advice was available and the source used. 
Having defined the variables to be measured, the next stage was to develop a series of question 
modules, each concerned with a different variable, and to consider the order in which they should appear 
in the final questionnaire. Within each module, question design and wording was carried out in 
accordance with a short set of simple rules and principles, developed by Oppenheim (1992). The 
majority of the questions asked were closed, with respondents being asked to tick one or more boxes in 
relation to a choice of alternative replies. The time for completion of the questionnaire was therefore 
anticipated to be no more than 30 minutes. Some open questions were however included, allowing 
respondents to express spontaneity in their views on the handling of specific incidents. 
In the design stage, thought was also given as to how to engender and maintain the co-operation of 
respondents. Questions were therefore included to enable, wherever possible, the use of 
information held within existing administrative systems. Consideration was also given to the layout, 
spacing and answering instructions. An innovative technique was to print the questionnaires on 
differently coloured paper each month, so that they would be clearly discernible amongst the 
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plethora of white papers routinely present on the desks of the nominated reporting officers. Each 
question also had a covert function: to motivate the respondent to continue to co-operate. 
The net result was the development of two reporting forms (see Appendix 5.2). The first served as a 
summary sheet of incidents for the month in question. If there were no incidents to report, the form 
was also used to record a "nil return". The second form, the design of which has been described 
above, was used to gather more detailed information with respect to each incident and was 
arranged in the format of "Twenty Questions regarding the Incident". 
Field Testing 
The surveillance system, as detailed above, commenced on the target date set of 1 January 1993. For 
the first six months, however, the system and, in particular, the data collection instruments were subject 
to a period of field-testing. This was undertaken with all participating Environmental Health Departments, 
primarily to assess the feasibility and acceptability of the system, and to detect any difficulties with the 
content of specific questions. The results were discussed by the Steering Group, at the first and second 
of its quarterly meetings in 1993, and also by the All Wales Chief Environmental Health Officers Panel 
(AWCEHOP)'. No problems were identified in respect of the system of reporting developed, nor the 
reporting forms. However, as had been anticipated, there were difficulties relating to the interpretation of 
the definition of an incident. Accordingly, as a condition to the full implementation of the system, it was 
agreed that the author should visit and meet with the reporting officers of each participating Department, 
to provide a harmonised view of the types of incidents that should and should not be reported. 
Phase I of the Project - Target B 
From the perspective of the participating Environmental Health Departments, there was little point in them 
reporting incidents, if they did not, in turn, benefit from the system. To this end, a target was set to 
analyse the data received and produce regular surveillance reports to the Steering Group for 
subsequent distribution, in confidence, to Chief Environmental Health Officers in Wales. 
The All Wales Chief Environmental Health Officers Panel comprised of representation of the Chief Environmental Health Officers of 
all 37 district councils and 2 port health authorities in Wales. Meetings of the Panel were held every two months. 
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Data Management 
With any surveillance system, procedures need to be established for the maintenance and retention 
of paper-based reporting forms, and for entry of the data into computerised databases (Sullivan, 
Gibbs and Knowles 1992). 
On receipt, each incident report was assessed by the author for timeliness, completeness and 
inconsistencies in the data. Often, a follow-up call was made to the reporting officer to check the 
accuracy of the data provided. For consistency in data collection and ease of analysis, the 
AWEHSP followed the lead of the ATSDR (with respect to the HSEESS) by emulating the data 
collection form in the statistical software package, SPSS for Windows V6. Following assessment, 
the data was therefore entered, in accordance with an established monthly schedule, into the 
database. The latter was also quality checked on a quarterly basis to remove any discrepancies 
from the dataset. The information provided in relation to open questions was not computerised, but 
retained in the filed paper copy. To guarantee the confidentiality on which the system was founded, 
access to the database was limited through the use of passwords and the original incident report 
forms filed and stored in a locked cabinet. Back-up copies of the database were also kept off-site to 
ensure the integrity of the system in the event of unforeseen problems, such as computer theft, fire 
etc.. 
Data Analysis 
The database not only provided a repository for data on the incidents reported, but also enabled 
improved data analysis. The results of these analyses are provided in the next two sections of this 
Chapter. In the first section, analyses are mainly limited to frequency distributions and cross- 
tabulations of specific variables in the process of defining the size and nature of the problem in 
Wales; whilst the second section provides an evaluation of the lessons learned by local authority 
Environmental Health Departments in the management of such incidents. 
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Disseminating Information 
The standard definition of public health surveillance, included in Chapter 3, requires the timely 
dissemination of findings to both the providers of data and public health policy makers. As 
Goodman, Remington and Howard state: 
... effective communication of public 
health surveillance results represents the critical link in 
the translation of scientific information into public health practice. 
(Goodman, Remington and Howard 1992) 
"Incident Bulletins" were therefore issued on a quarterly basis to the local authority Environmental 
Health Departments. Included were standard tabular and graphical analyses based on the 
combined data from all participating Departments, together with narrative reports about incidents of 
interest. Such feedback was perceived as essential in demonstrating to those involved that their 
data was being gainfully employed. 
The communication of surveillance results generally was, however, facilitated by the fact that all the 
primary target audiences were represented on the Steering Group. Other channels used included 
the presentation of update reports at bi-annual meetings of the Welsh Office with Chief 
Environmental Health Officers in Wales, the publication of an annual report by the Steering Group, 
and the extensive use of public forums, such as conferences and meetings. An annual one-day 
workshop for reporting officers from the Environmental Health Departments was also held to review 
examples of the incidents reported, and to provide an opportunity for feedback and discussion on 
the effectiveness or otherwise of the reporting system developed. 
Phase 2 of the Project - Target A 
As stated above, local authority Environmental Health Departments are just one of many agencies 
in Wales with responsibilities for identifying and reacting to potential health problems arising from 
community exposures to acute chemical incidents. The first target for Phase 2 of the project 
was therefore to identify other sources of data on incidents, and to evaluate the feasibility of 
including other agencies within the surveillance system. A target date of 1 July 1993 was 
set for implementation of this phase of the project. 
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Health Authorities 
The professionals most likely to receive reports where one or more individuals are suffering from 
symptoms which may be due to a chemical incident, that is, the second arm of the definition, were 
considered to be the Consultants in Communicable Disease Control (CsCDC) of the then nine HAs 
in Wales (subsequently amalgamated in April 1996 to form five new authorities). 
Following discussions with the All Wales CsCDC Group, it was decided that the most appropriate 
involvement for CsCDC would be for them to make known any incidents that they became aware of, 
via the reporting officers of the local authority Environmental Health Departments. This would also 
have the additional benefit of extending the already well established liaison arrangements between 
CsCDC and EHOs beyond communicable disease control to acute chemical incidents. This 
arrangement came into effect on 1 May 1993. 
Welsh Water 
In March 1993, the author met with the Divisional Manager of Welsh Water to discuss the feasibility 
of developing a separate, but complementary system for the surveillance of incidents of chemical 
contamination of water supplies in Wales. However, whilst supportive of the project, Welsh Water 
considered this to be a duplication of effort, given their statutory responsibilities to notify local 
authority Environmental Health Departments of all significant incidents involving public water 
supplies (Water Quality (Water Supply) Regulations 1989). It was therefore anticipated that reports 
of water contamination incidents would be received via the system already established with local 
authority Environmental Health Departments. 
Welsh National Poisons Unit 
In January 1994, however, a separate reporting system was established with the Welsh National 
Poisons Unit, based at Llandough Hospital, near Cardiff. Established in 1963, as part of the NPIS, 
the Unit was viewed as representing the first point of contact for Accident and Emergency 
consultants, other clinicians and CsCDC where specialist toxicological advice was required in 
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respect of the diagnosis, treatment and management of people poisoned (or suspected of being 
poisoned) by a wide range of substances or products. Although 80 per cent of the enquiries 
received by the Unit in 1993 related to the accidental or deliberate ingestion of drugs or household 
products by children or adults, the Unit was receiving an increasing number of calls relating to 
occupational and population exposures to chemical incidents (Welsh National Poisons Unit 1994). 
As the geographical remit of the Unit covered the whole of Wales, it was considered to be an 
excellent opportunity to evaluate the extent of overlap in the incidents reported by both local 
authority Environmental Health Departments and the Unit. The only difficulty was that, due to the 
large number of enquiries handled by the Unit, information on any chemical incident would need to 
be recorded in real-time. Accordingly, the second of the two reporting forms developed for the local 
authority system was condensed into a single A4 sheet (Appendix 5.3). Otherwise, the systems of 
reporting were identical in all respects. 
Gwent Fire Brigade 
In June 1994, a retrospective study was undertaken with Gwent Fire Brigade, one of the then eight 
Brigades in Wales (subsequently amalgamated in April 1996 to form three new Brigades), of all 
acute chemical incidents handled by fire fighters during the period 1 January 1993 to 31 May 1994. 
A total of 170 incidents were initially identified, although many of these were later excluded when 
fuller details became available, on the basis of their not meeting the definition. 
As only two of the incidents had previously been recorded by those local authority Environmental Health 
Departments providing services within the same locality, it was decided to develop a pilot reporting 
system with Gwent Fire Brigade, effective from 1 January 1995. The system of reporting adopted by the 
Brigade was the same as that developed with the local authority Environmental Health Departments. In 
this respect, the author provided training and education to each of the Brigade's Station Officers in the 
interpretation of the definition of an incident, and in the completion of the reporting forms. At the end of 
each month, reports of incidents or "nil returns" from each station were centrally collated at the Brigade's 
headquarters, and then forwarded to Cardiff, on receipt of the monthly prompt from the author. The 
Brigade was also represented on the Project Steering Group (Appendix 5.1). 
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Other Fire Brigades in Wales 
In addition to participating in the project, the Chief Fire Officer for Gwent Fire Brigade also agreed to 
facilitate its possible extension to other Brigades in Wales during 1995. In this respect, papers were 
prepared and tabled at a meeting of the Chief and Assistant Chief Fire Officers Association for 
Wales. However, whilst the proposals received general assent, any further progress was curtailed 
by the impending re-organisation of the Fire Service in Wales in April 1996. 
Police Constabularies 
Negotiations also took place during the early part of 1994 with all four Police Constabularies in 
Wales, regarding the possibility of establishing complementary reporting systems. However, a 
stumbling block soon became apparent. Details of all incidents investigated by the police were 
recorded on standard crime record sheets, access to which would not be available to the project, on 
grounds of confidentiality. The development of reporting systems with Police Constabularies in 
Wales was therefore not pursued any further. 
Health and Safety Executive / Her Maiestv's Inspectorate of Pollution 
Similar problems over confidentiality of information were experienced with respect to the Health and 
Safety Executive and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution, primarily because of their statutory 
responsibilities in relation to prescribed industrial processes. Approaches were made to both 
organisations in 1994. 
National Rivers Authority 
Given the concerns about confidentiality expressed by the Health and Safety Executive and Her 
Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution, it was perhaps surprising when the National Rivers Authority 
(NRA) - Welsh Region agreed to send reports of incidents to the project. The latter were to be 
limited to all Category 1A incidents, that is, those events categorised as major incidents by the NRA 
(27 Category 1A incidents occurred in Wales in 1993). It was also proposed to grant the author 
access to the Authority's central database in Cardiff to extract information on Category 1B (major 
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hazards to water quality) and 2A (significant pollution) incidents, both prospectively and 
retrospectively back to I January 1993. Unfortunately, as the negotiations were being completed, 
funding for the AWEHSP was coming to an end and it was not possible to operationalise the system 
that had been developed. 
Welsh Office Agriculture Department 
The Welsh Office Agriculture Department (WOAD) is responsible for coordinating the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food's response in Wales to any chemical incident which may pose a 
threat to the safety of food or the food chain. Most incidents are handled quickly and effectively by 
voluntary action, for example, by farmers withholding suspect milk from supply where livestock has 
been given contaminated feed. However, in the event of a serious incident, WOAD has recourse to 
wide-ranging powers under Part 1 of the Food and Environmental Protection Act 1985, to prohibit 
the distribution of affected produce from areas where foodstuffs may have been contaminated, for 
example, by smoke toxins arising from a chemical fire. 
For each of the three years of the project, WOAD provided a simple line-listing of such events, 
further highlighting the breadth of agencies / authorities in Wales involved in the management of 
acute chemical incidents. 
Phase 2 of the Project - Target B 
The second target for Phase 2 of the project was to establish systems for the routine 
monitoring of national and local newspapers in Wales for reports of acute chemical 
incidents. This started on 1 January 1993, in advance of the target date set of 1 July 1993. 
In effect, the only newspapers that were systematically surveyed for the three years of the project 
were the two nationals in Wales, that is, "The Western Mail" and the "Liverpool Daily Post". The 
routine vigilance of local newspapers in Wales proved too problematic, given the sheer numbers 
published and the time it was taking the author to survey them on a weekly basis. The feasibility of 
a press cutting service was investigated, but the costs were prohibitive. 
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The primary purpose of such vigilance was to check the sensitivity of the surveillance systems 
developed with the other agencies/authorities. Where an incident meeting the definition was 
identified in the press, a copy was taken, and the source and date recorded. If after two months, no 
report of the incident had been received from the local authority Environmental Health Department 
within whose area it had occurred, a letter was sent to the Chief Environmental Health Officer 
enclosing a copy of the cutting. The letter asked if the Officer's Department were aware of the 
incident and, if so, a request made for them to complete the necessary reporting forms. Similar 
systems of follow-up were established with the Welsh National Poisons Unit and Gwent Fire 
Brigade, but by a telephone call to the relevant officers, rather than by letter. 
Phase 3 of the Project 
The target for Phase 3 of the project was to evaluate the expertise (technical, scientific, 
medical, toxicological or epidemiological) currently available within Wales for supporting the 
handling of acute chemical incidents, and to recommend what additional expertise was 
required to better support the effective investigation and management of future incidents 
within the principality. 
The first part of the target was achieved through analysing the responses received in relation to 
those variables which had been specifically included within the questionnaire to ascertain the nature 
of expert advice sought (technical, scientific, medical, toxicological or epidemiological) by local 
authority Environmental Health Departments in handling acute chemical incidents, whether that 
advice was available and from what source. On completion, the gaps identified were then 
evaluated in conjunction with the answers provided to the twentieth and final question, that is, the 
lessons learned, leading to the development of appropriate recommendations on the nature of any 
additional expertise required to support the effective investigation and management of future 
incidents within the principality. 
Although these processes of analysis and evaluation were ongoing from the start of the project, it 
was obviously not possible to finalise the recommendations until all the data had been received, 
that is, after 31 December 1995. 
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Results 
The AWEHSP operated in Wales from 1 January 1993 to 31 December 1995. A total of 642 acute 
chemical incidents were reported from all sources. The systems developed with local authority 
Environmental Health Departments and for press vigilance functioned concurrently for the duration 
of the project. However, those implemented with the Welsh National Poisons Unit and Gwent Fire 
Brigade operated over different time scales. The results presented below are therefore based on 
analyses conducted of the combined data sets for each individual reporting source. 
Local Authority Environmental Health Departments 
Response Rate 
A 100 per cent response rate, that is, a nil return or report of an incident, was achieved each and 
every month for the three year duration of the project. 
The Number of Incidents 
A total of 270 acute chemical incidents were reported (Figure 5.2). Although there was no seasonal 
pattern to the reporting of incidents generally, there were underlying peaks in the reporting of 
specific types of incidents, for example, the proliferation of algal blooms affecting coastal and 
recreational waters during the summer months. Thirty-six of the 39 Departments handled at least 
one incident within their respective areas during the three year period of surveillance. The majority 
(78%) reported less than ten incidents; only 4 reported more than 20 incidents (Figure 5.3). Nearly 
two-fifths (39%) of the incidents reported came to light as a result of complaints made by members 
of the public (see Figure 5.4). A further thirty (10%) were identified through the routine district 
inspection and/or environmental monitoring activities of Environmental Health Departments. The 
other principal sources of notification of incidents to Environmental Health Departments were the 
Fire Service (11%), National Rivers Authority (now part of the Environment Agency) (10%) and the 
operators of the premises where incidents had occurred (9%). 
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Figure 5.2 Number of Incidents Reported by Local Authority Environmental Health 
Departments, Wales, 1993 -1995 
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Figure 5.3 Number of Incidents Reported per Local Authority Environmental Health 
Department, Wales, 1993 -1995 
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Figure 5.4 Original Sources of Information on Incidents Reported to Local Authority 
Environmental Health Departments, Wales, 1993 -1995 
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For the first time, it has been possible to gain an impression of the nature of acute chemical 
incidents occurring across Wales. Figure 5.5 shows that chemical spills were the most frequently 
reported type of incident (28%), followed by airborne releases (22%), and exposures to deposits of 
waste materials (16%). The remainder included fires (11%), algal blooms (7%) and water 
contamination incidents (7%). 
The Location of Incidents 
Sixty-five per cent of the incidents occurred at fixed facilities and 17% were transportation related (Table 
5.2). The origin of the fixed facility incidents was as follows: operational industrial sites (38%), 
residential premises (25%) commercial premises (11%), agricultural premises (8%), vacant 
industrial sites (7%), and waste disposal sites (5%). Of the transportation-related incidents, 62% 
involved transport at sea and 38% occurred on the highway. 
Police 4% NRA 10% 
Public Complaint 39% 
Figure 5.5 - Nature of Incidents Reported by Local Authority Environmental Health 
Departments, Wales, 1993 -1995 
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Table 5.2 Classification of 270 chemical incidents according to location, Wales, 1993- 
1995 
Cause Fixed facilities Transportation-related Other 
Number (Percentage) 176 (65%) 45 (17%) 49 (18%) 
Overall, the most frequently reported location for incidents (Figure 5.6) were operational industrial 
sites (25%). Airborne releases (37%), fires (31%) and chemical spills (19%) accounted for the 
majority of incidents reported at such sites (Table 5.3). At vacant industrial sites (5%), incidents 
included the discovery of asbestos fibres in broken building products, coal tip fires, acid spills from 
poorly secured tanks and drums left on site, and methane gas emissions from copper mine shafts. 
Drums of chemicals washed ashore on the tide, algal blooms (including "Red Tides" off 
Pembrokeshire in both 1994 and 1995), and spills of oil and of other chemicals into coastal waters 
were the most frequent causes of incidents at coastal locations (15%). The occurrence of blue- 
green algal blooms was also a perennial summer problem of reservoirs in Wales. This included in 
1995, the first reported cases of ill-health (skin rashes, vomiting) in users of recreational waters 
contaminated with such blooms. The other main causes of incidents involving inland waters (7%) 
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Fires 11 % 
Algal Bloorm 7% 
were spillages of raw, untreated sewage into watercourses and the seepage of chemicals from 
waste materials illicitly deposited on the banks of rivers. 
Figure 5.6 Location of Incidents Reported By Local Authority Environmental Health 
Departments, Wales, 1993 -1995 
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Spillages of slurry from defective storage tanks and the accidental run-off of herbicides into 
watercourses following land application were among the incidents reported at agricultural premises 
(5%), whilst incidents at commercial premises (9%) mainly involved garages and spillages of 
petroleum and/or diesel oil into drainage systems; leisure centres and emissions of chlorine gas 
from swimming pool treatment plants; and, supermarkets and leakages of refrigerant gases. 
Of most concern at residential premises (16%) were the 11 incidents of carbon monoxide 
poisoning, which gave rise to 5 fatalities and 23 casualties, the latter all requiring immediate 
hospitalisation and specialist treatment. Other incidents at residential premises included the 
chemical contamination of drinking water supplies (34%), exposure to fumes arising from the 
injection of chemical damp proof courses (14%), and flooding (14%). The latter primarily occurred 
at coastal locations, but also resulted from the collapse of a canal bank. 
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The fly-tipping of chemicals and chemical wastes in open parkland areas, car parks and the 
communal areas of residential housing estates was the main cause of incidents reported under the 
heading "open public spaces" (7%). An incident which highlighted the potential risk that may arise 
from such indiscriminate dumping occurred in North Wales in October 1994, where the discovery by 
children of a drum containing sodium sticks resulted in their distribution over a large residential 
estate and one child being admitted to hospital with severe facial burns. 
Seventeen (6%) incidents were reported as having occurred on the highway. These incidents 
mainly involved chemical spills from tankers following road traffic accidents, and drums and / or 
other packages of chemicals falling onto the highway from the flatbeds of lorries. A potentially 
serious incident occurred in January 1995, when a road collapsed below a tanker carrying liquefied 
petroleum gas. Prompt action to stabilise the tanker prevented any gaseous release and averted 
the explosive risk to neighbouring properties. 
Incidents at waste disposal sites (3%) either involved the detection of elevated and potentially 
explosive levels of methane in residential properties adjacent to operational or closed landfill sites, 
or the leaching of waste chemicals into watercourses. The "other" category included four incidents 
involving the chemical contamination of food. Those of greatest concern were two incidents 
involving contamination of milk, with naphthalene and 6-chloro-otho-cresol respectively. 
The Public Health Impact of Incidents 
A total of 237,991 people were reported as having been exposed in the 214 incidents for which 
information was available (Table 5.4). Fewer than 10 people were exposed in 118 (57.6%) of the 
incidents. However, thirty incidents were reported where more than 100 people were exposed. The 
population group most frequently exposed was the general public (236,101 exposed in 201 
incidents for which information was available), followed by emergency responders (1591 exposed in 
227 incidents for which information was available), and employees of the premises where the 
incidents occurred (299 exposed in 226 incidents for which information was available). 
101 
Table 5.4 - Breakdown of Incidents by Numbers of People Exposed and Population 
Group, Wales, 1993-1995 
NUMBER OF 
INCIDENTS 
(%) NUMBER OF 
INCIDENTS 
(%) NUMBER OF 
INCIDENTS 
(%) NUMBER OF 
INCIDENTS 
(%) 
0 190 70% 111 41% 81 30% 15 5.5% 
1 7 2.5% 8 3% 21 8% 17 6.5% 
2-4 11 4% 26 10% 28 10% 38 14% 
5-9 9 3.5% 30 11% 20 7% 47 17.5% 
10 - 49 9 3.5% 47 17% 18 7% 60 22% 
50 - 99 0 0% 4 1.5% 4 1.5% 7 2.5% 
100 > 0 0% 1 0.5% 29 11% 30 11% 
Not Stated 44 16.5% 43 16% 69 25.5% 56 21% 
In 57 of the 267 incidents for which information was available, people were also reported as having 
suffered symptoms (Table 5.5). Although two incidents were reported where exposure led to 
symptoms in 50 and 120 members of the public respectively, it was reassuring to find that 47 
(82.5%) of the 57 incidents involved fewer than 10 people with symptoms. The general public was 
the population group most frequently reported as having suffered symptoms (a total of 473 in 57 
incidents for which information was available), followed by employees of the premises where the 
incidents occurred (a total of 38 in 10 incidents for which information was available). Of the 1598 
responders exposed, it was encouraging to find that only 17 suffered symptoms, which points both 
to good training and the use of appropriate protective clothing and breathing apparatus by those 
involved. A total of 6 persons died in 5 incidents. Of those who died, 1 was an employee and 5 
were members of the public. 
Nausea, headaches, respiratory and eye irritations were the most commonly reported symptoms 
(Figure 5.7). Other symptoms included irritations of the nose and throat, vomiting, chemical burns, 
and dizziness or other CNS problems, the latter due mainly to the effects of exposure to carbon 
monoxide. Although the findings were predictable, it was helpful to have them verified by data. 
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Table 5.5 Breakdown of Incidents by Numbers of People with Symptoms and 
Population Group, Wales, 1993 - 1995 
NUMBERS 
WITH 
0 
1 
5-9 
10-49 
50 - 99 
100 > 
Not Stated 
EMPLOYEES RESPONDERS 
NUMBER OF 
INCIDENTS 
(%) NUMBER OF 
INCIDENTS 
(%) 
260 96.5% 266 980/1 
3 1% 1 0.5°/ 
3 1% 1 0.5°i 
4 1.5% 2 1% 
0 0% 0 0% 
0 0% 0 0% 
0 0% 0 0% 
0 0% 0 0% 
PUBLIC ALL INCIDENTS 
NUMBER OF 
INCIDENTS 
(°/) NUMBER OF 
INCIDENTS 
(%) 
218 80% 210 77% 
15 5.5% 16 5.5% 
13 5% 19 7% 
10 4% 12 4.5% 
9 3.5% 10 4% 
1 0.5% 1 0.5% 
1 0.5% 1 0.5% 
3 1% 3 1% 
Figure 5.7 Frequency of Symptoms Reported, Wales 1993 - 1995 
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Chemicals Released 
Details of the actual chemicals released were provided in 223 of the incidents reported. 191 or 
85.6% involved the release of a single chemical (Table 5.6). Details of those chemicals appearing 
three or more times in the database are provided in Table 5.7. For some incidents, only the class of 
chemical involved is specified. 
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Table 5.6 Number of Chemicals Released in all Incidents 
INCIDENTS 
NUMBER OF 
CHEMICALS RELEASED 
NUMBER OF 
INCIDENTS 
(%) NUMBER OF 
CHEMICALS 
(%) 
1 191 70.7% 191 58.9% 
2 11 4.1% 22 6.8% 
3 7 2.6% 21 6.5% 
4 2 0.7% 8 2.5% 
5 3 1.1% 15 4.6% 
6 or more 9 3.3% 67 20.7% 
Not Stated 47 17.5% 0 0.0% 
TOTAL 270 100% 324 100% 
Other Agencies Involved in the Management of Incidents 
Figure 5.8 provides a breakdown of the other agencies / authorities involved in the management of 
the incidents reported by local authority Environmental Health Departments in Wales. The Fire 
Service (17.5%), National Rivers Authority (now part of the Environment Agency) (16.9%) and 
Police (11.5%) were those agencies / authorities primarily involved. Local authority Emergency 
Planning Departments and health authorities were involved respectively in only 18 (3.5%) and 27 
(5.2%) of the incidents reported. 
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Table 5.7 Chemicals and Chemical Groups associated with the Incidents Reported by 
local authority Environmental Health Departments, Wales, 1993-1995 
Chemical/Chemical Group No. Chemical/Chemical Group No. 
Smoke toxins 34 Corrosive Liquids - chromic acid, nitric 5 
acid, phosphoric acid etc. 
Volatile Organic Compounds - paints, 20 Clinical waste 5 
Particulate matter 14 Herbicides 5 
Sewage 14 Sodium / Potassium hydroxide 5 
Hydrochloric Acid 11 Red tides - Gymnodinium aureola 5 
Petroleum 10 Flammable Liquids ex. propyl alcohol 5 
Propane / Butane Gas 10 Radioactive Gases 5 
Miscellaneous Oils - heating, waste, 
steam etc. 
10 Methane - landfill gas 5 
Heavy Metals - lead, copper, aluminium, 
iron, manganese, arsenic, mercury 
10 Bromine 4 
Asbestos 9 Miscellaneous Waste materials 4 
Blue-green algae 9 Carbon monoxide 4 
Sulphuric acid 8 Di-isocyanates 3 
Aromatic hydrocarbons - benzene, 
PAHs, cresols etc. 
7 Agricultural slurry / silage 3 
Phaeocystis algal blooms 6 Pesticides 3 
Damp Proof Course Injection Fluids 6 Crude oil 3 
Chlorine 6 Sodium / Potassium cyanide 3 
Diesel Oil 6 Fungicides 3 
Hydrogen Sulphide 5 Wartime incendiary devices / nerve 
gas bombs 
3 
Actions Taken (Figure 5.9) 
Environmental sampling / monitoring was carried out pursuant to 163 (60.4%) of the incidents 
reported. For incidents involving contamination of water, food and soil, sampling / monitoring had 
always been undertaken (Figure 5.10). This was not the case, however, in relation to contamination 
of the atmosphere. Neither sampling nor monitoring had been undertaken in 76.7% of fires, 71.4% 
of explosions and 41.7% of airborne releases; likewise, in 60.5% of incidents involving exposure to 
deposits of waste materials and 31.6% of chemical spills. 
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Figure 5.8 Other Agencies / Authorities Involved in the Management of the Incidents 
Reported by Local Authority Environmental Health Departments, Wales, 1993 
- 1995 
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In 27 of the 58 (46.6%) incidents where people had reportedly suffered symptoms, limited forms of 
"health surveillance" had been undertaken. These comprised primarily medical surveillance of 
people attending hospital Accident and Emergency Departments and / or GP surgeries, and 
occupational health surveillance. There were no instances of any formal epidemiological 
investigations having been instigated. The health authority had provided the lead in relation to 15 of 
the incidents; the remainder had been carried out by local authority Environmental Health 
Departments (N = 7) and industry-based occupational health services (N = 5). 
"Public health advisories", for example, the erection of warning notices around reservoirs affected 
by algal blooms, were issued in 81 of the incidents reported. In 74 incidents, persons were 
evacuated from their homes or advised to stay indoors with windows and doors firmly shut. The 
category "removal of hazard" embraces the extinguishing of fires, clean up of chemical spills, 
disposal of drums and packages of chemicals, and excavation of areas of contaminated soil 
(N = 176). 
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Figure 5.9 Actions Taken in relation to the Incidents Reported by Local Authority 
Environmental Health Departments, Wales, 1993-1995 
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The ventilation of residential properties following chemical damp proof course installations and the 
flushing of water mains pursuant to chemical contamination incidents were among the risk 
mitigation measures taken (N = 63). Preventative steps (N=108) included changes to work 
practices, such as the recommendation to move from hot-cutting to cold-cutting techniques in 
dismantling tanks that had been formally used for the storage of chemicals (following a major fire at 
a chemicals site in South Wales), and flood alleviation schemes. 
Legal actions were pursued in 23 of the incidents reported and formal cautions issued in a further 
48 incidents. Local authority emergency plans were invoked on only 6 occasions. 
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Figure 5.10 Environmental Monitoring Undertaken pursuant to the Incidents Reported by 
Local Authority Environmental Health Departments, Wales, 1993 -1995 
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Tables 5.8,5.9 and 5.10 provide a detailed breakdown of the technical, scientific and medical 
advice that was requested by Environmental Health Departments in responding to the incidents 
reported. Technical advice was that most commonly sought (N = 145), followed by scientific advice 
(N=115) and medical advice (N = 43). As shown in the tables, advice was generally available, 
although from a variety of sources, dependent on the nature and location of the incidents. Scientific 
advice was analysed against the National Academy of Sciences(NAS)/National Research Council 
(NRC) risk assessment paradigm (NAS/NRC 1983). Advice was most commonly needed in relation 
to the "Hazard Identification" (N=80) and "Dose-Response Assessment" (N=77) steps of the 
paradigm. The incidents for which advice was not available (N=11) mainly involved airborne 
releases from fires and industrial processes, where there were difficulties in both predicting thermal 
decomposition and/or reactivity products, and accessing suitable continuous monitoring equipment. 
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Table 5.8 Technical Advice sought by Environmental Health Departments at the time of 
chemical incidents, Wales, 1993 - 1995 (N = 145) 
Nature of Advice Required Number of Availability Source(s) of Advice [N] 
Requests 
Procedures for the safe 12 Yes = 7; Fire Service [6]; LA Technical Services 
handling of chemical drums / No=5 Department [4]; Private Consultants [2] 
packages / clinical waste 
Procedures for the decanting 4 Yes = 4; Industry [2]; Fire Service [2] 
of chemicals from damaged No =0 
tanks / road tankers 
Chemicals likely to have been 8 Yes = 5; Industry [5] 
released No =3 
Strategies for environmental 43 Yes = 38; University Departments [5]; Private 
sampling / monitoring No =5 Consultants [15]; NRA [11]; MAFF [9]; 
Public Analyst [13]; British Gas [4]; Torrey 
Research Station [5]; British Geological 
Survey [1] 
Dispersion modelling 1 Yes = 0; 
No =1 
Engineering solutions to 18 Yes = 18; Regional Waste Management Groups [6]; 
problems, ex. Methane No =0 HSE [3]; LA Engineering Department [2]; 
extraction at landfill sites; British Waterways [1]; Industry [7]; British 
safe operation of pipeline Geological Survey [1] 
systems; demolition 
procedures 
Cause of incident(s), ex. 21 Yes = 20; HSE [11]; HMIP [2]; Fire Service [1]; 
Carbon monoxide / Source of No =1 Industry [2]; British Gas [4]; NRA [3]; Water 
contamination Company [6]; Nuclear Electric [3] 
Procedures for containment / 14 Yes = 14; Fire Service [9]; NRA [9]; LA Technical 
neutralisation of chemical No =0 Services Department [4] 
spills incl. firefighting waters 
Procedures for isolation / 7 Yes = 7; Fire Service [5]; Industry [6]; British Gas [1] 
containment of airborne No =0 
releases 
Procedures for extinguishing 6 Yes = 6; Fire Service [6]; National Farmers Union 
of fires No =0 [1]; International Mining Consultants [1] 
Rehabilitation of contaminated 7 Yes = 7; Industry [5]; Private Consultants [4]; Fire 
soil No =0 Service [2]; HSE [1]; LA Technical Services 
Department [1]; Regional Waste 
Management Group [11 
Rehabilitation of polluted 4 Yes = 4; NRA [4]; Water Company [1] 
watercourses No =0 
Removal of asbestos waste 4 Yes = 5; HSE [1]; Private Consultants [5] 
products No =0 
Layout of drainage systems 3 Yes = 3; LA Technical Services Department [3]; 
No =0 Water Company [1] 
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Table 5.9 Scientific Advice sought by Environmental Health Departments at the time of 
chemical incidents (N =115) 
Nature of Advice Number of Availability Source(s) of Advice [N] 
Required Requests 
Hazard 80 Yes = 69; University Departments [6]; Private 
Identification No = 11 Consultants [15]; NRA [21]; MAFF [14]; 
Public Analyst[20]; HMIP [5]; PHLS [3]; 
[Identification and Torrey Research Station [4]; Industry [7]; 
quantification of Water Company [5]; Fire Service [2]; Health 
chemicals involved and Safety Laboratory [1]; Drinking Water incl. thermal Inspectorate [1]; Nuclear Electric [3]; British 
decomposition Gas [4] 
products] 
Hazard 77 Yes = 68; University Departments [6]; Private 
Assessment No = 11 Consultants [14]; NRA [19]; MAFF [14]; 
[Dose - Response 
Public Analyst[20]; HMIP [5]; PHLS [3]; 
Assessment] 
Torrey Research Station [4]; Water 
Company [5]; Fire Service [2]; Health and 
Safety Laboratory [1]; Drinking Water 
Inspectorate [1]; Nuclear Electric [3]; 
Industry [5]; British Gas [4] 
Risk Evaluation 21 Yes = 16; NRA [11]; MRC Toxicology Unit [1]; MAFF 
[Exposure No =5 [10]; HMIP [5]; Torrey Research Station [3]; 
Assessment] Industry [2]; Fire Service [2]; Water Company [5]; Nuclear Electric [3] 
Risk 9 Yes = 7; No Health and Safety Executive [6]; Industry 
Characterisation =2 [3]; Fire Service [1]; Nuclear Electric [3] 
Employee Safety 
Risk 24 Yes = 18; NRA [11]; MAC Toxicology Unit [1]; MAFF 
Characterisation No =6 [10]; HMIP [5]; Torrey Research Station [3]; 
Public Safety Industry [2]; Fire Service [2]; Water Company [5]; Nuclear Electric [3] 
Table 5.10 - Medical Advice sought by Environmental Health Departments at the time of 
chemical incidents (N = 43) 
Nature of Advice Number of Availability Source(s) of Advice (N)] 
Required Requests 
Clinical management 19 Yes = 19; No Accident and Emergency Department [14]; 
=0 General Practitioner [4]; Specialist 
Treatment Facility [4]; Ambulance Service 
[4]; Welsh National Poisons Unit [3] 
Likely adverse health 18 Yes = 14; No Health Authority [10]; HSE [1]; Fire Service 
effects of exposure =4 [1]; MAFF [1]; Welsh National Poisons Unit 
(acute / chronic) [1] 
Occupational health 8 Yes = 8; No Occupational Health Department, Hospital 
surveillance =0 [1]; Health Authority [1]; Industry [6] 
--mom . 0111,117M 
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Welsh National Poisons Unit 
In January 1994, a separate reporting system was established with the Welsh National Poisons 
Unit. As will be evident from the results presented below, the Unit mainly recorded incidents, where 
people had been referred to Accident and Emergency Departments for treatment following 
accidental exposure to chemicals. The Unit therefore provided a very useful supplementary 
reporting system to that implemented with local authority Environmental Health Departments in 
Wales. 
Figure 5.11 Distribution of 332 incidents by reporting source, Wales, 1994-1995 
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A total of 168 incidents were reported by the Welsh National Poisons Unit for the period 1 January 
1994 to 31 December 1995. A comparative analysis of the incidents reported by the Unit with those 
recorded by local authority Environmental Health Departments for the same period revealed only 2 
incidents as being common to both systems (Figure 5.11). This can probably be attributed to the 
very different sources of initial notification of incidents to each system. Reports of acute chemical 
incidents mainly came to the attention of the Welsh National Poisons Unit through calls received 
from hospital A&E Departments (76%) and General Practitioners (13%). 
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The Nature and Location of Incidents 
As for the system developed with local authority Environmental Health Departments, chemical spills 
(48.7%) constituted the most frequently reported type of incident, followed by airborne releases 
(29.7%) and fires (8.2%) (Figure 5.12) There was, however, a marked difference in the locations of 
the incidents reported by the two systems. Figure 5.13 shows that 78 per cent of the incidents 
reported by the Welsh National Poisons Unit occurred at operational industrial premises. In 
contrast, only 25 per cent of the incidents reported by local authority Environmental Health 
Departments occurred at such premises (see Figure 5.6 above). Other locations included 
commercial premises (7%), educational establishments (4%) and hospital premises (4%). 
The Public Health Impact of the Incidents Reported 
As the calls handled by the Unit related mainly to people who were attending hospital A&E 
Departments or general practitioner's surgeries for treatment, the numbers exposed were known in 
97.1 per cent of the incidents reported (Table 5.11). This compared with a figure of 79 per cent for 
incidents reported by local authority Environmental Health Departments (see Table 5.4 above). A 
total of 361 people were reported as having been exposed in the 163 incidents for which information 
was available. Eighty-four per cent of the incidents involved the exposure of just one individual, and 
in only 9 incidents were five or more people exposed. The population group most frequently 
exposed were employees of the premises where the incidents occurred (214 exposed in 163 
incidents for which information was available), followed by the general public (89 exposed in 165 
incidents for which information was available) and emergency responders (58 exposed in 166 
incidents for which information was available). This was in marked contrast to the incidents 
reported by local authority Environmental Health Departments, where employees were the 
population group least frequently exposed. 
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Figure 5.12 Nature of Incidents Reported by the Welsh National Poisons Unit, Wales, 
1994-1995 
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Figure 5.13 Location of Incidents Reported By the Welsh National Poisons Unit, Wales, 
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In 153 or 91.6% of the 167 incidents for which information was available, people were also reported 
as having suffered symptoms (Table 5.12). Accordingly, the symptom prevalence rates in 
employees and members of the public reflected very closely the exposure prevalence rates for the 
two groups, as shown in Table 5.11. This was not, however, the case with respect to emergency 
responders, where only 12 or 20.7% of those exposed (N = 58) suffered symptoms. 
Figure 5.14 shows that irritations of the eye and respiratory tract, headache and chemical burns 
were the most commonly reported symptoms. Other symptoms included irritations of the skin, nose 
and throat, and dizziness. 
Figure 5.11 Breakdown of Incidents by Numbers of People Exposed and Population 
Group, Wales, 1994 - 1995 
NUMBERS 
EXPOSED 
EMPLOYEES RESPONDERS PUBLIC ALL INCIDENTS 
NUMBER OF 
INCIDENTS 
(%) NUMBER OF 
INCIDENTS 
(%) NUMBER 
OF 
INCIDENTS 
(%) NUMBER OF 
INCIDENTS 
(%) 
0 9 5.4% 155 92.2% 156 92.8% 2 1.2% 
1 141 83.9% 4 2.4% 3 1.8% 137 81.6% 
2-4 9 5.4% 1 0.6% 4 2.4% 15 9% 
5-9 2 1.2% 4 2.4% 1 0.6% 3 1.8% 
10 - 49 2 1.2% 2 1.2% 0 0 5 2.9% 
50 - 99 0 0 0 0 1 0.6% 1 0.6% 
100> 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Not Stated 5 2.9% 2 1.206 3 1.8% 5 2.9% 
TOTAL 168 100% 168 100% 168 100% 168 100% 
Figure 5.12 Breakdown of Incidents by Numbers of People with Symptoms and 
Population Group, Wales, 1994 - 1995 
NUMBERS 
WITH 
SYMPTOMS 
EMPLOYEES RESPONDERS PUBLIC ALL INCIDENTS 
NUMBER OF 
INCIDENTS 
(%) NUMBER OF 
INCIDENTS 
(%) NUMBER 
OF 
INCIDENTS 
(%) NUMBER OF 
INCIDENTS 
(%) 
0 18 10.7% 163 97% 158 94% 13 7.8% 
1 135 80.3% 1 0.6% 3 1.8% 134 79.7% 
2-4 9 5.4% 2 1.2% 4 2.4% 13 7.8% 
5-9 3 1.8% 1 0.6% 1 0.6% 5 2.9% 
10 - 49 1 0.6% 0 0 
0 0 1 0.6% 
50-99 0 0 0 0 1 0.6% 1 0.6% 
100> 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Not Stated 2 1.2% 1 0.6% 1 0.6% 1 0.6% 
TOTAL 168 100% 168 100°% 168 100% 168 100% 
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Press Surveillance 
On 1 January 1993, systems were established for the routine monitoring of national and local 
newspapers throughout Wales. A total of 90 incidents were identified through this activity, of which 
59 were new to the project. Only a third of the incidents identified through press surveillance had 
been reported by local authority Environmental Health Departments (Figure 5.15). The information 
contained within the press cuttings was, however, variable in terms of both its accuracy and validity, 
and no further analyses are presented here. Although difficult to qualify, the press cuttings did 
highlight the political and public perceptions often surrounding the incidents reported, information 
which was hard to record on the reporting forms developed for the project. 
Figure 5.15 Distribution of 332 incidents by reporting source, Wales, 1993 - 1995 
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Gwent Fire Brigade 
The Number of Incidents 
On 1 January 1995, surveillance was further extended to include reports of incidents from Gwent 
Fire Brigade. A total of 55 acute chemical incidents were handled by the Brigade during the period 
1 January to 31 December 1995, of which 49 were new to the project. Analysis of the incidents 
again revealed a very different data set from that reported by local authority Environmental Health 
Departments and identified through press surveillance, with only 2 of the incidents common to all 
three systems (Figure 5.16). 
Figure 5.16 Distribution of 90 incidents by reporting source, Gwent, 1995 
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The Nature and Location of Incidents 
Chemical spills were again the most frequently reported type of incident (27%). Other incidents 
included calls to deal with chemical drums and packages which had either been indiscriminately 
dumped in rivers or had fallen from lorries during transportation (22%); airborne releases, including 
industrial emissions of ammonia and leaks of refrigerant gases in supermarket complexes (22%); 
and fires (20%) (Figure 5.17). 
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Figure 5.17 Nature of Incidents Reported by Gwent Fire Brigade, Gwent, 1994-1995 
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Figure 5.18 Location of Incidents Reported by Gwent Fire Brigade, Gwent, 1995 
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Operational industrial premises were the most frequent incident location (39%) (Figure 5.18). 
Incidents on the highway (29%) were also common. A smaller number of incidents were reported 
at residential properties (7%) including flooding, domestic gas leaks and exposure to freons 
following damage to a domestic refrigerator. Incidents at commercial premises (5%) included a 
release of chlorine gas at a leisure complex, whilst those reported under the headings "open public 
space" (5%) and inland waters (4%) covered a rubbish fire involving PCB wastes, and drums of 
chemicals illicitly deposited in rivers. 
Welsh Office Agriculture Department 
The Welsh Office Agriculture Department (WOAD) provided a line-listing of 84 incidents recorded 
for the period 1993 - 1995. The incidents reported related mainly to animal poisonings, caused by 
grazing on soils contaminated with heavy metals or through consumption of chemically 
contaminated feed. Only 2 of the incidents listed appeared in the reports received from local 
authority Environmental Health Departments. 
Discussion 
Introduction 
The twentieth and final question to be asked on the questionnaire was "What advice would you 
provide to other authorities who may experience similar incidents in the future? ". Answers were 
provided by the reporting officers of local authority Environmental Health Departments only. The 
answers were coded and could have been presented directly under the results section of this 
Chapter. However, it was decided to present these as part of a broader discussion, which was also 
able to take into account the notes made by the author at each of the annual one-day workshops 
held with reporting officers, and the conclusions and recommendations of a two-day conference and 
workshop organised by the AWEHSP in March 1994, on the subject of "toxicovigilance". 
The aim of the conference and workshop was to provide guidance to health authorities in Wales on 
meeting the requirements placed upon them by Welsh Office circular WHC (93) 61 (see Chapter 4 
and Appendix 5.4). This was to be primarily achieved through raising the awareness of emergency 
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services in Wales to the public health dimensions of the response to acute chemical incidents, 
thereby facilitating the inclusion of health authority representation (probably the CCDC) within the 
classical "Incident Command System" of emergency management. The conference, which was 
open to all, attracted 86 delegates on day 1, with 46 accepting the invitation to attend a closed 
workshop on day 2. The latter were drawn from the full range of response agencies and authorities 
in Wales. 
The following therefore represents a combined and evaluated appraisal of the three elements described 
above. However, the bias will be towards local authority Environmental Health Departments, not only by 
reason of their reporting officers having provided the answers to question 20, but also because in three 
years of surveillance, there was little evidence to suggest that health authorities were any more involved 
in managing the public health aspects of acute chemical incidents than they were before the introduction 
of WHC (93)61. Of the 270 acute chemical incidents reported by local authority Environmental Health 
Departments in Wales over the three years of the project, the CsCDC of HAs were involved in just 27 
(10%). The section is separated into three parts: emergency planning and preparedness, incident 
response and follow-up. 
Emergency Planning and Preparedness 
Integrated Emergency Management 
There was general agreement that an "Integrated Emergency Management" (IEM) approach to 
chemical incident preparedness, planning and response was needed (see Chapter 4). This was 
largely dependent on the ability of emergency plans to successfully integrate the contributions of a 
large number of different agencies and authorities. 
Roles and Responsibilities 
Whilst the roles and responsibilities of local authority Environmental Health Departments were 
clearly stated in emergency plans, the contribution that they were actually expected to make was 
not uniform throughout Wales and often lacked clarity. Instances were cited where they were 
counted upon to provide immediate advice at the scene of an incident on the need for evacuation of 
residents and / or on the potential health risks to exposed communities. However, the officers 
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involved were often unable to give the necessary critical advice, in the absence of, for example, 
front-line information on the toxicology of the chemicals released and their potential decomposition 
reaction products. 
The following were therefore emphasised as important considerations for all local authority 
Environmental Health Departments in Wales: 
(a) to determine the roles and responsibilities of the Department internally, in relation to likely 
incident scenarios; 
(b) to jointly investigate the roles and responsibilities perceived of the Department by other local 
response agencies, in relation to likely incident scenarios; this was viewed as particularly 
important in clarifying the complementary roles of HAs; 
(c) to examine the cost implications of providing these roles and responsibilities, for example, in 
undertaking environmental monitoring, disposal of chemical drums etc.; 
(d) to pre-identify where appropriate support, advice and consultancy services can be readily 
accessed in situations where in-house expertise is lacking, for example, confirming that 
symptoms in the population can be attributed to the toxicological properties of the chemicals 
involved; 
(e) to provide officers with pocket-size emergency procedures manuals, clearly delineating the 
roles and responsibilities of all response agencies; and giving the names and contact details 
of relevant counterparts within other agencies; and 
(f) to ensure that plans are regularly updated to take account of staff changes and departmental 
reorganisations. 
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Communications 
The importance of joint planning in communications was also highlighted. This included the need 
for familiarity with the forms, terminology and information technology used by other response 
agencies, and consideration of the requirements to equip the Department's officers at the scene of 
the incident with their own communications, for example, mobile phones. 
Best Practice Guides 
Linked to emergency planning were a number of suggestions intended to underpin the philosophy 
of joint working between local authority Environmental Health Departments and the other response 
agencies / authorities. These included the collaborative development of: 
(a) risk assessment guidelines with health authorities to support public health decision-making at 
the time of chemical incidents; 
(b) best practice protocols and joint methods of working with the emergency services for the safe 
handling and disposal of illicitly dumped chemical drums and containers; 
(c) inter-departmental policies for the safe handling and disposal of clinical waste found on 
beaches, in open parkland areas etc.; and 
(d) evidence-based guidance on the health risks associated with the explosive release of 
asbestos fibres during fires, both at the time of the incident and during the subsequent clean- 
up operations. 
Community Preparedness 
There was also scope for wider dialogue between local authorities, health authorities, other 
response agencies, industry and the community in relation to programmes of community 
preparedness. Where undertaken, the benefits had been clearly demonstrated, in terms of the 
effective pre-briefing of populations living in close proximity to major hazard sites, both in relation to 
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the inherent risks posed by the chemicals stored or processed therein, and the precautionary 
actions to be taken in the event of an incident. 
Hazard Assessment 
Although the perennial problems of staffing shortages and cutbacks in local authority funding were 
much in evidence in the responses received, a number of reporting officers felt that it would be in 
their authority's best interests to adopt a more strategic approach to the assessment of potential 
hazards within their respective areas. 
The CIMAH database at the Welsh National Poisons Unit was considered an important resource. 
However, it covered only a limited number of sites. It was therefore left to local authorities, in 
consultation with industry and other response agencies, to build up their own information resources 
on chemicals held at industrial premises within their respective areas, both as a means of 
identifying possible emergency situations and ensuring the availability of appropriate expertise and 
facilities for response. In compiling this knowledge base, recommendations included: 
a) the review of records held on particular premises, for example, COSHH assessments 
obtained under the provisions of health and safety legislation, to identify the presence of 
hazardous chemicals, the quantities held, and the potential release scenarios; 
b) improved liaison and co-operation with other agencies, particularly the Fire Service and the 
National Rivers Authority (now part of the Environment Agency), known to have formal 
responsibilities respectively in relation to the conduct of fire safety assessments at industrial 
premises, and the issue of pollution discharge consents to local industries; 
c) mapping the location of potential sources of pollution to watercourses, including storm water 
overflows, farm slurry/silage lagoons, waste disposal sites, areas of contaminated land and 
discharge points from local industries; and 
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d) auditing the lessons learned from the investigation of previous incidents or near misses, 
particularly those with a tendency to occur perennially, for example, the proliferation of blue- 
green algal blooms in local lakes and reservoirs during the summer months. 
Likewise, liaison and close co-operation with local fire and police services, customs officials and 
industry, was seen as essential in gaining relevant information on the nature and extent of 
chemicals being transported by road, rail and sea within a local authority's area. 
Sensitive Areas / Populations 
Many of those reporting officers who were in favour of the above approach also raised as a 
complementary activity the need for increased awareness of the populations and/or environments 
likely to be affected in the event of an incident, for example, the location of potential pollution impact 
sites downstream of incidents involving chemical spills into watercourses. These might include 
shellfish beds, water treatment abstraction points, fish farms and recreational water users. 
With respect to populations, knowledge of the position of residential estates, schools, hospitals and 
care homes for the elderly in relation to operational industrial sites, contaminated land etc. was 
perceived as important both in better quantifying those members of the community at heightened 
risk and in prioritising the siting of environmental monitoring equipment. 
District Surveillance 
Reference has already been made to the fact that 30 or 10 per cent of the 270 incidents reported by 
local authority Environmental Health Departments were initially identified through routine district 
surveillance activities. The continued resourcing of these statutory and non-statutory activities, 
including the maintenance of programmes of environmental sampling and monitoring, was 
perceived as particularly important in: 
(a) ensuring the early detection of incidents, for example, of blue-green algal blooms in 
recreational waters; 
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(b) recognising hazardous situations before problems arise, for example, improper storage of 
gas cylinders, illegal tyre dumps, and damage to asbestos-containing materials in public 
buildings; 
(c) identifying elevated levels of chemical contaminants in public and private water supplies, and, 
similarly, raised methane gas levels around landfill sites; and 
(d) surveying their areas for sites of contaminated land. 
Training and Education 
Training and education were considered important facets of any schemes of chemical incident 
preparedness. Specifically highlighted was the need for joint theoretical and practical training in the 
implementation of mutually agreed local emergency plans and best practice guides. 
It was also recommended that local authority CEHOs conduct a training needs analysis of their 
respective Departments, so as to ensure the availability on a 24 hour basis of staff with the 
necessary skills to fulfil the roles and responsibilities expected of them at the scene of an incident, 
for example, knowledge in the use of environmental monitoring equipment. Alternatively, 
suggestions were made that neighbouring authorities might consider entering into agreements for 
the exchange of specialists to provide mutual support in incident response situations. 
Incident Response 
Out of Hours Arrangements 
The capability to immediately attend the scene of an incident was considered an important factor in 
eliciting an effective environmental / public health response. Although costly, the retention of 
coverage on a 24-hour, 365 day basis was felt to be essential. 
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Health and Safety 
Incidents were also reported where officers of various response agencies themselves fell victim to 
symptoms of chemical exposure. The provision of suitable personal protective equipment and 
relevant safety training was therefore considered essential, particularly in relation to circumstances 
where response personnel were: 
(a) involved in the cleaning of beaches, inland waterways, and of residential and other premises 
contaminated by chemicals; 
(b) required to enter hazardous environments, for example, demolition sites and fire grounds, 
where potentially harmful chemicals may have been present; and, 
(c) placed at risk of exposure to contaminated air, water, soil etc., as a result of any requisite 
sampling and monitoring procedures. 
Inter-Aaency Working 
The most frequently stated lesson to be learned from the incidents reported was the need for 
improved inter-agency communication and collaboration. In particular, calls were made for the 
more effective and timely interchange of relevant information at and from the scene of an incident. 
Where achieved, it had been possible to effect appropriate mitigatory measures in advance of the 
escalation of any incident. Conversely, problems arose where information was not passed on, and 
local authority Environmental Health Departments found themselves compromised by their inability 
to respond effectively to community concerns. 
Risk Assessment 
From the comments received, local authority Environmental Health Departments clearly felt 
exposed by their inability to immediately access appropriate continuous monitoring equipment to 
assess possible health risks to the public who may have been exposed downwind of a fire, 
chemical spill or an airborne release. However, even if such a capability had been available, it is 
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unlikely that any CEHO would have allowed a member of his/her staff to enter a potentially 
hazardous environment to monitor air quality. Decisions therefore need to be taken as to which 
authority/agency is best placed to undertake such monitoring, whether staff should be provided with 
personal protective equipment and/or would the use of environmental modelling and/or biological 
sampling represent more appropriate methods of evaluating exposure. 
An issue that also came to prominence was the increasing pressure placed on local authority 
Environmental Health Departments to make objective assessments of risk in relation to civil claims 
by members of the public whose properties had been covered by dust or whose health had been 
allegedly affected by releases of, for example, hydrogen sulphide gas. Two of the main difficulties 
identified in drawing appropriate conclusions were (a) the general paucity of data available on the 
short and longer term health effects of exposure to chemicals; and (b) the lack of any information 
on typical background levels of chemicals in the environment. In relation to the latter, one option 
put forward was for the development of a database of ambient environmental concentrations of 
chemical pollutants, particularly around industrial processes. 
Finally, calls were made for the development of risk assessment guidelines to support public health 
decision-making, both at the time of incidents, and in answering any such follow-up enquiries from 
members of the public. 
Risk Communication 
From the responses received, there was little doubt that dealing with the public's perception of risk 
was becoming an ever more difficult problem for the agencies / authorities involved in incident 
management. The importance of ensuring the regular provision of accurate, consistent and co- 
ordinated information was highlighted as critical, both in reassuring the public regarding the 
potential risks to their health, and in advising those most at risk of the actions they should take to 
minimise their personal exposure, for example, evacuate or shelter indoors. 
Part of the problem was caused by journalists and television reporters who chose to highlight those 
aspects of an incident which were sensational and newsworthy rather than accurately 
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communicate the risks, which were often negligible, to the public. However, where properly briefed, 
it was recognised that the media could fulfil an important role for the response agencies in 
maintaining information flow during crisis situations. 
Additionally, in communicating with the public either directly or through the media, it was considered 
vital that the response agencies involved jointly designated an expert individual(s) as solely 
responsible for public / media relations; and that inter-agency consultation was required on the 
content of any press releases to eliminate potential confusion caused by the release of differing 
messages by individual authorities acting in isolation. 
Follow-up 
Epidemiological Follow-u 
As emphasised in the literature review, incidents of toxic exposure present rare opportunities for 
investigation of the short and long-term health effects of chemicals. However, in only one of the 
270 incidents reported by local authority Environmental Health Departments was any kind of formal 
epidemiological study undertaken. This followed a major explosion and fire at a South Wales 
factory in 1993, and involved no more than a retrospective study of symptom prevalence in a cohort 
of employees and emergency responders potentially exposed to the toxic effects of the chemicals 
released. The results proved inconclusive, but the ensuing discussion did highlight some of the 
difficulties faced by public health professionals in carrying out epidemiological studies following 
chemical incidents. These included: 
a) problems in identifying exposed people (hampered by lack of information on the area covered 
by the smoke plume); 
b) insufficient data on the chemicals stored at the factory (a definitive list of chemicals involved 
was not obtained until 2 weeks after the incident); 
c) scantiness of information on the likely thermal decomposition and reaction products of the 
chemicals involved in the fire; and, 
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d) the lack of any objective measures of exposure at the scene of the incident (environmental 
monitoring equipment was not available), which precluded the possibility of determining any 
dose-response relationships. 
Whilst it was evident, in relation to a number of the incidents reported, that local authority 
Environmental Health Departments had actively considered undertaking epidemiological studies (in 
collaboration with their respective health authorities), they had invariably been constrained by both 
the financial and organisational resources that would have needed to be made available. Criteria 
for determining the appropriateness and cost-benefit of conducting short and long term follow-up 
studies were required, as were model questionnaires and protocols to assist authorities in recording 
valid, reliable data. The division of responsibilities between local authorities and health authorities 
also needed careful consideration as part of the overall emergency planning process. 
Population / Environmental Rehabilitation 
In the rehabilitation phase, the aim must be to restore the affected areas to their pre-incident state. 
This includes not only the provision of social, economic and psychological support to the local 
population, but also rehabilitation of the environment. Based on the direct experiences of a number 
of the reporting officers, calls were made for the development of protocols and joint methods of 
working for dealing with rehabilitation issues in relation to: 
0 the disposal of oil contaminated beach materials; 
0 the safe handling and disposal of chemical drums washed up on beaches, illegally dumped 
or spilled in transport; 
" the safe removal and disposal of damaged drums and residual chemicals involved in fires; 
" the safe collection and disposal of clinical wastes including sharps; and 
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0 preventing and mitigating the effects of fire-fighting water run-off into water courses and 
sewers. 
Audit 
Reference was also made to the importance of each response agency maintaining records of all events, 
decisions and actions taken by its staff, and the necessity for formal debriefing sessions, on both a single 
and multi-agency basis. These were considered important for a number of reasons: 
a) to agree on appropriate adjustments to emergency plan(s) and procedures; 
b) to provide the basis for recommendations on future prevention strategies and legislative 
changes; and 
c) to allow the lessons learned from the incidents to be made more widely available for the 
benefit of those who might be called upon to respond to similar incidents in the future. 
Conclusion 
From the above appraisal, the views expressed by reporting officers at the one-day workshops, and the 
conclusions and recommendations made at the "toxicovigilance" conference, it was also felt that 
consideration should be given to the most effective way of providing additional advice and support to local 
authorities, health authorities and other agencies in Wales on a 24-hour, 365 day basis, in relation to the 
environmental and public health management of chemical incidents. One option put forward was for the 
establishment of a centralised advisory and support unit to complement the activities of the Welsh 
National Poisons Unit, which already provides advice to health professionals on medical management of 
casualties. Potential roles of such a unit might include: 
a) development and maintenance of a national directory of information resources and expertise. 
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b) provision of a 24-hour advisory and consultancy service on the public health, environmental, 
chemical, medical, toxicological and epidemiological aspects of acute chemical incidents, 
including advice on immediate measures to protect local populations; 
c) co-ordination of response to cross-boundary acute chemical incidents; 
d) promotion of joint planning between local authorities, health authorities and other key players 
such as the emergency services, the Health and Safety Executive, and the Environment 
Agency; 
e) development of best practice protocols, and provision of advice on their interpretation and 
application; 
f) co-ordination of surveillance of health effects of chemicals in the environment, to include the 
longer term health effects of accidental releases of chemicals, and the incidence and 
possible health effects of ambient levels of acute chemical incidents; 
g) collaborative working with other organisations in the UK and international centres of 
expertise; 
h) pro-active identification of the needs of local authorities, health authorities and other agencies 
responding to acute chemical incidents in Wales; 
i) promotion of programmes of training, education and research on a multi-disciplinary basis. 
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Evaluation of the AWEHSP 
Introduction 
In 1988, Thacker et al. proposed an evaluation method that could be applied to any system of 
epidmiological surveillance (Thacker et at. 1988). This was quickly adopted as best practice by the 
US Department of Health and Human Services (Centers for Disease Control 1988), and provides 
the basis for the following discussion and evaluation of the AWEHSP. 
The AWEHSP was and still remains an unique, collaborative venture. It brought together central 
government, local government and academics with the common goals of better defining the size of 
the problem of acute chemical incidents within the principality of Wales, and of identifying the 
additional expertise and resources needed to support health and environment professionals in their 
future management of such incidents. 
The primary question to be addressed in this section is whether or not the information provided by 
the project is useful. Has the system led to an improved understanding of acute chemical incidents 
in Wales? Were the original objectives met? Has the most effective use been made of public 
health resources? The AWEHSP is therefore reviewed with respect to its usefulness and cost, as 
well as on the basis of its quality. In assessing quality, the system is measured against each of the 
seven attributes formulated by Thacker et aL, that is, simplicity, flexibility, acceptability, sensitivity, 
specificity, representativeness and timeliness (Thacker et al. 1988). 
Usefulness 
The AWEHSP has demonstrated that a geographically defined, multi-agency surveillance system is 
feasible and useful in identifying high-risk locations and types of incidents, together with the 
chemicals most likely to be involved. Quantitative estimates are also now available of the morbidity 
and mortality experience of employees, emergency responders and the general public exposed to 
acute chemical incidents, and various expertise and resource issues have been highlighted for the 
future consideration of policy makers and public health professionals in Wales. 
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The surveillance system has therefore met its objectives. Nevertheless, in applying a more rigorous 
approach to defining usefulness, it is necessary to investigate further the impact of the project on 
policies and interventions (Thacker et at 1988). 
However, this is not an easy task. A large number of presentations were made and reports written 
on the project during its' period of operation. Quantifying the impact of the messages contained 
within these presentations and reports on policy makers, and on health and other professionals, is 
very difficult. For example, on 11 July 1994, a presentation was made to the Interdepartmental 
Group on Public Health (IDGPH) at the Department of Health, London. Chaired by the Chief 
Medical Officer for England, the IDGPH is acknowledged as an influential forum for debate on 
emerging public health issues in the UK. Although impossible to verify, the author is firmly of the 
opinion that the discussions held at this group catalysed many of the developments which will be 
covered in subsequent chapters. 
In spite of this, it is possible to accentuate many of the positive uses that have been made of the 
surveillance data and the research that has been undertaken. 
The AWEHSP has provided simple authoritative messages, such as most incidents involve the release of 
a single chemical. This is an useful finding, as it has been shown to be easier for the emergency services 
and health professionals to respond to such releases than to incidents which involve the release of many 
different chemicals, each having their own physico-chemical properties and each capable of reacting with 
one another to form substances which may have an even greater toxic potential than the original 
chemicals (Nantel 1992; Temple 1992; Sriramachari 1992). Additionally, the line-listing of the chemicals 
most commonly involved in incidents has already been used to prioritise the development of toxicological 
profiles for use by public health professionals in Wales. 
The development of the AWEHSP also happened to coincide with the initiation of a programme of 
activity by the International Programme on Chemical Safety (IPCS) in the field of toxicovigilance. It 
was therefore agreed to jointly organise an international conference on health aspects of chemical 
incidents and their follow-up. The conference was held at Cardiff Institute of Higher Education from 
1-3 April 1993, and experts invited from most regions of the world to present short discussion 
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papers on the health sector response to major chemical incidents. A conference objective was "to 
provide guidance to assist the AWEHSP in meeting its objectives". 
In this respect, the author gave a keynote presentation on the project. However, far from providing 
guidance to the project, one of the main conclusions drawn was the need to replicate the type of 
surveillance that was being undertaken in Wales on a global basis. IPCS therefore invited Cardiff 
Institute of Higher Education to become a WHO Collaborating Centre to act as an "International 
Clearing House for Major Chemical Incidents". The Collaborating Centre was formally launched in 
September 1995, and currently receives reports of major chemical incidents from eleven pilot 
countries, including Argentina, New Zealand and The Netherlands (a copy of the centre's "Terms of 
Reference" is included at Appendix 5.4). 
The conference also highlighted a number of key areas where it was recommended that additional 
policy and technical guidance was needed in order to assist public health authorities in identifying, 
investigating and managing acute chemical incidents. Of particular interest is the fact that many of 
the conclusions and recommendations that were made (a copy of the full text is reproduced at 
Appendix 5.5) have subsequently been validated by the results of the AWEHSP. 
Returning to Wales, the AWEHSP identified the need for further research into the development of 
risk assessment tools that would enable public health professionals to rapidly and objectively 
measure the severity of an acute chemical incident and its potential public health and environmental 
impact. The author therefore developed a "risk assessment scheme for the scaling of incidents" 
where the hazards presented by the chemical(s) released were related to the incident environment 
and the proximity of target populations (see Appendix 5.6), although this was never put into 
practice. 
Such a scheme was seen as beneficial not only at the time of an incident, in terms of guiding mitigation 
activities, but also for surveillance purposes. By introducing a scoring system, analyses could be 
undertaken of incidents of similar severity, a practice which Lillibridge has since stated would be: 
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.., invaluable for preparedness and prevention activities. (Lillibridge 1997) 
As will be evident from earlier sections of this Chapter, the results presented have been based on 
the combined data set from each reporting source. Although useful from the point of view of 
identifying general trends in the occurrence of acute chemical incidents in Wales, the results tell us 
very little about the relative risk posed by individual incidents. Consideration should therefore be 
given to the inclusion of such a risk assessment scheme within any future surveillance system. 
Other research opportunities identified by the AWEHSP have included the need for a more detailed 
review of the problem of domestic carbon monoxide poisoning incidents within the principality. This 
was based on concerns expressed by the project steering group over the number of events 
recorded between 1993 and 1995. In this respect, the author was commissioned by the Chief 
Medical Officer for Wales in 1996 to undertake a short scoping study of the problem. 
Although again difficult to quantify, in terms of usefulness, every opportunity was taken to promote 
the improved exchange of information between professionals within the various response agencies, 
via newsletters and workshops, on the most effective ways of handling particular incidents. The 
design of the forms also enabled reporting officers to identify areas where consideration needed to 
be given to the inter-agency development of guideline materials and best practice protocols. 
Another important outcome of the project was the immediate integration of the research undertaken 
into the organisation and delivery of modules at undergraduate and postgraduate level on the public 
health management of acute chemical incidents. As early as October 1993, sufficient data had 
been collected and research undertaken to inform the development of a specialist module on the 
Masters in Public Health degree programme, offered by the University of Wales College of 
Medicine. 
The AWEHSP has therefore demonstrated its usefulness from many different perspectives. It is 
probably fair to say that the data analyses conducted for this thesis could have been more 
extensive. However, it is the lessons learned in terms of additional expertise and resource 
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requirements that will predominantly need to be taken forward in the development of the public 
health management model for dealing with acute chemical incidents in Wales. 
Costs 
The economic analysis of surveillance systems, in general, has received little methodological 
attention (Thacker et aL 1988). This may be because estimating the overall costs of a surveillance 
system is a complex process. The costs of administering the AWEHSP, that is, in terms of the 
personnel and financial resources expended in data collection, analysis, and dissemination, 
amounted to approximately £42,000 per annum over three years. However, this reflects only the 
"direct costs" and excludes estimates of the Indirect costs", such as pricing the time spent by 
reporting officers in the completion of forms every month. 
To calculate a benefit / cost ratio is also very difficult, as many of the benefits involve unquantifiable 
value judgements, such as improved relations between response agencies. For the purposes of 
this discussion, it is therefore only possible to judge the "direct costs" against the objectives and 
usefulness of the surveillance system. 
Evaluation of the Quality of the AWEHSP 
Table 5.13 defines each of the seven attributes that are to be used to measure the quality of the 
surveillance system developed. However, each attribute should not be considered in isolation. 
They are all interdependent, and the improvement of one may improve or compromise another 
(Thacker et a!. 1988). For example, efforts to increase the sensitivity of a system to detect more 
events may detract from its simplicity or timeliness (Centers for Disease Control 1988). 
For ease of reference, the author has also incorporated within Table 5.13, details of the design 
features that were employed, from the outset of the AWEHSP, to meet each of the attributes. 
135 
Ü 
4) 
O 
N 
E 
d) 
E 
O OC 
0) c 
0 
o N ä E 
c a' U' 
a 
0 O p pýC 
C U UOO 
NL a) ä 2OÖ 
N N NO 
N 
p 
-0 
O 
-0 
NC 
cn 
o 
C y 
C 
ro 
Cc ro 
C r- (U (U 
CL 
E 
-0 c2. (D 
EEö 
T N "O O O c0 Y 
c y a 
> 
ao Co >cn ro Co a) y 
U) C» L L CU 0 
' a 7 m Cm CU E E 
Ü 
0 Ü ro O ui O7 
N 
7 
C pCpC 
O 
j Ü jC 
01 l0 - (ro m'D 7N 
`-O 
O L) 
7N 
N 
` .. 
Cd 
ca °O7rvE 
N 
>" CA 4-7 
8O NC 
T iÄ N (d 
O Q) ooT 
>TN 
N= o 
T'p 
aUOof0 
Ta 
NL o 47 OC T 
L ÜN 
CN 
o äý co ro ý 
rn m 
C 
ö Co ä .ýLä 0 ' 
ro c ö_ 
N 
cö 
N 
ro mr 
E ° 
ö_ ö 
,c 
t 
(d 
y CC 
N 
N 
m p Cý f CU 0 ID 
C, 
L o 
'D U y ro N 
0 
0O 
(0 Ü1 
ö 
Ö 
r "O NN 
CÖ 7 ä O 
a) CO CC UN>, 
C 2 
ON 
' 
a 
ro yE L_ j 
NN 
l 
?, 
O 
aNN 
NQ c Ö_) 
`) _NE3 C 
"0 
Ü 
ro U 
y6 
ö 
U 
tEN 
ÖI 
U) 
c 
'7 
ý 
!n U` 
ö 12 
= « v ri'3cýNý °°, ýro 
( O 0 ý0-%L-ömc° °ý°nEýr E°' 
O 
Ec°n `ý ö -0-0>c 
ID m 
c 
W ä 
.> 
C)° °' cE 43 
- C° a) t° '" °' 3 
E- Q0 ro °ý N 
ö 
«3 °' Läm 
ac°c 
LY 
U '3 
o) Cý N 
ro c : " c 
ö0DO ¢1 
a° ro 
Q 
Co 79 c 
'» NONCNN ac E 
o m 
C Ec0 
ja (D o QONC>OCO 
cm 
O cu r- °mm R! m 
_ 
ý ý 
CC =_ Loä 
CN (ö 
ý' m o° 
ö L 'C oo a- C) ,ýO0U 
Tc ca CL ýNoCÜ 
ö 
aaöE 
ö ro cö aNO° E Qö 
v C)- (13° 'N ro ý ma cu c a) 
°1 c 0 Eo 
c° ro cö 
« 
° (ö ro ý ý'ýýc>> 
U 
m ýc 
N 
ýýýroa"iäNä 
L 
ý öý: 
Ö N O 
o° 
C0 
g' 2c 
OC 76 
m ý-0 (L) 
Co 
a 
N M ,DN 
N (n m öQ O `Ö 
Nö 
E 
ÜCC.. O- C O_, 
(n ö3 
Co 7 
o°'°'Eý'ro ä ro 
Y 
tem«ö 
° 
" 
t 
Eý n 
ýi ro> ý i0' a ý ro-> >OO0ý C) °ý y3> °0 D9Y> U) CU 
LN Eo äu o as TO2 
:3 
No Co 
NOO 'CU 
(D vv o 
a :l (D v CU 
-0 Ev ro° 
N 
ci 
a) Q) CU O 
"o E 4 v 
ÜO 
°3 ý' y -. ° > N o m m 
d 
ro 
°N E 
m 
c 
ro . ri ý, m C NÜ 
LE a) 
DN 
mm u>i o c'pE (D 
0 TO E 
- Co Y: C O_ 
-2 -2 
cu 2 U E 
ýC 
M a 
NO [d XC 
7 
U NC ÜO 
ro 
r 
- 0c cm 
° LL ö 
O 
c -'n 
aim 
O) a i acic fC C NN ._ ro N ZU O 
- o 
U 
(1) 
jE 
N (n - 
:B> 
Co c 'D NO NN 
(U 
yj 
dc 
7 
75 
.5 d 
La 
ro 
N 
G) T= Ny 
C 
COO 
(d c) 
° 
N 
C 
y c ro a (p L 
'O 
A O Ü mpd Cyl C 9 LL ro O 
ÖC 
- . 
0 
Co 
(0 L E 
dm 
-Q7 
3 i ui a 
N 
c "N 
O (tl 
N 
D uý 
n ö 
nX N ro a 
.ca, 
N 
- j 
o 
O 
roc 33 
47 ö 
a 
' 
° 
°° ro ` 
" to a)o °' Ema Y V1 NN 
N 
U OC 
o 
Nr 
a 
M 
"C 
a 
c m- 
NO NUN 
Nö .C N ;: ro u iä ö 
N 
mä dL ö Ew c 
N 2 
0 y y Q) 
m Q) 
(D 
W 
0- 0 
2 L > 
cu u) 
c: 
(D E =0 ýY ro N N O aNE O O 1] ' N T . p jL C 
'C NÜN X E= (U U 
0 
, r- 
ce 
N q) a "U 2 
Ü 
.N 
-O 
OZ ro ONC7 ,. O 
U c 'O E 
0 
U 
O NN 
' 
. - 0 F-- .L QC U U. QO (n 
2 (/) U Q D. F- N 
N 
O 
N 
7 
C 
Q) 
L > 
Q 
E 
Y 
U = 
-' 
>- C 
X 
Q 
, ,ý 'y 
'C 
U 
ý E N E i u 
ý ý ä 
N U) IL (1) f- 
.. 
m 
C. 
y 
d 
0 
r-. 
U) 
w 
v 
0 
a. 
E 
N 
d 
cC 
W 
C 
C 
C) 
N 
t 
4- 
fC 
N 
4) 
4- 
4i 
4- 
E 
C) 
4- 
N 
N 
d 
U 
C 
t9 
C) 
i 
U) 
Cl) 
T7 
C) 
fC 
Simplicity 
Simplicity was very much the guiding principle in the design of the system. As the reporting of 
incidents from all sources was on a voluntary basis, the system had to be easy to understand, and a 
balance maintained between the system's needs for data of appropriate quality and the likely impact 
of the added burden of reporting on the work of local authority Environmental Health Departments 
and others. In the author's opinion, simplicity was largely achieved through the design features of 
the AWEHSP. At the annual one-day workshops, where reporting officers were given the 
opportunity to comment on the system, no criticisms were forthcoming and only minor amendments 
sought to the operational methods employed for data collection. 
Problems were initially experienced in that over-emphasis was placed on the use of an electronic 
system for communications between the author and the reporting officers, including the return of 
completed questionnaires. However, it was soon recognised that very few of the officers had 
received any training in the use of the messaging system proposed. Accordingly, a paper system of 
communications was adopted for the three year duration of the project. 
The principality of Wales was also a suitable size for the conduct of an active, geographically 
defined surveillance system. It was a manageable project for one full-time member of staff, and 
facilitated by the phased programme of implementation agreed by the project steering group. 
Flexibility 
The flexibility of the system originally developed with local authority Environmental Health 
Departments was clearly demonstrated by its ability to accommodate new reporting sources, that is, 
the Welsh National Poisons Unit and Gwent Fire Brigade. The introduction of these additional 
sources was also effected with the minimum of training requirements for reporting officers and 
without any additional funding. 
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Acceptability and Timeliness 
It would be easy to state that each month a 100 per cent return rate was achieved from each 
reporting source, which was the case. However, there was considerable variability in the 
willingness of individual reporting officers to make returns. From the author's perspective, there 
were individuals who questioned the benefits both to them and their authorities of participating in 
the system. Although no quantitative assessment was undertaken, the priority with which individual 
reporting officers viewed the project was manifested by delays in the return of forms, the rapid 
completion of nil returns when pressurised by the author, and the lack of completeness of those 
reporting forms returned on incidents. The latter was a particular problem at the outset of the 
project, with reporting officers simply providing a summary of an incident on the front sheet and 
leaving the remainder of the reporting form blank. 
Such issues were addressed through the design features listed in Table 5.13, but most effective 
was the opportunity provided to the author every other month to provide a progress report on the 
project to the All Wales Chief Environmental Health Officers Panel. This ensured that any 
difficulties were addressed to the operational "heads" of departments, who would jointly agree an 
appropriate course of action to effect improved timeliness and completion of returns. 
Sensitivity and Specificity 
The benefits of a multi-agency surveillance system were clearly demonstrated with respect to 
sensitivity, with little overlap in the incidents reported by the various sources. However, this 
suggests that the sensitivity of the system would only have been further enhanced by extension of 
reporting to other sources in Wales. 
The introduction of media vigilance as a check on reporting sources was also seen to effect 
improved sensitivity of the system. However, there were limitations to the project. Although difficult 
to quantify, it is well recognised that not all of the incidents that occurred in Wales between 1993 
and 1995 were reported to the project. Any surveillance system must question why small, rural 
authorities were reporting up to 15 incidents a year, and large, urban authorities only 3. In the 
author's opinion, there were two reasons: (a) the large, urban authorities did not perceive the project 
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to be as beneficial to them, because they had the resources and the need to employ more expert 
staff in-house to deal with acute chemical incidents (hence there was an acceptability problem), and 
(b) the same authorities appeared to operate on the basis of a higher threshold level for the 
reporting of incidents than the small, rural authorities. 
The latter point is also worthy of consideration in assessing the specificity of the system. There 
were problems initially with the definition being too permissive, with outbreaks of infectious diseases 
being reported. However, attempts were made to address these issues through personal meetings 
with each reporting officer to discuss the definition of an incident, and to place it within the context 
of possible scenarios that might be anticipated to arise within the geographical areas of each 
authority. 
Representativeness 
The representativeness of the system was also open to question. As stated above, there was 
evidence of reporting biases, dependent on the enthusiasm of particular agencies and the way staff 
chose to interpret the definition of an incident. It was also difficult to assess the reliability and 
validity of the responses received, for example, the results presented on numbers of people 
exposed and with symptoms are crude estimates, as post-incident health investigations involving 
accident and emergency departments, general practitioners and / or health authorities were rarely 
undertaken. 
Discussion 
The AWEHSP, based on the reporting systems developed with local authority Environmental Health 
Departments and with other agencies in Wales, certainly met its objectives, and has also 
demonstrated effectively the utility of collecting, collating and analysing data on acute chemical 
incidents. However, it is also important to consider the lessons that can be learned from the 
evaluation of the system. In particular, the concerns raised in relation to acceptability and 
timeliness, sensitivity and specificity, and representativeness will need to be carefully considered in 
the design and development of any future surveillance systems. 
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Chapter 6- Model Development 
Introduction 
This Chapter aims to progress the lessons learned from the All Wales Environmental Health Surveillance 
Project (AWEHSP) in developing a public health management model for dealing with acute chemical 
incidents in Wales. As any such model, to be effective, must be integrated into the existing system of 
control set out in Chapter 4, the author's original intention was to have carried out a survey of key 
personnel of agencies participating within the AWEHSP. The principal aims were to have been (a) to 
ascertain the perceptions and attitudes of the interviewees and their respective organisations, with regard 
to the role of public health in the management of acute chemical incidents; and (b) to utilise the results so 
obtained in the design and development of a public health management model for acute chemical 
incidents in Wales. However, the success of the AWEHSP opened up better opportunities to fulfil this 
component of the author's research. The development of the model has therefore followed an 
evolutionary locus which could not have been anticipated at the outset. A major factor in this process has 
been the politics of the NHS, which will form the first part of this Chapter. There then follows a series of 
stages, which take the author's research from Wales to the South and West of England, to the conduct of 
a national research project (Study of Activity on Public Health Effects of Environmental Chemicals) and 
participation in roundtable discussions. 
The Politics of the National Health Service 
The term "public health policy" may be viewed in different ways. It may be limited to authoritative 
statements of intent by government or may arise as a consequence of the actions taken by 
individuals in the process of implementation, that is, what policy is can only be seen in terms of 
outcomes (Barrett and Fudge 1981). As will be evident from the following discussions, it is the 
interpretations and actions of the lower-level actors, which include the author, that have largely 
determined the model that has been developed. The role of government, which at the time was 
Conservative, was to ensure that the market model of health service provision was upheld. This, in 
essence, was its statement of intent. 
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A market model assumes that health services are a product like any other. Where a demand 
exists, then market forces will supply the services required for a price. Suppliers will advertise their 
wares, while competition ensures a price which guarantees that consumer preferences are met 
(Allsop 1995). This contrasts with the two traditional models of health service provision: the 
professional model and the bureaucratic model, which assume that health services are too 
important and knowledge too specialised to be treated as a market good. The professional model 
places authority with the expert. Because it is based on technical and expert knowledge, those who 
need services must be protected from unqualified practitioners. The approach is therefore 
essentially paternalistic. In the bureaucratic model, the state assumes the role of determining 
health policy and becomes involved in distribution issues such as: ensuring access to services for 
all, the allocation of resources, the management of services and the ordering of priorities. 
From its establishment in 1948 to the late 1980s, the NHS was a prime example of a centrally planned 
and funded public health service (Ranade 1994). The dominant model was the bureaucratic model. 
Within this model, however, considerable autonomy was also given to the professional providers (the 
professional model), in what has been described as a corporatist style of health politics (Cawson 1982; 
Ham and Hill 1993), and a command and control economy (Allsop 1995). Like most command and 
control economies, the NHS was criticised for its rigidity, its inefficiency and its meanness. Problems 
were also manifest in achieving value for money, and in implementing change where it did not coincide 
with the concerns of professional medical interests (Allsop 1995). Consequently, in 1989, this all 
changed with the issue of the White Paper "Working for Patients" (Secretary of State for Health 1989), 
which pioneered the market model of organising and delivering health services. Enacted by the NHS and 
Community Care Act of 1990, a structure was created of buyers and sellers by separating responsibility 
for the purchase of health services from its provision, and allowing limited competition for business 
between providers, e. g. hospitals within strict regulatory guidelines (Ranade 1994). As will be shown, the 
marketplace has proven to be an important factor in guiding the work undertaken. 
Another aspect of the politics of the NHS which has impacted on the development of the model has 
been the interest groups involved. In this respect, Alford has suggested that: 
interests in health care can be classified into three major groupings: the professional 
monopolisers, the corporate rationalisers and the community interest. 
(Alford 1975) 
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The dominant grouping are the professional monopolisers which, in the case of acute chemical incidents 
in the UK, comprise a small number of doctors and scientists, whose expertise of the subject area means 
that they can sell their skills and knowledge at a price. In contrast, the second grouping, the corporate 
rationalisers, include the politicians and administrators at central (Welsh Office) and local level whose 
primary objectives are to achieve greater coordination and integration in the planning and delivery of 
health services. Their interests lie in making the best use of the resources available. Finally, the third 
grouping represents the cluster of organisations which seek to introduce a different set of priorities. They 
attempt to influence health policy through, for example, lobbying both the professional monopolisers and 
the corporate rationalisers. As with the marketplace, the presence and role of all three groupings will 
become increasingly evident in the following discussions. 
From Wales to the South and West of England 
In May 1995, the author was invited by the Regional Director of Public Health (RDPH), NHS (South 
and West) Region, to present a paper on the AWEHSP at a meeting in Bristol. This was partly as a 
result of the findings of a survey conducted by Gunnell of the 21 DHAs within the Region (Gunnell 
1993). The survey found that 15 of the 17 DHAs that had replied possessed no specific policies for 
handling acute chemical incidents, prompting concerns about the ability of the public health 
medicine profession to be seen as competent to manage such events. In attendance at the 
meeting were the RDPH and other representatives of the NHS Region, two local authority Directors 
of Environmental Health, plus officials from Welsh Office and the Department of Health. The 
outcome of the meeting was a recommendation to replicate the AWEHSP in the NHS (South and 
West) Region. This was considered beneficial to both sides. From the author's perspective, the 
ecology of the South and West was essentially the same as that of Wales (major conurbations, 
large tracts of agricultural land and an extensive coastline). Replication therefore provided an ideal 
opportunity to validate the findings of the AWEHSP. 
At the meeting, the author also placed particular emphasis on the need for the proposed South and 
West Environmental Health Surveillance Project (SWEHSP) to be a collaborative venture between 
local authority Environmental Health Departments and health authority Departments of Public 
Health Medicine. Accordingly, the author was mandated to organise a meeting in Stroud, 
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Gloucestershire in October 1995, to which the CEHOs of 16 representative local authorities, and 
the DsPH and CsCDC of all 12 health authorities in the Region were to be invited. A copy of the 
agenda for the meeting is attached at Appendix 6.1, together with a short discussion paper 
prepared by the author on the potential benefits of the SWEHSP to the Region. 
From the round table discussions that followed the various presentations, it however became 
apparent that whilst surveillance was recognised as important, it was a 24 hour support and 
advisory service that was required, along the same lines as that described in the last Chapter. 
Those attending the meeting therefore agreed to establish a "Project Advisory Group", under the 
chairmanship of the author, comprising representation from the Regional Office, and an equal 
number of CEHOs and DsPH. Pump-priming for the venture was provided by the Regional Office. 
Development of a 24 hour Support and Advisory Unit for Wales and the NHS 
(South and West) Region 
The Project Advisory Group for the SWEHSP met for the first time on 11 December 1995. At the 
meeting, the author tabled a draft "Service Delivery Plan" for the provision of fast response, multi-skilled 
advisory services on both a 9-5 weekday basis and a 24-hour, 365 day basis. In delivering the plan, the 
intention was to pool the expertise and resources of three existing centres: (a) the Welsh Combined 
Centres for Public Health of the University of Wales College of Medicine in applied public health medicine 
and environmental epidemiology; (b) the Toxicology and Therapeutics Centre of the University of Wales 
College of Medicine in medical, occupational and environmental toxicology; and, (c) the School of 
Environmental Sciences at the then Cardiff Institute of Higher Education in environmental health and 
environmental risk management. A schematic of the model developed, incorporating details of the expert 
resource available within each Centre is provided in Figure 6.1. A copy of the draft "Service Delivery 
Plan" is reproduced at Appendix 6.2. 
The service, named the Chemical Incident Management Support Unit (CIMSU), was aimed at both local 
and health authorities in the NHS (South and West) Region, and likewise at similar authorities in Wales, 
following presentations by the author at meetings of the Welsh Collaboration for Health and Environments 
I The Welsh Collaboration comprises senior professional representatives from all Environmental Health and Public Health Medicine 
Departments in Wales, Health Promotion Wales and the Welsh Combined Centres for Public Health. The purpose of the collaboration 
is to provide a network to encourage the free-flow of information between relevant health professionals. 
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Figure 6.1 Model for delivery of a comprehensive multi-skilled acute chemical incident 
support services to health and local authorities in Wales 
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(2 February 1996) and the All Wales Chief Environmental Health Officers Panel (26 February 1996). 
These authorities were targeted not only because they had asked for such a service, but also because it 
was perceived as politically acceptable for CIMSU to provide services to the NHS (South and West) 
Region. The Welsh National Poisons Unit, one of the seven centres of the UK National Poisons 
Information Service and an integral part of the Toxicology and Therapeutics Centre, was already 
contracted by Welsh Office and the Department of Health respectively to provide poisons information 
services to both Wales and the NHS (South and West) Region. 
Although the culture in the NHS was, by early 1996, one of commissioning of services, it was never 
the authors intention to enter a competitive marketplace environment. The creation of CIMSU was 
perceived as a development project to foster partnerships with and between local and health 
authorities (and also the emergency services and other response agencies), in the common 
interests of securing improvements in the public health management of acute chemical incidents. In 
the absence of any centralised source of funding, it was however necessary to ask authorities to 
contribute to the development of the Unit. 
The development of CIMSU also enabled HAs in Wales and the NHS (South and West) Region to 
meet the responsibilities placed upon them by national guidance. In both Welsh Health Circular 
(93)61 and Health Service Guidelines HSG (93)38 (health service arrangements for dealing with 
chemical accidents - see Chapter 4), each HA was required to ensure access to: 
the necessary advice and expertise concerning public health hazards arising from chemical 
accidents. 
(Welsh Office 1993; Department of Health 1993) 
However, in meeting the demands of the client, and offering services at a price, there was no 
escaping entry into the market model of health service provision. 
Development of other 24 - hour Support and Advisory Units in England 
At the same time as CIMSU was being developed, similar services were also evolving in other parts 
of England. In the West Midlands (NHS) Region, the clinical, toxicological and chemical expertise 
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of the West Midlands Poisons Unit (part of the NPIS) was being brought together with the 
environmental, public health and epidemiological expertise of the Institute of Public and 
Environmental Health, University of Birmingham to form the Centre for Chemical Incidents (Vale 
1996). At the Medical Toxicology Unit at Guy's and St Thomas Hospital, London (again part of the 
NPIS), a "Chemical Incidents Research" programme had been in existence since 1990 (Medical 
Toxicology Unit 1995). This became the Chemical Incident Response Service, London in January 
1996. Finally, in Newcastle, the University Medical School's Department of Occupational and 
Environmental Medicine was developing a service (Chemical Incident Service, Newcastle) for 
health authorities located in the Northern and Yorkshire (NHS) Region (Blain 1996). In terms of the 
politics of the NHS, the individuals behind these units might therefore be described as the 
professional monopolisers. 
The Position of Central Government 
Of particular relevance in linking these developments to national roles and responsibilities, was the 
separate approach taken by the Scottish Office Department of Health. In 1989, central funding had 
been provided by the NHS in Scotland to resource the Environmental Health (Scotland) Unit, as a 
sister unit to the Communicable Disease (Scotland) Unit, which had been established in the late 
1960s. The functions of the Unit were: 
(a) to be a national centre for expert advice on all matters of environmental health ... 
available to central government, local government, research organisations, and the 
public, free of charge; 
(b) to undertake environmental investigations on its own initiative, or when requested 
by an organisation; 
(c) to initiate surveillance and research programmes on important environmental health 
issues; and 
(d) to develop graduate and post-graduate training in environmental health for medical, 
veterinary, environmental health, nursing and other health personnel. 
(Forbes 1993) 
In being funded by the NHS, the unit was able to give independent and unbiased advice to both 
central and local government, a capability that was effectively demonstrated in the handling of the 
public health aspects of the Braer disaster (Campbell et a/. 1993). In 1994, the two units merged to 
form the Scottish Centre for Infection and Environmental Health (SCIEH). 
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By way of contrast, under the system that was evolving in Wales and England, the corporate 
rationalisers at Welsh Office and the Department of Health respectively soon realised that they 
might themselves not have access to the advice provided by CIMSU and the other units to health 
authorities. There was also no readily identifiable national centre in existence which could 
coordinate the activities of the Units, for example, in relation to surveillance, training and the 
handling of cross-regional incidents. 
In parallel with these developments, references were also increasingly being made within the public 
health literature to the need for the development of a national chemical incident surveillance - 
resource centre -a so-called Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre (CDSC) for toxicological 
hazards to health (Baxter et al. 1995). Ayres went further in suggesting that such a centre might 
have the following functions: 
1. to monitor the frequency and severity of incidents; 
2. to act as an information and skill resource centre giving information and loaning 
expertise, particularly at the time of the disaster, but also giving advice on continuing 
surveillance requirements; 
3. to define the training needs for public health doctors and members of other agencies 
who are responsible for managing disasters when they occur; 
4. to support the planning process in all establishments where there is a need; 
5. to promote the development of links nationally between agencies ...; 
for example, 
toxicology units, occupational health departments, epidemiology units etc.; 
6. to assist the International Programme on Chemical Safety to promote international links 
to increase the amount of expert knowledge available, and improve access to that 
knowledge. 
(Ayres 1995) 
Study of Activity on Public Health Effects of Environmental Chemicals 
Introduction 
In January 1996, the Department of Health therefore concluded that there was a need to 
commission a study to review the scope and targeting of the activities which it was currently 
supporting on the effects of environmental chemicals on human health. This included incidents of 
acute exposure to relatively high levels of hazardous or potentially hazardous chemicals. The aims 
of the study were: 
a) To determine the availability of expertise and resources which could be utilised to 
support the needs of the Department of Health and the National Health Service for 
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information and advice in fulfilling their recognised roles in responding to chemical 
accidents; 
b) To identify sources of expertise which could be utilised to assist the Department of 
Health in its functions of providing advice to various parties on the relationship 
between ill-health and environmental chemicals; 
c) To augment and support the above, through the identification of a network of 
research centres, able to keep the Department of Health abreast of potential 
hazards to human health arising from exposure to environmental chemicals. 
(Department of Health 1996) 
Accordingly, tenders were invited by the Department of Health, by way of a letter sent to selected 
UK organisations on 8 January 1996, to: 
(a) undertake a short study to map out existing activity by the Department and other 
bodies; and 
(b) identify gaps which the Department should consider filling. 
(Department of Health 1996) 
The author submitted an application to undertake the study, under the auspices of the Welsh 
Combined Centres for Public Health, and was invited to do so by the Department of Health on 29 
January 1996. Although it was recognised that the study centred primarily on England, the intended 
outcome was essentially the same, that is, to develop a public health management model for acute 
chemical incidents. As such incidents have no respect for boundaries, it was considered unlikely 
that the Welsh Office Public Health Unit would agree to a separate model for the principality from 
that proposed for England. This was confirmed by Welsh Office's endorsement of the study 
(Whinney 1996). There was therefore very little point in the author undertaking the planned 
structured interviews of key personnel of agencies in Wales, when there would have been no 
possibility of testing the resultant model in any practical setting. 
Having had the opportunity to review the accompanying papers to the letter, the author set the 
following objectives for the study: 
(a) to conduct structured interviews with representatives of key UK organisations active in the 
area of health effects of environmental chemicals, including government departments, 
government funded bodies, university departments, professional associations and the 
private sector; 
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(b) to establish the present range and scale of activities of these organisations in relation to the 
perceived gaps in current provision; 
(c) To collate the information and prepare a report for the Department of Health summarising 
which organisations are active, the scope and scale of their activity and how their 
respective activities overlap; and 
(d) To identify and report where the Department of Health could make use of existing activity to 
meet the needs for itself and / or for the NHS and where gaps remain which need to be 
filled. 
Method 
Study Design 
The Department of Health were keen for the study to be completed by mid-March 1996. The 
planning, reading, design and exploratory pilot work therefore had to be compressed into a two- 
week period. In this respect, Oppenheim's five stage approach to decision-making in relation to 
study design provided a useful guide to best practice (Oppenheim 1992). 
A. Method of data collection 
A standardised, formal interview approach was chosen as the method of data collection for the 
study. The advantages of using interviewers, as opposed to postal questionnaires, were (a) 
improved response rates and consequently less biases in the sample of respondents, (b) the 
capacity to provide explanations of the purpose of the study more convincingly than could be 
achieved by a covering letter, (c) the ability to maintain better control over the order or sequence in 
which the questions were answered, and (d) the potential for personal insights to be obtained of the 
perceived gaps in current provision with respect to the study's areas of interest. 
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B. Method of approach to respondents 
Oppenheim found that: 
the most important determinant both of response rate and of the quality of the responses is 
the subject's motivation. 
(Oppenheim 1992) 
To gain the respondents' cooperation, a letter was therefore sent in advance of the study, which (a) 
informed each respondent that an approach would soon be made to set a mutually convenient date 
and time for their interview; (b) made reference to the fact that the study was sponsored by the 
Department of Health (which subsequently proved to be a powerful motivator); and (c) gave 
assurances of confidentiality and anonymity in respect of the data provided by each respondent. 
The issue of dealing with non-responders did not arise, as all intended respondents participated in 
the study. 
C. The build-up of question modules 
A questionnaire is essentially a tool for data collection; its function is measurement. The detailed 
specification of measurement aims must therefore be precisely and logically related to the aims and 
objectives of the study and the reference framework adopted (Oppenheim 1992). In this respect, 
the author used the internationally evaluated guidance materials on the public health sector role in 
chemical incident preparedness, response and follow-up, which had been prepared in consultation 
with the International Programme on Chemical Safety, as the reference framework for the 
questionnaire design. 
The result was the development of a series of question modules, each concerned with a different 
variable, for example, surveillance of incidents, emergency planning and risk assessment. These 
modules were then placed in order, having regard to the internal logic of the inquiry and the likely 
reactions of respondents. 
150 
D. Order of questions within modules 
The so-called "funnel" approach (Oppenheim 1992), preceded by various "filter" questions, was 
employed in ordering the questions within each of the modules. Accordingly, many of the modules 
started with a filter question, aimed at excluding respondents from a particular question sequence if those 
questions were irrelevant to them. A broad question was then included, followed by a progressive 
narrowing down of the scope of the questions until some very specific points were reached. 
E. Question types 
Open questions were primarily chosen for inclusion within the questionnaire. This was to give free 
expression and spontaneity to respondents in their replies, which was seen as particularly 
important, in light of the need to identify gaps in current provision 
The end result of this five-stage process is the questionnaire shown at Appendix 6.3. As will be seen, the 
questionnaire is divided into four sections, and a number of sub-sections. Section A asks about the 
scope and range of activity of each organisation in relation to chemical incidents. Each sub-section or 
variable then follows a set pattern of questioning, aimed at identifying whether an organisation has 
received requests for assistance to provide a particular service, for example, risk assessment expertise, 
and from whom; the capability of that organisation to respond and on what basis; the number of years of 
experience possessed; the means of financing such an involvement; and, any proposals for the future. 
Sections B and C were designed to obtain qualitative data on the surveillance / research activities of the 
organisations interviewed, in relation to both the systematic, ongoing collection of data on the health 
effects of "routine" levels of pollution, and specific studies investigating the human toxicology of 
environmental chemicals. Finally, Section D covers the gaps perceived by interviewees in organisational 
response to the public health effects of environmental chemicals. 
Manaaement of the Stud 
As with the AWEHSP, the author set up a small steering group to provide direction to the work 
being undertaken. The steering group met on three occasions during the course of the study, as 
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shown in Table 6.1 below. An ongoing dialogue was, however, maintained between the author and 
individual members of the steering group during the writing-up phase of the study. 
The Interview Process 
In view of the large number of organisations to be interviewed over such a short time period, the 
author also engaged the services of two other colleagues with experience both in the conduct of 
interviews and the management of the public health aspects of chemical incidents: Mrs. Sarah 
Jones, Senior Lecturer in Environmental Health and Environmental Risk Management at the then 
Cardiff Institute of Higher Education and Dr. Jane Layzell, Lecturer in Public Health Medicine at the 
University of Wales College of Medicine. 
Although unachievable in practice, interviewers are bound by the requirement of stimulus 
equivalence, that is, that every respondent should understand a given question in the same way as 
every other respondent (Oppenheim 1992). The author therefore met with the two other 
interviewers on several occasions, in advance of conducting any interviews, to discuss the ordering 
and phrasing of questions, the use of open-ended probes, and how to deal with "problem 
respondents". Given the constraints of time imposed by the Department of Health, it was only 
possible to pilot the questionnaire in two interviews. Both were followed by further discussion, 
leading to changes in the design of the questionnaire and the preparation of an interview schedule 
to promote precision and conformity. 
In discussion with the Department of Health, a total of 41 organisations were selected for interview. 
The author conducted 13 interviews, with the remaining 28 split equally between the two other 
interviewers. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with representatives of 37 of the 
organisations, and telephone interviews with the other 4 organisations. 
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Table 6.1 Study Timetable 
Description Timetable 
Notification received from Department of Health of "Approval of Tender" 29 January 1996 
Formal meeting with Department of Health to agree study protocol, to 6 February 1996 
include organisations to be contacted, questionnaire design etc. 
Steering group meeting 13 February 1996 
Author meets with co-interviewers to finalise questionnaire design, 13 February 1996 
allocation of responsibilities, methods of working etc. 
Appointments made with key personnel of all organisations to be 13 - 15 February 1996 
interviewed 
Pilot study completed, involving administration of questionnaire to key 15 and 19 February 
personnel at the Welsh National Poisons Unit and Welsh Office 1996 
Steering group meeting 19 February 1996 
Author meets with co-interviewers to review progress, evaluate pilot study 19 February 1996 
and develop standardised interview protocol 
Formal meeting with Department of Health, including administration of 21 February 1996 
questionnaire and full debrief on progress made 
Structured interviews conducted with key personnel of all organisations 21 February 1996 to 8 
March 1996 
Steering group meeting 8 March 1996 
Author meets with co-interviewers to review progress and discuss 8 March 1996 
nrannrnfinn of final rannrt 
Data processing 1 11 - 13 March 1996 
ung witn uepartment of rteaitn to aiscuss preliminary tinaings 113 marcn 
I Author writes final report 114 March - 30 April 
1996 
Data Processing and Information Evaluation 
Although easy to ask, the answers to open questions are often difficult to analyse. As a rule, a 
classification process must therefore be employed, known as coding (Oppenheim 1992). The 
questionnaire design therefore included some scope for field coding, where the interviewers were able to 
code answers on the spot by ticking or circling one or more categories of possible response. 
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For the most part, however, the responses were recorded in writing and coded back at the office. The 
coding frame employed was again based on the internationally-evaluated guidance materials on the 
public health sector role in chemical incident preparedness, response and follow-up. To check for 
accuracy, a summary of the coded information was prepared and sent to each organisation for comment. 
Where necessary, appropriate amendments were then made to the original data record. 
The Statistical Package for the Social Services (SPSS) for Windows Version 6 was used for some 
processing and analysis, but in that the data collected from Sections A, B and C of the 
questionnaire was mainly qualitative in nature, the results were summarised in a series of tables, in 
accordance with the coding frame. A different approach was taken for Section D, as a number of 
the representatives interviewed did not wish their views to be attributable, as they were not 
necessarily the same as those held by the organisations on whose behalf they were being 
interviewed. The results for Section D are therefore anonymised, and presented on the basis of the 
combined data set from the organisations interviewed. 
Results 
The results presented below relate only to the responses received in relation to questions raised 
under Sections A and D of the questionnaire, that is, those applicable to incidents of acute exposure 
to relatively high levels of hazardous or potentially hazardous chemicals. The results from Sections 
B and C of the questionnaire, which relate primarily to "surveillance of health effects of "routine" 
levels of chemical pollution and supporting baseline information" fall outwith the remit of this 
dissertation and are therefore not presented. 
Section A- Chemical Incidents 
General 
Of the 41 organisations interviewed, only three considered that they had no role to play in the 
response to chemical incidents. Appendix 6.4 provides a summary of the activities of each of the 
41 organisations interviewed. "Activity" was carefully defined in terms of an organisation's 
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experience of that role in an incident, as opposed to a statement that, although having no 
experience, it would have the capability to accomplish it. 
Specific 
The tables contained within Appendix 6.5 provide a detailed analysis and breakdown of the specific 
activities of the organisations interviewed, both in relation to the coding frame and the geographical 
area covered by their respective operations in the United Kingdom. 
Registration of Sites / Carriers 
The registration of sites was undertaken by 9 organisations. However, only two were mandated to 
do so by legislation (both government departments). In Wales and the NHS (South and West) 
Region, the NHS (West Midlands) Region and the NHS (Northern and Yorkshire) Region, a 
government-funded body and two university departments respectively were in the process of 
independently developing inventories of major hazard sites. The remaining 4 organisations 
comprised a government-funded body, a professional body, a private sector organisation and a 
centre of the NPIS. 
Surveillance 
Although 16 organisations reported undertaking surveillance of chemical incidents, only 4 of the 
systems could be said to truly meet the definition, as set out in Chapter 3. There were clear 
similarities between the three systems already in existence, in that the Department of 
Environmental Health and Institute of Occupational Health at the University of Birmingham, and 
SCIEH had both modelled their respective surveillance activities on the AWEHSP at WCCPH. The 
fourth system was in the process of being piloted by the WHO Collaborating Centre at WCCPH and 
was again founded on the AWEHSP. The remainder comprised ad hoc systems of incident 
recording, based on statutory notifications to government departments, voluntary reporting systems, 
analysis of enquiries and vigilance of press cuttings. 
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Environmental Monitoring and Modelling 
Eighteen organisations stated that they received requests for assistance to undertake environmental 
monitoring following chemical incidents. Nine of the organisations were capable of deploying staff to the 
scene of an incident to undertake monitoring, but only three on a 24 hour, 365 day basis -a government 
department, a government-funded body and a private sector organisation. Of the remaining 9 
organisations who received requests, 5 had access to the resources of other agencies on a contract 
basis, whilst 4 provided advice only on the nature and extent of the monitoring to be undertaken. 
Twelve organisations were involved, to varying degrees, in the modelling of potential population 
exposures to airborne releases and / or chemical spills into watercourses. Only 3 organisations, 
however, had any experience of modelling at the time of an incident, namely the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF), the Marine Pollution Control Unit and the Water Research 
Centre. A further three organisations, two of whom had access to Geographical Information 
Systems (GIS), possessed the capability to undertake modelling. The remainder were either 
currently in the process of developing a modelling capability (N=3) or were involved primarily in a 
research capacity in initiating, commissioning and developing the actual models (N=3). 
Biological Sampling 
Fourteen organisations reported that they received requests for assistance in undertaking biological 
sampling of persons exposed following chemical incidents. However, only 6 (primarily university 
departments and government-funded bodies) had the capability to deploy staff to the scene of an 
incident. Of the remaining eight organisations, 3 held contracts with other agencies to conduct 
biological sampling on their behalf, whilst 5 provided advice only on the nature and extent of the 
sampling to be undertaken. 
Analytical Services 
Eleven organisations operated laboratory facilities capable of undertaking the rapid analysis of 
environmental and biological samples taken pursuant to chemical incidents. These included the Health 
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and Safety Laboratory (part of HSE), the Laboratory of the Government Chemist and the Water 
Research Centre (both private sector). A further four organisations reported receiving requests to provide 
analytical services. All relied on the resources of other agencies to fulfill their obligations. 
Emergency Preparedness / Planning 
Twenty-eight organisations, comprising all sectors, reported receiving requests for assistance in the 
development of contingency plans. The main sources of such requests were HAs (N=19) and local 
authorities (N=15), followed by Regional Offices of the NHS (N=10). The remainder included 
emergency services, public utilities, industry and government departments. 
The Department of Health, NHS Executive, Welsh Office, Scottish Office Department of Health and 
Department of Health and Social Services, Northern Ireland all confirmed that they had issued 
guidance to HAs within their respective territories in the past three years on "health service 
arrangements for dealing with chemical accidents". The Health and Safety Executive had also 
issued guidance to local authorities and industry in interpreting the emergency planning 
requirements of the CIMAH regulations (see Chapter 4). Other guidance comprised mainly that 
issued by professional bodies, such as the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health and the 
Chemical Industries Association to their constituent members. 
Fifteen organisations stated that they regularly provided technical advice and assistance to HAs 
and local authorities on matters pertaining to emergency planning. These included all four support 
and advisory units, plus SCIEH. Fourteen of the organisations appeared as contact points in 
contingency plans (predominantly government departments and government-funded bodies), and 8 
regularly participated in simulation exercises and / or incident debriefings. These included private 
sector organisations, such as the National Chemical Emergency Centre and the Water Research 
Centre. Two organisations provided training in emergency planning, namely the Emergency 
Planning College and the Marine Pollution Control Unit. The latter organisation is responsible for 
the development and maintenance of the national contingency plan for dealing with incidents of 
pollution from shipping and offshore installations with the potential to threaten UK interests. 
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Risk Assessment 
Twenty-seven organisations reported receiving requests for assistance in assessing risks to human 
health following chemical incidents. Twenty-one of the organisations possessed the necessary 
capability to provide assistance with such assessments, and in 17 cases, support was potentially 
available on a 24 hour, 365 day basis. Seven of the organisations also had the capability to deploy 
staff to the scene of the incident, if required. 
Of the six other organisations, 2 were experienced in undertaking assessments of risk to health 
arising from chronic exposure situations, but not specifically in relation to chemical incidents; one, a 
professional body, provided general advice on risk assessment methodologies only, whilst the three 
remaining organisations perceived their role as facilitating contact, on behalf of enquirers, with more 
appropriate sources of information. 
Risk Management 
The receipt of requests for assistance in managing the risks to human health presented by chemical 
incidents was reported by 24 of the organisations interviewed. Twelve possessed an in-house 
capability to provide expert advice and information on the risk management techniques to be 
adopted in such incidents, and 5 were also able to deploy staff to the scene of the incident. 
Two organisations, namely the Laboratory of the Government Chemist (land remediation works) and the 
Marine Pollution Control Unit (counter-pollution measures at sea) were experienced in undertaking risk 
mitigation / mediation steps at the incident scene, whilst five organisations (principally the National 
Poisons Information Service) possessed the necessary treatment facilities for the provision of specialist 
clinical care to patients exposed to chemicals. Four of the 5 latter organisations also acted as 
administration centres for the dispatch of antidotes to Hospital Departments. 
The Government Departments interviewed considered their roles to be informing and co-ordinating 
the policy and strategy development process for managing the public health aspects of chemical 
incidents, of enforcing legal restrictions (for example, MAFF in relation to the Food and 
158 
Environmental Protection Act 1985) and of facilitating access to other sources of advice and 
assistance (for example, HAGCCI). 
Risk Communication 
Twenty-six organisations reported that they received requests for assistance in communicating risk 
to the public/media following chemical incidents. Most (N=17) provided advice only, leaving 
communication to members of the local response teams. All four support and advisory units offered 
help in the preparation of press statements, but only one indicated that they were prepared to take 
part in the risk communication process. 
Eight organisations had direct experience of communicating risk following such incidents. These 
were primarily Government Departments, with dedicated media liaison officers, who were also 
responsible for preparing briefings for Ministers and senior government officials, and answering 
parliamentary questions. Additionally, the four Health Departments all considered it part of their 
brief to promote consistency in the messages issued by the NHS and the other local response 
agencies/authorities. 
Two organisations, both University Departments, stated that they were currently conducting 
research into the impact of information campaigns on public perception and knowledge, the results 
of which might usefully be applied in improving practices of risk communication following chemical 
incidents. Finally, the Chemical Industries Association had produced general guidance for its 
member companies on approaches to be taken in communicating risk to the media and/or the public. 
Epidemiological Follow-up 
Although 16 organisations reported that they received requests to undertake or participate in 
epidemiological studies of persons exposed following chemical incidents, only 7 of those 
interviewed provided any real evidence of experience. These included the Health and Safety 
Executive, the Scottish Centre for Infection and Environmental Health, the South East Institute of 
Public Health and the Welsh Combined Centres for Public Health. The other nine organisations 
stated that, whilst they had not been specifically involved in carrying out epidemiological studies 
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following chemical incidents, their staff were capable of coordinating and conducting such studies. 
In seven cases, this opinion was founded on their experience of undertaking or participating in 
studies organised in relation to chronic exposure situations. 
The commissioning of studies was perceived as falling within the remit of three of the government 
departments interviewed, as well as the Medical Research Council Institute for Environment and 
Health (government funded body). A supportive role was identified for the Office of Population, 
Censuses and Surveys. 
Training 
Thirty organisations reported receiving requests to organise and/or participate in the delivery of 
training courses relating to the management of chemical incidents. Twenty-eight actively offered or 
participated in the delivery of such courses. The exceptions were the Department of Environment, 
which had no resources specifically available for training, and the NHS Executive, which perceived 
its role as informing the training and educational establishments, and professional bodies, of the 
needs and requirements of public health trainees. 
The full range of courses was on offer, including both undergraduate and postgraduate degree 
programmes. The principal subject areas were risk assessment and risk management, epidemiology, 
toxicology, environmental monitoring and modelling, and emergency planning. Of particular interest were 
the speciality modules offered at MSc/MPH level in "incident management' by the Department of 
Environmental Health and Institute of Occupational Health, University of Birmingham; the Department of 
Epidemiology and Public Health, University of Newcastle; the Environmental Epidemiology Unit, London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine; the Scottish Centre for Infection and Environmental Health; the 
South East Institute of Public Health; and the Welsh Combined Centres for Public Health. 
International Activities 
A total of 30 organisations were engaged in international activities. Twenty-two had contributed to 
the development by international organisations of public health related plans for response to 
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chemical incidents and 21 to the development of international training materials and methods. The 
main international organisations involved were the International Programme on Chemical Safety 
(IPCS), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World 
Health Organisation, in particular its European Office (WHO EURO). 
Section D- Gap Analysis 
General 
A consistent view presented by 14 of the 41 organisations interviewed was "the apparent lack of any 
organised response in the United Kingdom, in relation to the public health management of chemical 
incidents". Specific comments included "the Department of Health and NHS need to better define not only 
their own roles, but also promote public health interests within the roles of other response agencies" and "at 
present, there is a lack of coordination and communication between the multiplicity of agencies involved, with 
many having unrealistically compartmentalised views of their respective responsibilities in relation to 
incidents". Others expressed their lack of understanding about the lead role of the HA in managing the 
public health aspects of chemical incidents and in carrying out longer term surveillance of those exposed. 
The support provided currently to the Department of Health and NHS in meeting their responsibilities for 
managing the public health aspects of chemical incidents was independently viewed by 6 organisations 
as being dependent on the ad hoc involvement of a number of interested individuals, as opposed to a 
coordinated evidence-based system of response. However, this is not entirely true, given the existence 
of both the NPIS network and the HAGCCI advisory system in the UK. 
Specific 
Surveillance 
Nine organisations considered that there was an urgent need for surveillance of chemical incidents 
to be co-ordinated on a national basis, and that a starting point might be to harmonise the data 
collected by the surveillance networks already in existence in the United Kingdom. 
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Environmental Monitoring and Modelling 
Whilst acknowledging the fact that a number of agencies have statutory responsibilities in respect of 
environmental monitoring following chemical incidents, six organisations felt that practical advice 
and guidance urgently needed to be developed on the nature and extent of environmental 
monitoring programmes to be instituted in such circumstances. One of the organisations went 
further in commenting that "monitoring was mainly undertaken to prove that safety levels had not 
been exceeded and not to measure health risk". Another stated that "there were already well- 
defined methods, rationales and databases of results in occupational settings, but that this was not 
the case in relation to community exposures". 
Five organisations also commented on the problems of obtaining good exposure information at the 
time of an incident. Three of the 5 considered that improved methods for modelling pollutant 
dispersion in all three environmental media of air, water and soil were required, in order to be able 
to better predict the dose of chemical(s) to which the community may have been exposed. The use 
of GIS was also seen as an integral part of this development by two of the organisations. 
Emergency Preparedness /Planning 
Four organisations observed that whilst appropriate provision had been made for on-site and off-site 
emergency planning at CIMAH sites, no such steps had been taken in relation to small and medium sized 
enterprises. Most incidents occurred at non-CIMAH sites and yet, there was no requirement for the 
operators to prepare emergency plans for dealing with incidents involving chemicals stored, processed or 
disposed of at their premises. Comments were also made by two organisations that "ambulance service 
personnel and police officers attending the scene of a chemical incident were often poorly equipped in 
terms of personal protective equipment". Guidance was needed in relation to this issue. 
Risk Assessment 
Two organisations were of the opinion that more extensive and scientifically based assessments of risk 
were required in order to guide risk management and risk communication decisions. There was also an 
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urgent need for "Environmental Exposure Levels" to better determine the risk mitigation measures to be 
implemented at the scene of an incident. This was particularly the case with respect to contamination of 
the atmosphere. Additionally, it was considered that the assessment process should embrace both the 
acute and longer term health effects of people exposed to an incident. 
Risk Communication 
One organisation commented on the importance of managing the perception of risk by the public, 
following a chemical incident. In particular, there was a need to develop risk communication 
techniques to help the public better appreciate magnitudes of absolute relative risk, and population 
attributable risks". 
Epidemiological Follow-up 
The lack of epidemiological follow-up of chemical incidents was highlighted by seven organisations. 
All considered that such studies were important, not only where there were acute cases of ill health, 
but also where people were exposed and not acutely harmed. Four of the 7 organisations also 
commented that most of the information on the toxicology of chemicals was currently based on 
animal studies and occupational studies, and that epidemiological follow-up of incidents was 
required to better establish the dose-response relationships between particular chemicals and 
human health effects, including those on the human foetus. 
Additionally, the same four organisations called for the co-ordinating focus of an identified centre or 
network of units to oversee the arrangements for the epidemiological follow-up of chemical 
incidents. Two of the organisations also recommended the development of guidance materials on 
epidemiological approaches for the assessment of the human health effects of chemical incidents. 
Both felt that criteria were urgently needed to support public health professionals in making 
decisions on when to conduct a follow-up study. In particular, the cost-benefit equation was an 
important factor in determining whether the costly commitment of undertaking an epidemiological 
study was likely to be of benefit to society, where the evidence of a health risk was small. 
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Training 
Nine organisations believed that public health doctors required more training, particularly in 
toxicology, environmental medicine, and environment and health issues. Three of the 9 
organisations felt very strongly that these aspects should all be constituent parts of the formal 
training of any medical practitioner, and that continuing professional development should be no 
more than a means of supplementing and building on that training. 
No observations were made in relation to "registration of sites / carriers", "biological sampling", 
"analytical services", "risk management" and "international activities". 
Possible Models 
Based on the general and specific comments gained from the gap analysis, a number of models for 
mobilising expertise to support the Department of Health and NHS in the public health management 
of chemical incidents were recommended: 
(a) Model I- the centralised "task force" model (Figure 6.2). This was viewed as an 
independent and centrally funded unit, with the power to react with appropriate expertise and 
resource on a 24 hour, 365 day basis. Staff of the "task force" would be on permanent standby, 
enabling the provision of a rapid-response field service to manage the investigation and control of 
any chemical incident, on behalf of the HA or Regional Office. When not in the field, staff would 
be engaged in preparedness planning for future responses, national surveillance of incidents, 
development of training and education programmes, and various research and consultancy 
activities. None of the four organisations who favoured the model felt that the "task force" should 
be attached to any existing institution. 
(b) Model 2- the centralised support model (Figure 6.3). Very similar to model 1 and based on 
the existing system of communicable disease control in the United Kingdom. Indeed, views were 
expressed that the brief of the PHLS' Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre might simply 
be extended to include chemical incidents. The key differences between this model and the 
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"task force" model were that (a) it was intended to support the role of the HA and / or Regional 
Office in the management of a chemical incident, rather than assume responsibility, and (b) it 
might be possible to incorporate a regional tier, as had occurred with the appointment of "regional 
epidemiologists" for the communicable disease model, to assist, when requested, with local 
investigations. Staff at the central unit would fulfill the same roles of preparedness planning, 
surveillance of incidents etc., as those for model 1. This model was supported by 6 of the 
organisations interviewed. 
(c) Model 3- the regional "support" model (Figure 6.4). Seven organisations favoured a 
regional support network, with units developed on the basis of the eight NHS regions in 
England. Each unit would provide services similar to those of the centralised "support" 
model, which would include preparedness planning, surveillance of incidents etc. To 
ensure a consistency of approach between the eight units, there would also need to be a 
national co-ordinating centre for the development of appropriate guidelines and standards 
for joint working. 
There were, however, some differences of opinion regarding the extent of the remit of the 
regional units. Three of the 7 organisations considered the role of such units to provide 
support and advice only, whilst four felt that a more hands-on approach could be offered, 
for example in providing on-site environmental monitoring support, participating in press 
briefings and assisting the HA in the epidemiological follow-up of those exposed. 
(d) Model 4- NPIS "support" model (Figure 6.5). Identical to model 3, but with only five support 
units, located on the geographical basis of the existing NPIS network in England and Wales. 
Whatever the preferred model, seven organisations commented on the need for adequate funding 
to be provided. Four of the 7 also stated that the staffing of units, whether at the central or regional 
level, needed to be carefully considered. The mix of skills required to effectively support the public 
health response to chemical incidents was more than just knowledge of the toxicology of chemicals. 
It also needed to embrace disciplines such environmental monitoring and modelling, health risk 
assessment, risk communication, and epidemiology. 
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Figure 6.2 Centralised "Task Force" Model 
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Figure 6.4 Regional "Support" Model 
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Figure 6.5 NPIS "Support" Model 
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Six organisations stated that any proposals, in respect of the establishment of regional and / or 
central units, would require the widest possible consultation to ensure ownership by future users. 
As part of the consultation process, there would need to be liaison with all agencies / authorities 
having a role to play in response to chemical incidents. This would include not only the NHS, but 
also industry, "Other Government Departments" and local response agencies. Eight organisations 
specifically asked that the interests of local authorities, particularly Environmental Health 
Departments, and the emergency services be taken into account. 
Other comments included "the Centre or Units should not be a re-creation of Health Advisory Group 
for Chemical Contamination Incidents (HAGCCI)". The latter was seen as having too narrow a 
remit, with question marks over the availability of key individuals when most needed. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The study design provided a useful framework on which to base an evaluation of the expertise and 
resources currently available within the United Kingdorin for supporting the Department of Health and the 
NHS in meeting their roles and responsibilities with respect to the management of the public health 
aspects of chemical incidents. However, from the authors perspective, the study did have its limitations: 
(a) originally, it had been anticipated that structured interviews would take place with 
approximately 25 organisations. Through consultation with the Department of Health, the 
number rapidly increased to 41, to account for as many UK organisations as possible, 
active in the areas of interest. This placed extreme time constraints on the author in 
completing the study on time, with inevitable impacts on quality. 
(b) in that interviews were conducted by the author and two other interviewers, the study was 
immediately open to potential bias. Details of the measures implemented to overcome this 
potential problem have already been provided in this Chapter. 
(C) the study findings were based on overviews of the stated activities of the organisations 
interviewed. Most interviews lasted less than 2 hours and therefore a detailed insight into 
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the activities of the organisations, many of which were complex, intersectoral and 
multidisciplinary in nature, was not possible. In particular, it was felt that additional time 
was needed to thoroughly assess the claims made by some organisations of their actual 
capabilities to react to various aspects of the response to chemical incidents. 
(d) there can be no guarantee that the opinions of the interviewees were the same as those of 
the organisations which they were representing. In relation to the gap analysis part of the 
study, for example, many interviewees expounded their own personal views, as well as 
those of their organisations. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the underlying conclusion, in relation to all of the activities 
considered, from surveillance to epidemiological follow-up and from environmental monitoring to 
risk communication, was the need to change from the current position where support was provided 
to the Department of Health and NHS by the ad hoc involvement of a multiplicity of individuals and 
organisations, to a systems-based co-ordinated approach at the regional and national level. 
Clearly, there were many organisations already active in the areas where gaps in support were identified. 
Foci of coordinated activity were present in Wales and the NHS (South and West) Region, the NHS 
(West Midlands) Region, the NHS (Northern and Yorkshire) Region and Scotland. There were, however, 
no similar foci of activity in any of the other NHS Regions. Furthermore, there was no inter-regional 
coordination of the activities being undertaken. This was perceived as particularly important where 
incidents had the potential to impact on more than one NHS Region. 
A number of possible models were therefore recommended to the Department of Health, and the 
suggestion made that their evaluation should form the basis of a separate research study. In 
particular, the issues requiring further detailed consideration included: 
(a) the location(s) and remit of any central / regional units; 
(b) the funding mechanisms; 
(c) the breakdown of expertise that would need to be retained within any central / regional 
units; and 
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(d) the way any central / regional units would be expected to work both together and with other 
agencies / authorities, for example, the emergency services. 
A two-stage process to the study was proposed: 
Part A: the production of a discussion paper, based on the models already highlighted; 
Part B: widespread consultation on the paper, involving not only the Department of Health 
and the NHS, but also those organisations interviewed in the present study, and 
other local response agencies. 
The author's report was submitted to the Department of Health on 10 May 1996. 
The Role of the Public Health Medicine Environmental Group 
Having now considered the respective roles of the professional monopolisers and the corporate 
rationalisers in the development of the model, it is timely at this point to introduce the third grouping, 
that is, what Alford referred to as the community interest (Alford 1975). In relation to the model, no 
other organisation did more to influence policy than the Public Health Medicine Environmental 
Group (PHMEG), part of the Faculty of Public Health Medicine. 
In 1995, the PHMEG conducted a survey of its members to identify which health professional within 
each HA had been designated as the "appropriate officer" for the purposes of effecting compliance 
with HSG (93)38 and HSG (93)56 in England, and WHC (93)61 and WHC (94)26 in Wales (see 
Chapter 4). The survey found that responsibility rested with CsCDC in 88% of HAs (Public Health 
Medicine Environmental Group 1996). 
On further questioning of CsCDC, the survey also confirmed their need for: 
access 24 hours a day to advice on the public health, medical, environmental, chemical, 
scientific and toxicological aspects of chemical health hazards. 
(Public Health Medicine Environmental Group 1996) 
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Although acknowledging the ability of the NPIS to provide specialist toxicological advice (Murray 
1992), the PHMEG concurred with Hill and O'Sullivan's view that the service could not meet the 
additional needs of CsCDC in dealing with the reality of a chemical incident (Hill and O'Sullivan). 
The PHMEG concluded that: 
a contract must therefore exist between Districts (HAs) as purchasers and a toxicology unit 
or other suitable unit as providers to ensure that Districts are able to comply adequately 
with the guidelines. 
(Public Health Medicine Environmental Group 1996) 
In this respect, the PHMEG convened a working party to develop a draft specification for a contract 
with such a provider unit. The draft specification was issued on 24 January 1996 and is reproduced 
at Appendix 6.6. 
The PHMEG were, by now, also conscious of ongoing developments with respect to each of the 
four support and advisory units in England and Wales. Accordingly, the group decided to hold a 
meeting of its members, referred to in correspondence as a "marketplace meeting" (see Appendix 
6.7), to which representatives of each of the units were invited to make a 30 minute presentation, 
detailing the level of service that they were able to provide against the PHMEG's specification and 
the costs involved. The author was therefore invited, in his capacity as Head of CIMSU. The 
meeting was scheduled for 27 March 1996, but was later postponed, pending the outcome of the 
Department of Health's "Study of Activity on Public Health Effects of Environmental Chemicals". 
Ten days after the report of the study was submitted (10 May 1996), the Department of Health received a 
letter from the PHMEG outlining seven areas of concern, expressed by its members, in relation to the 
impact of subscription services for public health support in the management of non-communicable 
environmental hazards (Monk 1996). These are summarised in the first column of Table 6.2. 
To address these concerns, the Department of Health convened a meeting on 31 May 1996 to 
which the "Heads" of all four support and advisory units in England and Wales were invited. Also in 
attendance was the secretary of the PHMEG, and representatives of the Department. At the 
meeting, the author made the comments detailed in the second column of Table 6.2, in relation to 
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the areas of concern raised by members of the PHMEG. The author also stated that the 
Department of Health would need to consider (a) how it could best obtain the advice it required to 
alert and brief the Chief Medical Officer, Ministers and / or its own media liaison officers, and (b) 
how each of the four support and advisory units would interface with the HAGCCI advisory system. 
Table 6.2 - Areas of Concern expressed by the PHMEG regarding the Introduction of 
Subscription Services and the Author's Response 
PHMEG Concerns (Monk 1996) Author's Response at DH meeting 
1 What happens to those HAs 1 Can really only be addressed through a centrally funded support 
without a subscription when they service. If 4 out of the 5 HAs in Wales subscribe to CIMSU and a 
have a major incident? major incident occurs in the nonsubscribing authority, it would be 
very difficult to say "no, we cannot help you" to the DPH / CCDC. 
However, is this fair to the other HAs who are paying? There are 
therefore ethical and moral questions as to whether such public 
health issues should be subject to the marketplace. 
2. How are examples of good 2. Surveillance must be nationally co-ordinated. Perhaps one of the 
practice to be shared by the support units could act as a clearing house to receive incident 
support units? How will the reports from the others. This would not preclude each unit from 
units be coordinated? disseminating its own newsletter etc. Through the mechanism of a 
clearing house, surveillance would also be better able to provide 
guidance on training requirements and R&D priorities nationally. It 
would also seem sensible for any system to be tied in with the 
WHO Collaborating Centre, Cardiff. 
3. Training must be nationally 3. Training provision has been reviewed as part of the DoH study. 
based. How will it be Training must be considered in a broad context from 
coordinated? undergraduate and postgraduate courses to short courses / 
workshops / simulation exercises / conferences. There are a 
multiplicity of current players providing training and what is required 
is for the PHMEG to initially define the specific needs of their 
members. These can then be evaluated against current provision 
in the United Kingdom and shortfalls addressed on a national 
basis. 
4. If a non-communicable 4. Whether the provision of a service is left to the marketplace or 
environmental hazard occurs in centrally resourced, such agreements will have to be reached. All 
a district which is contracted of the support units will have to embrace the need for clear lines of 
with provider A, but comes to communication and responsibility. If left to the marketplace, 
the attention of provider B, who however, it is doubtful whether this can be achieved - competitors, 
does provider B inform, the for what effectively is business, are unlikely to co-operate and 
CCDC in the district where the share information and ideas. 
episode has occurred or 
provider A? 
5. In cross-boundary incidents, 5. As for point 4, but there may be an additional complication. It has 
where the two districts involved always been the intention to offer the services of CIMSU to both 
contract with provider A and local authorities and HAs. A potential problem might arise where 
provider B respectively, how will CIMSU is contracted to provide advice to a local authority, but the 
consistency of advice be HA for the same area subscribes to another support unit. This 
assured? could lead to conflicts in the advice given by the two units to their 
respective clients. 
6. How will long term surveillance 6. These are issues which fall within the remit of CIMSU. Indeed, in 
be coordinated? Wales it is the medium to long-term health concerns that are more 
regularly being faced by CCDCs and EHOs. CIMSU will provide 
support and advice only. Should a fuller study be warranted, then 
this would be undertaken on a consultancy basis and/or through 
collaboration with other agencies, for example, SASHU in the 
investigation of such incidents. 
7 How will research priorities in 7. Both nationally and locally; what is important is that any activity is 
the area of non-communicable co-ordinated, for example, one of the support units may be 
environmental hazards be proposing to investigate the public health impact of formaldehyde 
decided? emissions from a wood chip manufacturer. Through collaboration, 
it may become evident that such a study has already been 
undertaken by another Unit and that important lessons can be 
learned. Alternatively, the study power could be increased by a 
collaborative investigation in relation to a number of such plants 
across the United Kingdom. 
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Conclusion 
The PHMEG played an important part in representing the interests of its members, who in turn, 
were to be the main clients of any public health management model developed for dealing with 
acute chemical incidents. Armed with (a) the views of the PHMEG, (b) knowledge of the current 
status of the four support and advisory units (the professional monopolisers), and (c) the 
conclusions and recommendations of the author's report on the "Study of Activity on Public Health 
Effects of Environmental Chemicals", it was now left to the corporate rationalisers, that is the 
Department of Health, in consultation with Welsh Office, the Scottish Office Department of Health 
and the Department of Health and Social Services, Northern Ireland to determine the way forward. 
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Chapter 7- Model Selection 
Introduction 
As will have been evident from the previous Chapter, the author has had a developmental role in all 
stages in the formulation of a public health management model for dealing with acute chemical incidents, 
not only for Wales, but for the whole of the United Kingdom (UK). In this Chapter, the author will detail the 
system requirements for any support and advisory system so developed, and will also put forward the 
model that he would personally have selected for England and Wales. However, the ultimate decision 
rested with the Department of Health, in consultation with Welsh Office, the Scottish Office Department of 
Health and the Department of Health and Social Services, Northern Ireland. The final model selected will 
therefore be described, as will its evolution into a fully operational system. 
System Requirements 
Figure 7.1 provides the author's proposed schematic model of the skills, facilities, expertise and 
resources which any support and advisory system would need to provide to central government 
health departments and those other parts of the National Health Service (NHS), primarily health 
authorities, responsible for dealing with the public health aspects of an acute chemical incident. 
The model has been developed on the basis of (a) a systematic review of the available literature, 
(b) the lessons learned from the AWEHSP, (c) the specific gaps in current provision identified by 
the "Study of Activity on the Public Health Effects of Environmental Chemicals" and (d) consultation 
with the various health interest groupings over a year. 
The model comprises five components. A reactive component, that is, emergency response, lies at 
the heart of the model, as it is in relation to this aspect that the effectiveness or otherwise of any 
government health department and/or health authority will ultimately be measured by the public. 
The four proactive components of surveillance, training and education, emergency planning and 
research are included to ensure that there will always be a continual drive towards the improvement 
of the emergency response. From the research undertaken, it is also evident that different skills, 
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facilities, expertise and resources are required to support the public health management of an acute 
chemical incident over time, as represented by the three concentric circles in the model. Finally, 
the skills, facilities etc. are further separated into actions directed at the individual, the population 
and the environment, although, in practice, there will be considerable cross-linkage, for example, 
between the results of environmental monitoring and decisions on population health risk 
assessment; and between the recording of clinical symptoms in individuals and the establishment of 
case definitions for any epidemiological follow-up. 
Preferred Model 
The model which best fits the theoretical rationale developed in this thesis is shown in Figure 7.2. 
This idealised model has been based on political considerations and resource constraints. Each of 
the eight NHS regions in England, together with Wales, should have had access to their own local 
support and advisory unit, such as CIMSU. Unfortunately, only four such units have emerged. The 
author would therefore have separated England and Wales into four areas, as shown in Figure 7.2. 
To enable each of the units to meet effectively the system requirements detailed above, appropriate 
levels of funding would have been levied from health authorities, either on a per capitation basis or 
at a standard rate applicable across the whole of England and Wales. It would also have been 
important to provide each unit with assurances that such levels of funding would be retained for at 
least three years, to enable them to attract appropriate expert staff. The reasoning behind this 
approach was to remove the units from the cut-throat world of the competitive marketplace and yet 
still assure their existence, thereby encouraging cooperation and collaboration between what were 
in effect a small number of expert professionals in the UK. 
Each unit would have been responsible for providing front-line support and advice on the public 
health management of acute chemical incidents to both health authorities and Regional Offices (not 
Welsh Office) within their respective areas. In being located reasonably central to their client 
groups, it would also have enabled them to become familiar with the staff of other local response 
agencies / authorities, thereby facilitating improved emergency planning and the introduction of 
systems for the multi-agency surveillance of acute chemical incidents. Training and research 
activities could also have been tailored to meet local needs. 
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Figure 7.2 Preferred Model 
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However, the development of such a system did not preclude the need for a national co-ordinating centre. 
This was required to ensure that all health authorities and Regional Offices received equivalent standards 
of service irrespective of the unit that was providing support to them. Procedures also needed to be 
established for the handling of cross-border incidents and for the coordination of incidents of national 
significance. Other roles for such a centre might include national surveillance of incidents, and an alerting 
/ briefing role for the Department of Health and Welsh Office. 
The Model Selected 
All four government health departments demonstrated their commitment to finding an appropriate 
model for the future, in jointly endorsing the following action point in the "United Kingdom National 
Environmental Health Action Plan", published in July 1996: 
The Government will explore the most effective way of providing support to public health 
authorities in their response to chemical accidents and in the wider monitoring and 
surveillance of public health to detect possible adverse health effects of chemicals in the 
environment. - 
(Department of the Environment 1996) 
The decision, however, came via a Department of Health communique to the author and the 
"Heads" of the other support and advisory units, dated 4 July 1996. Following Departmental 
discussions with the RDsPH, it had been agreed "that it would be sensible for each of them to 
coordinate, within their own region, arrangements for the response to chemical incidents locally". 
Whilst it was left to the discretion of the RDsPH, every encouragement was given to ensuring "that 
the provision of any support service from outside the Region (took) into account the fact that 
incidents cross boundaries, and this would quite likely mean that a single service provider would be 
sensible". In short, the Department was retaining the market model of health service provision for 
the fixing of contracts between health authorities and the various support and advisory units, whilst 
at the same time adopting a bureaucratic style to encourage each Region to ensure that its 
constituent health authorities all contracted with the same unit. 
The Department of Health also recognised the need for a coordinating centre, and indicated its 
intention to "develop a framework in order to invite tenders for a 24 hour, 365 day national focus for 
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work on chemical hazards". The initial functions identified for such a focus were "(a) to provide a 
contact number available in the event of an incident, and to direct callers to appropriate sources of 
information and expertise; (b) to ensure regional surveillance arrangements are in place and 
compatible on a nationwide basis; (c) to provide information on relevant training and, perhaps, to 
promote suitable training opportunities; and (d) to maintain a proactive role in identifying needs, and 
to provide a resource to assist with maintaining a consistent approach across the country. " The 
bureaucratic model of health service provision was therefore set to remain at the national level. 
The inference from the communique was that the framework would be developed as a matter of 
priority, but that this did not preclude any regional arrangements for contracting from moving ahead 
of that time-scale. The decision immediately resulted in a flurry of activity in the "marketplace", with 
all four units vying against each other for health authority contracts. However, in reality, the two 
elements of the public health management model progressed in parallel. 
CIMSU 
The suggested regional approach to contracting was followed. For 6 of the 8 regions in England, 
there was little competition between the units, with contracting undertaken on the basis of 
geographical location, and personal and professional contacts. The Centre for Chemical Incidents, 
Birmingham was contracted to provide support and advice to health authorities in the NHS (West 
Midlands) Region through top-sliced funding at Regional level; the Chemical Incident Service, 
Newcastle to health authorities in the NHS (Northern and Yorkshire) Region; and the Chemical 
Incident Response Service, London to health authorities in the NHS Regions of North Thames, 
South Thames, Oxford and East Anglia, and the North West. These decisions were taken over 
differing time-scales, to which the author was not party. 
With respect to CIMSU, the first task for the author was to re-write the service delivery plan, in light 
of PHMEG's specification and having regard to the views of the project advisory group established 
for the SWEHSP. A copy of the revised plan is reproduced at Appendix 7.1. Although the author 
was invited by letter, dated 6 August 1996, to tender for health authority contracts within the NHS 
(Trent) Region, the decision was taken, in conjunction with the Directors of the three centres 
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comprising CIMSU, to confine the service to local and health authorities in Wales and the NHS 
(South and West) Region. On this basis, the author embarked on a series of meetings to market 
the Unit to local and health authorities within these areas. 
In Wales, the Welsh Office took a similar line to that of the NHS Regions in England, enacted by a 
letter from the Chief Medical Officer to the DsPH of the 5 health authorities, suggesting that it might 
be in their collective interests to contract with a single support and advisory unit, such as the one 
located within the principality. The NHS (South and West) Region did likewise, given the pump- 
priming that it had already provided to support the project advisory group, and the marketing of 
CIMSU. However, it soon became apparent that CIMSU was disadvantaged by the fact that it was 
still a developmental unit. Subsidised by funding and manpower from each of its constituent 
centres, the decision was therefore taken to formally launch CIMSU on 9 September 1996. 
Accordingly, a dedicated 24 hour chemical incidents hotline was installed at the Welsh National 
Poisons Unit, and the number distributed to subscribing authorities (at this stage only 12 local 
authorities had contracted with CIMSU). On receipt of a call, the author was immediately paged. 
Contact was then made with the original caller within a target time of 15 minutes. Given the facts of 
the incident, the author either provided direct advice over the telephone, asked Poisons Unit staff to 
fax datasheets on the chemicals of interest to the caller and / or facilitated liaison between the caller 
and appropriate experts within each of the three constituent centres, for example, the staff of the 
Welsh Combined Centres for Public Health in environmental epidemiology. 
In spite of the direction provided by the project advisory group, which met on a quarterly basis 
during 1996, the strong marketing policy of the Chemical Incident Response Service, London and 
the offer of a service at a price £500 less than that of CIMSU soon created problems in securing 
contracts with health authorities in the Region. Eventually, the RDPH had no option but to follow 
the lead of the NHS (Trent) Region and put the contract out to tender. Unfortunately, for CIMSU, 
the contract was won by the London Unit, as was that with health authorities in the Trent Region. 
For reasons that will soon become obvious, the author left his position as "Head" of CIMSU on 31 
January 1997. At this time, 19 local authorities were contracted to the Unit (7 from Wales, 9 from 
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the area of the NHS (South and West) Region and 3 from other parts of England). Gwent health 
authority, one of the 5 health authorities in Wales had also subscribed, with the remainder due to 
join on 1 April 1997. Expressions of interest were also starting to be shown in the Unit by the 4 
Health Boards in Northern Ireland. 
The National Focus 
On 16 August 1996, the Department of Health placed an advertisement in a number of journals, 
inviting "tenders for the operation of a unit to act as a central Focus for work on response to 
chemical incidents and surveillance of possible health effects due to chemicals in the environment" 
(see Appendix 7.2). In accordance with the advertisement, the author registered an interest with 
the Department, on behalf of the WCCPH, to tender for the contract. 
Following a shortlisting process, necessitated by the large number of expressions of interest 
received by the Department of Health, the WCCPH, along with seven other organisations were 
invited to tender for the National Focus. To guide the content of the applications, the Department of 
Health included a paper on the proposed "Scope of Work" of the National Focus within the tender 
documents. This is reproduced at Appendix 7.3. 
The approach adopted by the WCCPH was essentially the same as that for CIMSU, that is, to pool 
the expertise and resources of three existing centres: (a) the Welsh Combined Centres for Public 
Health of the University of Wales College of Medicine in applied public health medicine and 
environmental epidemiology; (b) the Toxicology and Therapeutics Centre of the University of Wales 
College of Medicine in medical, occupational and environmental toxicology; and, (c) the School of 
Environmental Sciences at the then Cardiff Institute of Higher Education in environmental health 
and environmental risk management. 
The author was responsible for preparing the WCCPHs application, which was submitted to the 
Department of Health on the due date of 11 November 1996. Eight days later, the author received 
a letter from the Department of Health, inviting the WCCPH to make a presentation on its bid to a 
tender panel. Two other organisations had also been shortlisted for interview. The presentation 
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took place on 27 November 1996, and three weeks later, an offer was made in writing to the author 
for the WCCPH to enter into a contract with the Department of Health to provide a "National Focus 
for Work on Response to Chemical Incidents and Surveillance of Health Effects of Environmental 
Chemicals". The latter became operational on I February 1997, with the author appointed to the 
position of "Head of National Focus". 
A Public Health Management Model for Acute Chemical Incidents in Wales 
The Welsh Office immediately extended the remit of the National Focus to Wales, and by October 
1997, the Scottish Office Department of Health and the Department of Health and Social Services, 
Northern Ireland had done likewise in respect of their own territories. The model that has been 
developed has therefore been applied throughout the UK, but for the purposes of the last part of this 
Chapter and the next Chapter, the model primarily considered will be that which relates to Wales 
only. 
Figure 7.3 shows the model for Wales. As originally set out in WHC (93)61 (Welsh Office 1993), 
the primary health service responsibility for coordinating the health aspects of response to chemical 
incidents remains with the five health authorities. This includes: 
(a) ensuring that satisfactory plans exist for the health authority response to an incident within 
the general framework of existing local emergency planning arrangements; and 
(b) the designation of an individual responsible for ensuring that the health authority has 
access to the necessary support and advice concerning public health hazards arising from 
chemical incidents. 
The latter individual in all 5 health authorities in Wales is the CCDC. In terms of the advice 
available to health professionals in Wales, in particular, consultants in accident and emergency 
medicine and general practitioners, the Welsh National Poisons Unit (part of the NPIS) still fulfills an 
important role in providing information on the hazardous nature of the chemicals involved in an 
incident and on the diagnosis, treatment and management of any casualties following exposure. 
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Figure 7.3 Public Health Management Model for dealing with Acute Chemical Incidents in Wales 
NATIONAL 
OTHER 
GOVERNMENT 
DEPARTMENTS 
CHEMICAL 
INCIDENT 
MANAGEMENT 
SUPPORT UNIT 
LOCAL 
WELSH OFFICE 
NATIONAL FOCUS 
LOCAL AUTHORITY & 
OTHER LIAISON 
OFFICERS (ex EA) 
POLICE 
lo FIRE 
HAGCCI 
WELSH 
NATIONAL 
POISONS 
UNIT 
HEALTH AUTHORITY 
pl, v IF transportation 
AMBULANCE HOSPITAL 
casualties t4 It 
INCIDENT SCENE 
self-referrals 
GPs 
185 
However, as has been discussed in Chapter 6, this is only part of the advice needed by health 
authorities in being able to effectively respond to the public health aspects of a chemical incident. 
Accordingly, as of 1 April 1997, all have contracted with CIMSU for the provision of a 24 hours a 
day, 365 days a year support and advisory service on the public health, environmental, scientific, 
toxicological and epidemiological aspects of an acute chemical incident. CIMSU also furnishes a 
number of other services. These include: 
(a) assistance with emergency planning; 
(b) maintenance of systems for the surveillance of incidents; and 
(c) preparation and delivery of appropriate training courses and materials. 
The roles of the National Focus are: 
(a) to extend and strengthen the ability of the NHS in Wales to respond effectively to chemical 
incidents, and the possible health effects of chemicals in the environment; 
(b) to provide a telephone contact available 24-hours a day, 365 days a year; 
(c) to provide assistance to the NHS in Wales, with respect to: 
" epidemiological approaches to the assessment of both the short and longer-term health 
effects of chemical incidents; and 
" methods of investigation for identifying the incidence and possible health effects of 
exposure to typical ambient levels of chemical contamination; 
(d) to work closely with all relevant centres of expertise in the UK, for example, the Water 
Research Centre and the National Chemical Emergency Centre; 
(e) to develop a national multi-agency surveillance system for acute chemical incidents in the 
UK, incorporating reports of incidents from CIMSU; 
(f) to maintain a pro-active role in identifying the needs of the NHS in Wales in responding to 
acute chemical incidents; 
(g) to promote joint planning between health interests and other key players locally, such as 
local authorities, the emergency services, and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE); 
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(h) to ensure that the providers of support and other related services (for example CIMSU) to 
health authorities on the border between Wales and England co-ordinate the coverage of 
their services and develop effective liaison; 
(i) to provide information on relevant available training and to promote the development of 
further suitable training, if needed; 
Q) to develop best practice protocols and guidance in areas of work covered by the National 
Focus, for example, criteria for the epidemiological follow-up of acute chemical incidents; 
(k) to take over the responsibility from the Department of Health of activating the Health 
Advisory Group on Chemical Contamination Incidents (HAGCCI). 
Under the new arrangements, when an incident occurs which requires greater expertise than is 
available locally, the CCDC will in the first instance contact CIMSU. Normally, this will enable the 
incident to be dealt with appropriately. If an incident is unusual, particularly complex, or is likely to 
have a major impact on public health, to attract national media attention or to span the Wales / 
England border, the health authority or CIMSU should contact the National Focus. The National 
Focus will then: 
(a) alert officials at Welsh Office (and the Department of Health in the event of a cross-border 
incident), including media relations personnel; 
(b) provide national coordination, if necessary; 
(c) liaise with "Other Government Departments", such as HSE and Environment Agency; 
(d) direct callers to appropriate sources of information and expertise in the UK or elsewhere; 
and, 
(e) advise on circumstances in which HAGCCI can assist and, where the need arises, make 
arrangements for access to the relevant expert(s). 
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Chapter 8- Model Implementation and Evaluation 
Introduction 
The model selected for Wales has been in place since 1 February 1997. It is therefore too early for any 
definitive conclusions to be drawn on the effectiveness or otherwise of the two complementary units that 
have been established. The aim of this Chapter is to review both the progress and the impact that has 
been made in Wales up to 31 March 1998 by the Chemical Incident Management Support Unit (CIMSU) 
and the "National Focus for Work on Response to Chemical Incidents and Surveillance of Health Effects 
of Environmental Chemicals" (hereinafter referred to as the National Focus), and to comment on the 
issues / concerns that have emerged over this fourteen month period. 
Relationship between CIMSU and the National Focus 
As already indicated in Chapter 6, CIMSU had been established and the tender for the National Focus 
prepared, on the basis of collaborative arrangements between the same three centres of expertise. 
However, CIMSU was a commercial unit and the National Focus, a government funded unit. The latter 
therefore had to be seen to be operating independently of CIMSU, with no cross-subsidisation of 
resources; and also equitably towards the other three commercial units in England, and the government 
funded Scottish Centre for Infection and Environmental Health (SCIEH). 
Accordingly, steps were immediately taken to physically separate the two units by location, with 
CIMSU moving from its original base at the University of Wales Institute, Cardiff to the offices of the 
Welsh National Poisons Unit (WNPU) at Llandough Hospital, Cardiff, and the National Focus taking 
up new accommodation at the University. Appointments were also made to each unit, so that they 
were exclusively resourced by their own dedicated complements of "core" staff. However, this did 
not preclude the units from independently accessing the expertise and resources of each of the 
three centres underpinning their existence. For example, both units were able to make use of the 
same environmental epidemiologist(s) within the Welsh Combined Centres for Public Health, or the 
same chemical database resources held at the WNPU. 
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Obviously, as with any new developments, it does take time to make the necessary staff 
appointments and to re-locate office accommodation. Until 1 July 1996, there was therefore not 
such a clear demarcation, as that stated above, between the operational arrangements for the two 
Units, and the author was certainly aware of some allegations levied at the National Focus of cross- 
subsidising resources to CIMSU. This was not the case, but such allegations were an inevitable 
consequence of the market model within which CIMSU was expected to operate. 
The management arrangements established for the two Units were also very different. For CIMSU and 
the National Focus, a "Project Executive Board" and a "Focus Management Executive" respectively were 
set up at the local level. However, to oversee the work of the National Focus and to take full account of 
its UK-wide remit, the Department of Health also brought into existence in April 1997 a national "Steering 
Group". The primary purpose of the Steering Group was to advise the National Focus on the 
development of its work programme, and to monitor the effectiveness and timeliness of its performance 
against objectives and target dates set (copies of the National Focus' Work Programmes for 1997/1998 
and 1998/1999 are included at Appendices 8.1 and 8.2). 
Outside of the Steering Group, which meets biannually, the National Focus has also established an 
informal and regular dialogue with CIMSU and the "Health Professionals Group" at Welsh Office 
during the past fourteen months, to discuss aspects of implementation of the work programme 
within the principality, and also to ascertain other tasks which Welsh Office may wish to take 
forward on a purely territorial basis. 
Chemical Incident Hotlines 
Both CIMSU and the National Focus have operated, on a 24 hours a day, 365 days a year basis, 
chemical incident telephone hotlines since 1 February 1997. Under an agreement reached at that 
time between the management boards of the two units, details of all calls received on the CIMSU 
hotline in relation to acute chemical incidents occurring within the principality, however trivial, were 
required to be immediately drawn to the attention of staff of the National Focus, in order for them to 
be able to effectively fulfil their alerting and briefing role for Welsh Office. On a reciprocal basis, any 
calls received on the National Focus hotline relating to acute chemical incidents within the 
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principality or which had been picked up by the media vigilance activities of Focus staff were to be 
immediately forwarded to CIMSU. 
CIMSU 
Number of Incidents 
A total of 48 calls were received by CIMSU on their hotline during the period 1 February 1997 to 31 
March 1998, of which 37 related to acute chemical incidents. The remainder mainly comprised of 
enquiries regarding the significance of chronic levels of pollution in the environment, for example, 
the potential health risks associated with residing close to areas of contaminated land or alleged 
clusters of illness in communities linked to controlled discharges from industry to the environment. 
Although outwith the scope of this thesis, there is evidence to suggest an increasing trend in the 
receipt of this type of enquiry by not only CIMSU, but the other 4 advisory and support units 
(including SCIEH) in the UK. If this is the case, then the Units are not currently resourced to handle 
this type of enquiry, which may be an issue for the National Focus to consider and raise with the 
Department of Health and, likewise, in relation to Wales, with Welsh Office. 
Sources of Enquiry / Notification 
Of the 37 calls received in relation to acute chemical incidents, the most frequent source was the 
unit with which CIMSU was co-located, that is, WNPU (N = 11). These all related to calls received 
by WNPU from Accident and Emergency Departments, who were in the process of providing 
medical care to those suffering from symptoms of exposure to chemical incidents. Eight calls were 
received respectively from local authority Environmental Health Departments, HA Departments of 
Public Health, and the National Focus, with two calls relating to local authority simulation exercises 
making up the total. Those incidents notified to CIMSU by the National Focus included 5 identified 
through media vigilance, 2 queries raised by Welsh Office from their own media vigilance, and 1 
alert from the Health and Safety Executive. 
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Nature and Location of Incidents 
The most frequently recorded types of incident were chemical spills (N = 16) and airborne releases (N =10), 
followed by fires (N = 4) and explosions (N = 3). The remainder consisted of I potable water contamination 
incident, I food contamination incident and 2 incidents where there was no release. Incidents most 
commonly originated at operational industrial sites (N = 13), although only 2 at CIMAH sites, and at 
commercial premises (N = 5). The remainder included sewers (N = 3), educational establishments (N = 3) 
and open public spaces (N = 3). Only three incidents were transportation-related, 2 following road traffic 
accidents and the other on the railway. The latter had the potential to be a very major incident, involving the 
derailment of a tanker containing 60 tonnes of vinyl chloride monomer in a residential area. More than 1,000 
residents were evacuated for 2 days, but fortunately there was no release. 
Public Health Impact 
There were no deaths attributed to the incidents recorded, and in 16 of the incidents, there were no 
people with symptoms. Of the remainder, only 4 resulted in symptoms in 5 or more people. The 
maximum number of people with symptoms in any one incident was 20. 
Chemicals Involved 
Thirty-five of the 37 incidents involved the release of a single chemical. In the other 2 incidents, 2 
and 3 chemicals respectively were released. Asbestos, chlorine, ammonia, pesticides and petrol 
were those chemicals / chemical products most frequently released in the incidents recorded. 
Nature of Advice Sought 
In relation to 16 of the 28 incidents (the other nine calls to CIMSU were no more than notifications of 
incidents from the National Focus), advice was primarily sought by the caller on the hazardous 
properties of the chemicals involved, in order to support their risk assessment decisions at the time 
of the incident. The other main types of advice requested can be grouped as follows: medical 
toxicology, for the treatment of people with symptoms (N = 15); environmental sampling and 
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monitoring (N = 15); biological sampling (N = 8); risk management (N = 7), for example, on the need 
for evacuation; environmental rehabilitation (N = 5); and epidemiology (N = 3). 
Other Actions Taken 
From the above analysis of the "sources of enquiry / notification" of incidents to CIMSU, it would 
appear that, in spite of the introduction of the "Welsh Health Circulars" in 1993, and the findings of 
the AWEHSP, CsCDC of HAs in Wales are still not involved in many of the incidents that occur 
within the principality. In the author's opinion, one of the most important roles that CIMSU has 
fulfilled in the past fourteen months is to immediately alert the relevant on-call CCDC to any acute 
chemical incident known to the unit to be occurring within their respective areas. This has served to 
galvanise CsCDC in Wales to get more involved with other local response agencies in the 
management of the public health aspects of acute chemical incidents, and also to enable them to 
do so armed with the relevant toxicological, environmental and public health advice. 
National Focus 
The roles of the National Focus, on being alerted to an acute chemical incident, are as outlined in Chapter 7. 
The 37 acute chemical incidents that have occurred in Wales over the past fourteen months represent 
exactly 37% of the 100 incidents reported to the National Focus from all sources in the UK during this period 
(primarily notified by the five advisory and support units). The main role of the National Focus in relation to 
the incidents in Wales has been to consider the likely political ramifications of each for the Welsh Office 
Health Department, and where necessary, to alert and provide written briefings for the use of their public 
health professionals and media liaison officers. In this respect, the National Focus has alerted Welsh Office 
to 22 of the 37 incidents, and provided written briefings in relation to 12 of the incidents. 
One of the other roles of the National Focus' chemical incidents telephone hotline is to act as a 
back-up resource to the front-line role of CIMSU, should the latter not be contactable or advice is 
required above and beyond that available from the unit. Over the fourteen month period under 
evaluation, no such calls were received on the National Focus hotline, suggesting the effective 
operation of the CIMSU hotline and the satisfaction of callers with the advice received. 
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Relationships with other Advisory and Support Units 
The Future of CIMSU 
In the author's opinion, one of the biggest threats to the future of the existing model in Wales is the 
sustainability of CIMSU. In having to compete in the marketplace for contracts with HAs, including 
those in Wales, the unit has a very low income base. On 1 April 1997, CIMSU held contracts with 5 
Health Authorities (£3000 each) and 19 local authorities in Wales and England (£1200 each), 
enabling the employment of just '1 full-time dedicated member of staff. Although the situation has 
improved slightly with additional contracts having been negotiated with other local authorities in 
Wales and with the 4 health boards in Northern Ireland, this member of staff has been on call 24 
hours a day, 365 days a year for the last fourteen months, which is untenable. 
Additional pressure is placed on CIMSU by the fact that all the contracts are renewable on an 
annual basis, which means that there is little security of tenure for the current member of staff or 
any likelihood of attracting new members of staff to the unit. Already, there is anecdotal evidence of 
a competitive marketing strategy by one of the other advisory and support units in relation to the 
contracts held by CIMSU with local authority Environmental Health Departments. 
This is where the author's preferred model, which was outlined in Chapter 7, would have benefited 
the smaller units, such as CIMSU. With contracts of at least three years' duration and a more 
equitable distribution of contracting HAs per unit, CIMSU and likewise the other three units in 
England would each have had a sustainable resource base. As it now stands, CIMSU will continue 
to be under threat from the retention of the market model of health service provision. 
Handling of Cross-Boundary Incidents 
The other issue of concern, with respect to the market model of health service provision, was that 
competition between the four advisory and support units might not lead to harmonised working in 
the event of an incident crossing the boundary between the respective operational areas of two 
separate units. For example, if an explosion and fire was to occur today in Avonmouth, Bristol and 
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the resulting smoke plume was to drift across the River Severn to Gwent in Wales, the Chemical 
Incident Response Service, London would provide advice and support to Avon HA, and CIMSU 
likewise to Gwent HA. However, there would be an additional complication, in that CIMSU also 
holds a contract with the Environmental Health Department of Bristol City Council, whose 
jurisdiction lies within the area of Avon HA. 
This is therefore where the coordinating role of the National Focus comes into effect. Since I 
February 1997, the National Focus has generally built up good, working relationships with all four of 
the advisory and support units in England and Wales, and also SCIEH in Scotland, and now chairs 
a regular meeting with the "Heads" of these units. Under consideration at the next meeting of this 
group will be the need to formulate plans for the handling of cross-regional incidents, where more 
than one unit may be involved. As part of this process, discussions will also be held on the benefits 
of securing improved harmonisation of the information contained within the chemical data sheets 
issued by the various units, in incident management situations. 
Surveillance 
The National Focus was also given responsibility on 1 February 1997 for the development and 
maintenance of a national surveillance system for acute chemical incidents in the UK. This was 
intended to build on the experiences of the All Wales Environmental Health Surveillance Project 
(AWEHSP) and those of other systems that had subsequently evolved in the NHS (West Midlands) 
Region and in Scotland. To guide this programme of activity, the National Focus has therefore 
during the past year: 
(a) undertaken a systematic review and evaluation of existing surveillance systems in the UK 
and overseas. A number of systems were identified, including examples of good practice. 
However, none afforded complete coverage of the UK, and their status varied from fully 
operational to pilot systems; and 
(b) convened a working group of all interested parties to discuss and reach agreement on: (a) 
the aims and objectives of any proposed surveillance system; (b) the minimum dataset 
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required; (c) the reporting formats to be used; and (d) the most appropriate mechanisms for 
data reporting, analysis and dissemination of lessons learned. Those participating in the 
working group discussions have included representatives from each of the five advisory 
and support units in the UK (incl. CIMSU), the Ambulance Services Association, National 
Chemical Emergency Centre, Health and Safety Executive, Environment Agency, Marine 
Pollution Control Unit, the NHS (Yorkshire and Northern) Region and Welsh Office. 
Key features of the proposed surveillance system include: 
(a) the development of multi-agency surveillance systems by each of the five advisory and support 
units; in this respect, CIMSU is progressing well with the evolution of a system for Wales; 
(b) the monthly submission of an agreed minimum data set to the National Focus; 
(C) the analysis of data and dissemination of regular reports to an agreed distribution list; 
(d) the cross-referencing of incidents to reports received from other national sources, for 
example, the National Chemical Emergency Centre, to evaluate the sensitivity and validity 
of the national and regional systems developed; and 
(e) the provision of a sub-set of the national data to the WHO Collaborating Centre for an 
International Clearing House for Major Chemical Incidents, Cardiff. 
On 1 April 1998, the Department of Health Steering Group gave their approval for the surveillance 
system to be piloted over the next 12 months. 
The National Focus has also developed, in association with the Ambulance Services Association, a 
surveillance system for the reporting of acute chemical incidents by ambulance service trusts in the 
United Kingdom. The aims of the project, which is being funded by the Department of Health's 
Emergency Planning Co-ordination Unit, are: (a) to increase awareness of ambulance services 
personnel to the hazards arising from response to acute chemical incidents; (b) to review the 
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effectiveness of decontamination and personal protection procedures employed by ambulance 
services personnel in responding to chemical incidents; and (c) to guide the development of 
appropriate training materials, methodologies and courses for ambulance services personnel and 
others working within the NHS. Surveillance of acute chemical incidents for this project will again 
commence on 1 April 1998. 
Emergency Planning 
Both CLMSU and the National Focus targeted emergency planning as one of their respective key 
areas of activity during the past fourteen months. In this respect, the "Heads" of each of the units 
have been fully involved in supporting the Welsh Collaboration for Health and Environment in the 
development of a "Model Plan for dealing with Acute Chemical Incidents in Wales". This was 
officially launched on 11 June 1998. 
On a similar theme, in April 1997, the National Focus was asked by the Department of Health's 
Emergency Planning Co-ordination Unit (EPCU) to take the project lead on the revision of Chapter 
9- Health Service Arrangements for Dealing with Chemical Incidents, as part of a fundamental 
review of major incident guidance in the NHS. It is anticipated that a draft version of the completed 
guidance will be issued for wider consultation within the next few months, with a view to publication 
later in the year. The Chapter will also be adapted for Welsh Office. 
Staff of the National Focus have also represented the Department of Health on two consultative 
committees of the Health and Safety Executive, established to consider strategies for the 
implementation of the new Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Directive; and also on 
various consultative fora and technical groups of the Coastguard Agency, which is currently revising 
the "National Contingency Plan for Pollution from Shipping and Offshore Installations". 
Training 
As part of its contractual obligations to subscribing authorities, CIMSU has developed and run two 
desktop exercises during the past fourteen months. Both were well received by the target 
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audiences, and it was encouraging to see a mix of CsCDC and Environmental Health Officers at the 
training days. The National Focus was involved in an observer capacity for the first of the two 
training days. 
The role of the National Focus is to provide information on relevant available training and to 
promote the development of further suitable training, if needed. In this respect, the National Focus 
has just completed a "training analysis review" of courses, methodologies and materials currently 
available to the health sector both in the UK and overseas, where the content of all or part of the 
syllabi relate to public health aspects of the management of chemical incidents. 
The review will then provide a basis for discussion over the forthcoming year with the professional 
faculties and other interested parties towards the development, where necessary, of a range of 
accredited courses, materials and methodologies for CsCDC and other health professionals both 
within and outwith the NHS. 
From 9-11 March 1998, the National Focus also hosted, in collaboration with the WHO 
Collaborating Centre for an International Clearing House for Major Chemical Incidents and the 
International Programme on Chemical Safety, an "International Training Conference on Chemical 
Incidents" . 
The aim of the Conference was to highlight the importance of improved inter-agency 
working to protect the health of emergency responders and the public. Held in Cardiff, the 
Conference attracted over 100 delegates from a range of disciplines and agencies. 
Best Practice Protocols 
Two areas of activity have been identified, to date, for the development of best practice protocols: 
(a) the need for criteria to guide decisions on the likely efficacy of conducting epidemiological follow- 
up of a particular chemical incident, and (b) guidance on how to communicate risk to the public / 
media at the time of a chemical incident. These will be taken forward as part of the work 
programme for 1998 / 1999. 
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HAGCCI Secretariat and Activation 
In June 1997, the Department of Health passed responsibility for activation of the HAGCCI advisory 
system to the National Focus. Since that time, no calls have been received from any of the 5 DsPH 
of HAs in Wales or from the Chief Medical Officer for Wales requesting activation. Likewise, no 
such requests have been received from similar professionals in England, Scotland or Northern 
Ireland. With the advent of the various support and advisory units, together with the coordinating 
function of the National Focus, it may be that the HAGCCI advisory system is no longer required. In 
this respect, the National Focus has been asked, as part of its work programme for 1998/1999, to 
review the existing system in light of current developments, and to make appropriate 
recommendations for the consideration of the four government health departments (including Welsh 
Office), and the three standing members of the HAGCCI core panel. 
Better Health, Better Wales 
Finally, both CIMSU and the National Focus have contributed to the Welsh Office's green paper on 
"Better Health, Better Wales", which states that: 
A number of organisations will also provide the National Assembly for Wales with excellent 
resources to ensure that Wales manages well the health aspects of emergency and long- 
term incidents involving dangerous substances. These include the National Focus for 
Chemical Incidents ... and the Chemical incident Management Support Unit. (Welsh Office 1998) 
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Chapter 9- Conclusions and Recommendations 
In answer to the original aim of the project, the establishment of a national coordinating and a 
regional advisory and support structure for dealing with acute chemical incidents was considered to 
be warranted for Wales and accordingly, a public health management model was developed for its 
provision. The model has been in place since 1 February 1997. It is therefore too early to draw any 
definitive conclusions regarding its utility, but in its first fourteen months of operation, the model has 
made a constructive contribution to the enhancement of local and national arrangements for the 
public health management of acute chemical incidents within the principality. 
This is important, as advances in chemical technology will continue to occur in Wales, as they will in 
all parts of the world. As demonstrated by the results of the All Wales Environmental Health 
Surveillance Project, and the review of the first fourteen months of activity of the public health 
management model, in spite of improved prevention and state of the art safety management 
systems in industry, inadvertent chemical releases are still common occurrences in Wales. 
Although most do not give rise to any harm to human health or the environment, public health 
professionals are invariably faced with problematic health risk assessments from an increasingly 
informed and concerned public. Ensuring that such professionals have access to the best advice 
available on a 24 hours a day, 365 days a year basis is therefore critical. This, in essence, is the 
rationale behind the model that has been developed. 
As anticipated at the outset, an important factor in the very completion of this research was the 
decision taken to seek solutions, at all stages, to the potential barriers that might exist in effecting 
implementation of any model developed, by both public health policy and decision makers. One of 
the major obstacles to progress was in overcoming the narrow view held by the traditional 
emergency responders of the role of public health in the management of acute chemical incidents. 
In the author's opinion, this may partly be explained by the evolution of definitions and conceptual 
models of public health. Although characterised by a wealth of intellectual traditions, the field is still 
over-shadowed by clinical medicine and biomedical research. Allied with lack of powers, resources 
and training in the field of non-communicable environmental hazards, such public health 
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professionals have in the past been unable to undertake the necessary inter-sectoral collaboration 
to break into the classical command and control structure of incident management. 
The downside of seeking solutions to such perceived barriers was that the research was very often 
guided by the politics of the National Health Service (NHS) and of the three health interest groups: 
the professional monopolisers, the corporate rationalisers and the community interest. The path the 
research has followed has therefore taken many different turns, which have been recounted in 
previous chapters. 
With the occurrence of acute chemical incidents such as aluminium contamination of water supplies 
at Lowermoor and the sudden emergence of a cluster of cases of aplastic anaemia in children in 
Cardiff, it was understandable that the Department of Health and Welsh Office had to be seen to be 
addressing public concerns about environmental hazards. In response, they therefore increased 
the roles and responsibilities of health authorities, and made the latter more accountable for the 
protection of the health of populations potentially exposed to chemical hazards within their 
respective areas. In Wales, the Welsh Office quite rightly recognised that in doing so, they needed 
to better define the size of the problem of acute chemical incidents within the principality and also 
attempt to identify the additional expertise and resource requirements of public health professionals 
involved in the management of such incidents. 
Given the limitations of chemical incident database resources for this type of evaluation and the 
general paucity of data on acute chemical incidents in the scientific literature, the only way to 
achieve these objectives was to develop a surveillance system. 
The All Wales Environmental Health Surveillance Project (AWEHSP) was the first active, 
geographically defined, community-based surveillance system to be set up in Europe, and has 
clearly demonstrated that relevant data on acute chemical incidents can be collected, collated and 
analysed to guide the actions of public health policy makers. The benefits of a multi-agency 
surveillance system were also highlighted, with little overlap in the incidents reported by the various 
reporting agencies. 
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The AWEHSP showed that acute chemical incidents were common in Wales. A total of 642 
incidents were reported from all sources over the three year duration of the project. Of the 270 
incidents reported by local authority Environmental Health Departments, most were chemical spills 
(28%) or airborne releases (22%), and 75% occurred outside operational industrial premises. A 
total of 237,991 people were exposed in the 214 incidents for which information was available, 
although few suffered symptoms (528 people in 57 incidents). A single chemical was implicated in 
86% of releases. An integrated emergency management approach was largely adopted, with inter- 
sectoral collaboration between many different agencies, dependent on the nature of the incident. 
However, in only 10% of incidents was there any health authority involvement, suggesting that, 
even with the prescription of new roles and responsibilities, Consultants in Communicable Disease 
Control (CsCDC) were still not being alerted, or taking part in the response to incidents. A further 
issue of relevance to health authorities was that in only one of the 270 incidents reported was any 
kind of formal epidemiological follow-up undertaken. 
The usefulness and cost-effectiveness of the AWEHSP was also clearly demonstrated, but whilst 
the system exhibited qualities of simplicity and flexibility, there were concerns regarding the 
sensitivity and specificity of the "definition of an incident" used, the acceptability and timeliness of 
the system, and the representativeness of the data collected. These should be taken forward as 
lessons in the development of any future surveillance systems, including that proposed by the 
National Focus within its current work programme. 
The AWEHSP concluded that, based on the results of the surveillance system and the outcomes of 
discussions held with individual reporting officers, and delegates at a two-day conference, that 
consideration should be given to the development of a centralised advisory and support unit to 
complement the activities of the Welsh National Poisons Unit (WNPU), in providing assistance to 
public health professionals in Wales in managing acute chemical incidents. 
The preferred evolution of that system would have been as a developmental project for Wales, and 
possibly the NHS (South and West) Region (the latter on the basis that the WNPU was already 
contracted by the Department of Health to provide medical management advice to health 
professionals within the Region). However, the marketplace politics of the NHS and the increasing 
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presence of other professionals with expertise to offer in the field meant that the Department of 
Health, supported by Welsh Office and the other two government health departments, had to take a 
strategic view of the situation, both to ensure that they had access to the best available advice to 
discharge their own responsibilities and to bring some coordination to any network of support that 
was developed. 
In the author's opinion, the conduct of the «Study of Activity on Public Health Effects of 
Environmental Chemicals in the Environment" was the right way forward, as it ensured that all 
relevant parties, both within and outwith the NHS, had an opportunity to express their concerns and 
opinions on the gaps in current provision and on the nature of any model that was to be developed. 
However, the final model chosen was not the author's preferred model. There was agreement 
between the latter model and the one selected that the primary health service responsibility should 
rest at the local level, in line with national policy on emergency planning. There was also 
agreement that there was a need for a national, coordinating centre: (a) to act as a source of 
alerting and briefing to the Department of Health, Welsh Office etc., (b) to coordinate and harmonise 
the activities of the five advisory and support units, and (c) to provide the necessary evidence-base 
for the public health management of acute chemical incidents through programmes of surveillance, 
training, and emergency planning, and best practice protocol development. The difference of 
opinion was in leaving the contracting of advisory and support units by health authorities to the 
marketplace. In the preferred model, there would have be an equitable distribution of fee-paying 
health authorities, based on NHS Regions in England and Wales as a whole, between the four 
emerging units. This model would have been retained for a period of three years to guarantee the 
sustainability of the units and to encourage harmonised working, under the coordinating umbrella of 
the national centre. 
In contrast, the model selected left this aspect to the marketplace, resulting in the rapid 
monopolisation of 6 out of the 8 regions in England by one unit, and concerns over potential 
difficulties in these now competitive units working together in the event of a cross-regional incident. 
These are matters currently being addressed by the National Focus. 
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With respect to the model in Wales, there are concerns regarding the future sustainability of the 
Chemical Incident Management Support Unit (CIMSU), given its small share of the market. 
However, during the past fourteen months, the unit has operated very effectively in the performance 
of both its reactive incident support roles and proactively, with respect to emergency planning, 
surveillance and training. Likewise, the National Focus has met all of its targets for year 1, as 
measured against the work programme set by the Department of Health Steering Group. 
The research has therefore achieved the aim set in the introduction. Only one recommendation is 
made and that is for a full evaluation of the selected model to be performed at the end of three 
years. 
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